Daily Report

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President Alia Departs for Visit to Italy

AU2110143891 Tirana ATA in English 1304 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Tirana, October 21 (ATA)—The president of the Republic of Albania, Ramiz Alia, left on October 21 on a working visit to Italy at the invitation of the president of the Italian Republic, Francesco Cossiga.

The president was seen off at the Rinas Airport by the chairman of the Presidency of the People's Assembly, Kastriot Islami; the vice chairman of this Presidency, Lush Perpali; the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ylli Bufi; the vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, Zydi Pepa; the minister of foreign affairs, Muhamet Kapllani, etc.

On this visit, President Ramiz Alia is accompanied by the minister of trade and tourism, Agim Mero; the vice minister of foreign affairs, Ilir Bocka; the chief of the Cabinet of the President, Vladimir Meci; as well as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Italian Republic in Tirana, Torquato Cardilli.

Talks With Polish Foreign Ministry Delegation

AU2110144291 Tirana ATA in English 0906 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Tirana, October 21 (ATA)—On October 20, negotiations were held at the Foreign Ministry between the delegation of the Republic of Poland, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Iwo Biczewski, and the Albanian delegation, headed by the deputy foreign minister, Ilir Bocka.

Bilateral relations occupied an important place in these negotiations. They pointed out that besides traditional trade it is useful to find out new forms of cooperation in fields of mutual interest. Negotiation also concentrated on the current European processes, the relations with neighbours, as well as the recent developments in Yugoslavia. As for the Yugoslav crisis, they aired the view that the solution to the problems there should have in essence the principle of self-determination of the peoples attained through peaceful and democratic means.

Bufi Meets Trade Unionists From Oil Industry

AU2110163091 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] This morning, Prime Minister Ylli Bufi met representatives of the Independent Trade Union of Oil Workers, led by its chairman, Mentor Xhemalaj, and Skender Elbasani, a member of its Managing Committee.

In reply to their demands, Prime Minister Ylli Bufi told them about the main paths of the development of the economic reform in our country. He said that the government's platform for the reform, to be submitted to the People's Assembly today, sets out the logic of the reform and lays down its main directions—privatization, price liberalization, and the liberalization of the management of state enterprises. The package of laws to be discussed by the legislature also paves the way for and supports this reform. After explaining to the trade union representatives the government's vision of this reform and the difficulties that must be confronted while it is carried out, the prime minister underlined that the government will also bear in mind those aspects that relate to workers' vital interests. The steps we will take to liberalize prices, to close loss-making enterprises, and so forth will be conditioned by reality, the financial resources that will be secured at home and abroad, the aim to limit as far as possible the pains of the transition period, and so forth. However, it must be borne in mind that it is the real resources of our economy, which is at present in a very difficult situation, that determine the government's social policy. As the economic situation improves, social and economic support will be expanded.

The prime minister underlined that the government thinks the road to achieving economic stability and growth lies only through the reform.

The representatives of the Independent Trade Union of Oil Workers then expressed their concern at the slow pace in introducing the market economy to their industry; the low level of prospecting, drilling, and production technology; the organization of scientific oil studies; and the need to renew managers in the oil industry.

After considering their demands as fair, Prime Minister Ylli Bufi spoke about the prospects that will be opened to this industry of national importance by the implementation of the reform and the arrival of foreign firms and capital, up-to-date technology, and so forth.

After thanking the prime minister for the candid talk, the representatives of the Independent Trade Unions of Oil Workers expressed their unreserved support for the government's program and stressed that they entirely agree that the reform, as the only way of emerging from the economic crisis and reviving the economy, should start immediately.

Pashko Interviewed on Economic Reform

AU1710060191 Tirana ZERI I RINISE in Albanian 14 Sep 91 pp 2, 4

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Gramoz Pashko by Ilir Kadia; place and date not given: "I Carry the Cross of the Reforms on My Back"]

[Text] [Kadia] You are known to our public as "the man with three roles." What role would you prefer for our talk, that of deputy prime minister, party activist, or Pashko the intellectual?

[Pashko] Definitely the third.

[Kadia] You spoke first at the youth seminar on 7 September on the unannounced topic "Nevermore Communism" [English in original]. What would you reply if you were asked: Communism is dead. Shall we bury or embalm it?

[Pashko] If it really has died, let us bury it as soon as possible. Embalm it? No. It would be continually in front of our eyes like Lenin.... In any case, the establishment of a market economy in Albania will be its death knell.

[Kadia] You have said, "For me, as a technocrat, there is only one way of moving to a market economy," and have used the expression of the Bolivian De Perera, "You cannot cut off a cat's tail in segments." Can you enlarge on that idea?

[Pashko] Why can you not "cut off a cat's tail in segments"? In other words, why can reforms not be introduced gradually? Because reforms are interdependent. The aim is to create a market economy. That means recognizing at the same time the right to private property and free competition. Otherwise, private property has no meaning. It must also be accompanied by liberalized prices because, if prices are distorted, squeezed, or fossilized by some kind of administration, then there is no way of realizing either competition, private property, or even people's individuality and freedom. That means that all those measures must be taken immediately and together. Each of them has its own consequences. For example, if I introduce private property, I must at the same time change the entire system of legislation for organizing an enterprise, the relations between employers and employees and among workers themselves, and pay. Thus, one aspect of the reform requires another.

Second, it is necessary to allow competition. How will enterprises establish relations with each other? In that case, too, there must be legislative changes.

Third, prices must necessarily be liberalized in order to permit competition and to give opportunities for profit to the most able and to those who produce goods of quality at a suitable price. That means, at the same time, taking measures regarding bank interest rates, the calculation of profits, accountancy, and statistics, so that all of those changes become a whole package of steps and interventions that are carried out all at once. Carrying out only one of them carries the risk of their all degenerating and distorting the entire operation. The reform therefore demands a thorough and total intervention.

The speculation current today, especially in the communist press, against my idea of a full, total, and immediate reform is fear of "shock therapy." I do not want to embark on psychological explanations of why people do not want "shock therapy" and why some of those people speculate on its possible consequences. It seems to me that gradual, distorted, and partial reforms would involve worse consequences. The case of Russia is an example of that. Yet speculation exists, alongside other reasons connected with the fear of some and the insecurity of others, who, infected by their privileges, sinecures, and the cronyism of the old system, will lose those things and will not have time to adapt immediately. People should not be frightened by the phrase "shock therapy." It is a form of therapy that takes place instantly, in one blow. In some countries of the East, such as the CSFR, the economy was well developed and prosperous. Vaclav Klaus, when he intervened, was forced to stir up the waters in order to see where the weaknesses were. That has now been done in Albania. The economic crisis is evident.

For us, the problem can be solved by removing subsidies from enterprises and letting them compete. That frees resources for pay, sorting out those enterprises that are no longer capable from the others that remain. Those that are capable make profits, and those that are not incur losses. That "shock," that removal of the sum of money we used for subsidies (that is, paying for the losses of enterprises that produced nothing for us), creates certain funds that were formerly used to even up those incapable firms to the level of successful ones. That fund or common pot goes to make up what is called social assistance. It serves as a channel of communication between those who lose their jobs and those who start them again. People receive money from that common fund until they are requalified and adjust to the new structure.

We have carried out macroeconomic calculations, and, as for the consequences, I would say that we have exaggerated them. I can say that the pain will be less, much less than was anticipated, because we are today much more able to use the aid and the credit we are receiving. Some years ago, I said at an international seminar at the time when we were asking for aid from Germany that, if they gave us $2 billion, we would not know what to do with it. However, we have now reached the stage in which, even if they give us less, we will know how to use it properly. I therefore say that the reform will be less painful. Therefore, "shock therapy" frightens people more because of the propaganda noise created by party interests than because of the specific solutions the government is offering.

[Kadia] At the seminar I mentioned earlier, you preferred to concentrate and enlarge at length on the danger posed to democracy by neocommunism and populism. Why are you so frightened?

[Pashko] Those two dangers are genuinely present. I am frightened because the world's bitter experience justifies that fear. Populism especially appeared in Latin America during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Democracy degenerated into populism and turned again into dictatorship, as in the famous disappeared. What does populism mean? It implies that the laws and the rules do not create democracy. Unfortunately, democracy is at first very weak and has no defense. It is its own defense. Weak as it is, it is constructed on a system of laws and logical rules that people hold in common but

that is extremely sensitive to violence. The first form of violence against it is failure to respect those rules and laws of the game of democracy, when street forces begin to lay down the laws of democracy. Democracy is finished if the authorities that should defend democracy—that is, the legislature, which makes its laws; the government, which is its guardian; and the judiciary, which is its third level—begin to obey and subject themselves to the logic of the streets and not the logic of the laws. As a result, people lose faith in democracy, politicians, the legislature, and the law itself. It is therefore clear that people will look for another external force to establish order in Albania. That is populism. The second danger is neocommunism. I consider neocommunism to be a form of communism that has only shed the name of communism and continues to be the same as communism in its essence and its operational and institutional system. That means preserving the same system, the same rules, and the same laws and changing only some people. That is a very great danger for us because it is tied to the previous question. Will we go through with the pain of reform? When the moment comes to make a choice, sick people prefer to remain sick than to undergo an operation, and prefer to suffer pain than to undergo the removal of that pain. That happens in this case, too. When people are told that they will make a small sacrifice, they do not want to accept that. They then inevitably lapse into neocommunism. They say: It is over. The dictatorship has disappeared. Now let us remain as we were. They forget that changes must be made in the entire system of institutions, the economy, and democracy as a whole. It must be realized that the system itself generates dictatorship and that, under a dictatorship, people are moved like pieces on a chessboard.

Those are therefore two great dangers that grow like mushrooms after rain. Albania is virgin territory, but burned and scorched by dictatorship. Only a little rain is enough to make those mushrooms sprout. The rain that came with democracy fertilized all those forces, giving birth to honest forces but also to parasitical mushrooms, and so forth. The important thing is to group together healthy forces and to continue to advance. Then the recovering health of the body itself will eliminate those dangerous forces of neocommunism and populism. Specifically, there is a whiff of neocommunism in the war the political parties are waging against the state.

[Kadia] Without distinction?

[Pashko] Without distinction. There must be a clear division between the state and the political parties. That is a necessary condition for societies going through a transition phase: The state has its own job to do, and the government is given a mandate and continues to carry out the reform without being distracted by interference from left and right. Such behavior smacks of neocommunism. It also happens in the case of other nonpolitical forces and associations that exist in Albania.

Populism often appears among people on the street. Major difficulties are being encountered in privatization because people want to privatize according to the logic of the moment, failing to realize that the best way is the one that yields the fruits that we anticipate over a long-term period but will be a real solution and will benefit everyone.

[Kadia] What is your opinion of certain people who advocate advancing the election date?

[Pashko] We must decide everything with a proper balance. There are advantages and disadvantages to advancing the election date, as certain political circles in Albania advocate. The advantage is that it would give the people an opportunity to reflect better on the country's political structure. However, are we sure that political transformations in Albania have now crystallized? Or are they still in the process of doing so? If they have crystallized, let us go to the polls and "render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's." However, if the political forces have not crystallized, the need to decide once again will arise. From the point of view of the executive power and the economy, advancing the elections would hamper the reform because reforms need time. The ground has been prepared quite well for fully crystallizing the reform in September and October and to set it on the right lines. Albania will receive a considerable sum from the EEC and the Group of 24 in the middle of September, which will have to be administered well and in an orderly manner.

[Kadia] Are hopes high for 17 September and 16 October?

[Pashko] Certainly. In my view, the Brussels conference will depend on us, on the extent to which we are able to put forward Albania's needs for aid and the extent to which Albania is able to absorb that aid. It is not enough to merely beg. It is important to be able to show what priorities you will give to that aid and to show that you are able to reform the economy and absorb that aid. The second point is the most vital one, and it depends on us. It is clear that aid will be forthcoming if we are able to make a good impression, to outline clearly the reforms we have carried out and intend to carry out, and to show that we are serious about the matter. We will join the IMF on 16 October, and that is a key to our further advance. By joining the IMF, we will be able to secure foreign investments (the IMF supports them). We will be able to ensure the convertibility of our currency, which is the basis of all foreign investments and of the repatriation of the profits that foreign investors earn. That means that, in mid-October, Albania will offer full security for integration in Europe and the free world and will show that the reforms have really been made irreversible because they so far exist on paper.

[Kadia] Once again, in your own words: "Communism in Albania was an association of friends, not of ideologies." Does pluralism remind you of that in any way?

[Pashko] Unfortunately, it is still the same. Communism in Albania had no roots as an ideology. It was more a clan of friends who ruled for 46 years through personal acquaintance and ties of that kind, and through the arbitrariness and subjectivity of those connections. Communism in Albania was not a manifestation of that pure, original, "sui generis" ideology of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and I don't know who else, but involved elements of Albanian patriarchalism, Albanian paternalism, and Chinese, Vietnamese, and Third World elements. All those elements led to an ideology that could not so much be called communism as communism with a national coloring. It is therefore very hard to totally eradicate that communism, however easy it may have been to bring down. It is compounded of local and indigenous elements. The situation is not the same as in the CSFR and Hungary, where communism was separate and distinct from the country's spiritual and cultural life. Communism settled down in Albania and was called the best national solution. That is where the problem lies.

[Kadia] After the ebb of the Kadare-Agolli "war" in literature in the 1970's and 1980's, the 1990's have begun with the Nano-Pashko rivalry in the economy. What kind of person is Nano to you?

[Pashko] Nano is an intellectual with whom I am not at war. I am at war with the mistakes of his government. Many of the mistakes we encounter are those of his government. Nano's government—and this even started in the time of Mr. Carcani's government—embarked on an economic reform that to my mind was dilettante. It gave rise to spontaneous privatization. The consequences are obvious.

Today's open conflict between workers and managers in enterprises is the consequence of that confusion. This government created conditions for arbitrary privatization in the countryside, whose consequences we are obliged to face today. It created conditions for arbitrariness and serious mistakes in the manner in which foreign investment was to be brought to Albania, whose consequences we have still not repaired today. That means that Nano embarked on an ill-considered reform. We, therefore, who wish to reorientate and redirect ourselves, are obliged to repair those consequences. In that sense, regardless of the qualities he may possess as an intellectual and an economist, Nano and his government, in practice, perhaps also because of the circumstances that arose, made many errors in the manner in which that transition was to be accomplished. The government was not a success. I am only talking about its technical aspect.

[Kadia] An expression taken from the Italian press describing the National Stability Government is circulating among the public. It runs: "Mr. Bufi's government, led by Mr. Pashko..." Who were you thinking of when you said last Saturday that "the good socialists in the government tidied up and ruined our work!"?

[Pashko] It is Bufi's government, not Pashko's. In my view, Bufi is a colleague with whom one can work very well. Throughout our work together, I have never at any time found that he has obstructed my ideas about the reform. I am entrusted with the reform. I carry the cross of the reforms on my back. It was a difficult problem. At first, a good proportion of the socialists in the government had to be persuaded. However, if you look at the reforms that have been carried out, starting with the simplest one, at the government's credentials, and at the land distribution and the reforms in the economy, you will see that they were all announced nine months ago in the Democratic Party's program. It was possible to bring them about because we succeeded in convincing a section of the socialists in the government that this was the best way.

The drawback is that the world and the public at home, seeing the government's socialist composition, is not convinced that this government is a...

[Kadia] ...a nonsocialist government.

[Pashko] ...a nonsocialist government. In its enactment of reforms and its program of reforms, this is a nonsocialist government. It is socialist in its composition and its credentials, and that, to an extent, reduces its credibility.

[Kadia] How do you feel in the government, compared with your brother-in-law Mr. Genc Ruli?

[Pashko] Genc is a brilliant technocrat and an able politician. We complement instead of duplicating each other. In complementing each other, there are also points on which we do not agree. We discuss until we convince each other. Fortunately, Genc is not only my brother-in-law. He was also first my friend and then my student. We then became colleagues and people who spent a great deal of time together, not just because of our tie through his sister but also because we shared views and our anticommunist ideals. With that kind of tie, when we meet, we are able to thrash out ideas on which we do not agree before we raise them before the government, the legislature, or in intellectual circles.

[Kadia] What about the confrontation with the president that happened on the day you were appointed to high office and reminded you of the famous fable of the tortoise and the eagle?

[Pashko] Work does not tie me to the president. I consider my job to hold certain responsibilities. I have my responsibilities and my duties. The president has his own work. I do not work according to the old formula of "holding the president's hand in everything." I have my reservations about him, which, as a politician, I defend. In the human sense, I have nothing to do with him. My relations with him on the occasions I meet him are normal.

[Kadia] You have said that "the Socialist Party is the alter ego of the Albanian Workers Party [PPSh]." Is the Democratic Party anyone's alter ego?

[Pashko] There is no doubt that the Socialist Party is the PPSh's alter ego. After nine congresses, it held a 10th and changed its program and its name but not its content. As for the Democratic Party, it is not affiliated to the PPSh in any way in its form or content. However, in the eddies of Albanian history, when the Democratic Party has had to solve one problem or another, it, too, has made mistakes that have recalled the coloring and behavior patterns of the Socialist Party. Of course, only the dead never make mistakes.

[Kadia] Were you at all upset by the interview with Hajdin Sejdia [director of Illyria Holdings] in ZERI I RINISE, with his allusions to corruption in the National Stability Government?

[Pashko] I do not deal with statements that assorted businessmen may make here, there, and everywhere. They themselves are responsible for what they say. If they have proof of violations of the law by the government or corruption among members of the government, it would be more honest if they were to show them to the public. That would solve the problem all the more easily when they say they are well-wishers.

[Kadia] What about the equation Adil [Carcani] + Farudin [Hoxha] + Fatos [Nano] = Illyria Holdings?

[Pashko] I will reserve my answer to that question.

[Kadia] Let me borrow a question that our chief editor will no doubt ask you. "One November day, after Kadare's departure, your telephone rang and Voice of America asked you for an interview. Do you remember that moment of danger?"

[Pashko] It did not happen quite like that. I can expand on that. I was walking on the boulevard of Tirana with Diza Hasstad, a Swedish journalist, and we went to drink coffee in the 15-storey building [Hotel Tirana]. I cannot forget that moment. It was 1100. Another journalist, Misha Glenny of the BBC, came into the lobby and said into my ear, "Kadare has asked for political asylum." I knew something about that. The problem of Kadare and me was very complex that fall. We were under total surveillance. The Security Service watched me and did not allow me to meet foreign journalists. When I heard the news, I issued a statement to all the journalists: "I consider Kadare to be a friend, and his flight hurts me deeply. However, I am fully convinced that Kadare will return to Albania when democracy is established." That statement was given to the entire Western press. Only the Albanian press and public knew nothing. About 10 days later, I invited the journalists Laura Silber and Misha Glenny to my home. I talked with them and said, "The time has come to make my statement known to the Albanian public. The time has come to dissociate myself from the Tirana government. Finally." I thought it over carefully for a few hours, and the interview was then conducted in my home on my tape recorder. There were four questions: one about the crisis, one about the need for democratization in Albania, one about the obstacles to this process, and one about Kadare. After that, I was subjected to a real witch-hunt for an entire month. There was pressure to dismiss me from the faculty, and various party organization meetings were held in order to strike at me. I had joined the party a few months earlier. However, I had very strong support from many of my colleagues and especially from the students. The course of events in December is now well known. As for the danger, it was the first time I had not been afraid. There were entire years in which I was frightened of arrest or of the Security Service's terror. This time, I was sure that I had strong support. I was not frightened because I had a presentiment that I had hit the target.

[Kadia] Was this the culminating point of your dissidence, or did it start there?

[Pashko] My dissidence began long ago, in the middle of the 1970's, when I had a lot of free and liberal ideas. As I said in another interview, I was called to the State Security Service during a campaign of warnings against intellectuals, and I now understand that arrest warrants were prepared for me several times. However, I was saved by the fact that my father had been a war hero, and it would have done Enver Hoxha's government no good to have put a hero's son in prison. My dissidence started when the first purges began in Albania and when my friends and comrades were put in prison for merely thinking freely. My dissidence became full and rationally based when I understood that Marx's doctrine had failed. When I completed my study of Marxism, I understood its failure.

[Kadia] However, as you said, you were admitted into the PPSh a few months before the peak of your time as a dissident.

[Pashko] I joined the PPSh on 27 April 1990 and handed in my party card in December 1990. There can be three reasons for joining a political party: belief in its ideals, careerism, and the desire to change it from within. The year 1990 was the culminating point of the reforms in the East. I was brought in several times as a consultant even by the PPSh Central Committee in order to help the economic reform, or what was called self-financing. At the same time, in May 1990 I published in Sweden a very long chapter about the Albanian economy, in which I totally rejected that idea of self-financing.

Nevertheless, it seemed to me that I could struggle better with legal means, working within the party as an economist, because I did not think that a genuine legal anticommunist opposition could be quickly created in Albania. The speed of events led me to disown the party immediately. It was a matter of either handing in my party card or making criticisms in every forum. I chose the first. As for the two other reasons for joining a party, I have never suffered from a career complex because the academic career that I had achieved was enough for me and had made me happy. Nor was I a convinced communist; for me, communism was a failed doctrine.

[Kadia] ZERI I POPULLIT called on you, as the son of Josif Pashko, to dissociate yourself from those who slung mud at the heroes of the National Liberation War.

[Pashko] I did not read it. I respect my father as having been an honest man. He died in 1963, when I was eight years old. He was a man who tried to do good, as far as he was able. The fact that Enver Hoxha tried to use those people's honesty for different purposes is another matter. Everyone knows that people at my father's level of power did not decide things in Albania. Decisions were made at another level. However, there is another thing. I have not gone deeply into what my father specifically did because he had little time to do much. For most of the time, he was construction minister. I do not know how his career would have further progressed, but I am sure that he would have ended up in prison in the 1970's or at the receiving end of one of Enver Hoxha's bullets because his firm stand against injustice was well known. Everybody knows that.

[Kadia] What is your opinion of the equation of the National Liberation War with a civil war?

[Pashko] I have not made any deep analysis of the National Liberation War, but it included many elements of a civil war, a struggle for power. Historians will have to reassess the merits of those who took part in that war. It is difficult for me to talk about that problem today. The time for that will come later. However, it does not seem to me fair to be biased and to defend only the merits of my father and his friends and to disparage those whose qualities have unfortunately been cast in the shade because of the class war. That means that I do not have a paternalist attitude and cannot say that everything about that war was good because my father was in it. My father and those who joined that war had an ideal and a purpose, but that does not mean that the other side did not have an ideal and a purpose and cannot have had justice on its side. We must look into and analyze that problem.

[Kadia] In your view, what will Albania be like after one year?

[Pashko] In my opinion, after one year, Albania will be stable, will have overcome the crisis, and will have properly embarked on the road toward a market economy and prosperity.

[Kadia] And after five years?

[Pashko] After five years, Albania will have the right to take pride in its past and will be knocking at the gates of Brussels.

[Kadia] Thank you.

* * *

Here is a detail from the office of the deputy prime minister, Mr. Gramoz Pashko. A computer has been installed to his left. A Bible is to his right. Jesus Christ, instead of the president, hangs above his head.

Strike in Puke District Supports Miners' Demands

AU2110162191 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Report by Rrok Lencaj]

[Text] Puke District has rarely lived through events of this kind. Everything has fallen silent. Not a sawmill is working. The miners have extinguished their lamps and left their underground galleries. The copper processors are not producing a single tonne of concentrate. The geological prospecting teams are no longer drilling. Drivers have left their steering wheels, paralyzing the transportation of all the goods this district produces. One can see in motion only an occasional vehicle taking home the workers of these enterprises who have laid down their tools.

After a more than two-week-long work stoppage by 270 miners of Laku i Roshit and Fushe Arrez, the miners and processors of two mineral enterprises and all the employees of other enterprises have gone on strike in solidarity with their demands.

The demands raised by this district's workers are precisely the same as those for which they demanded a solution about six months ago. However, a long time has passed since then, and not a single point of their petition has been solved. The first item on the petition of the workers, the district's Independent Trade Unions, and the Strike Committee is that Puke District should be declared a free zone with total economic independence.

To discuss these points, without requiring the surrender of their fair demands but with the aim of solving them by ending the strike, the Presidium of the district's Pluralist Executive Committee organized a meeting with the Strike Committee and the managers of some enterprises. Pjeter Dema, chairman of the district's Pluralist Executive Committee, told those present at the meeting what had been achieved at his meeting with Prime Minister Ylli Bufi on 15 October. To solve the demands of the Bugjon hunger strikers and certain other problems involving the district's grave socioeconomic situation, the prime minister promised that a government group headed by a member of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers will come to Puke by 25 October to tackle the district's grievances.

Besides discussing the problems the whole country is experiencing, the purpose of this meeting between the Strike Committee and the government was to create conditions for ending the strike. However, at this meeting, the Strike Committee did not agree to end this district general strike that was declared on 18 October until the government undertakes to solve all the economic demands of the district's workers.

Thus, the general strike still continues today. The mere judgment that their demands are fair no longer pacifies the miners, copper processors, lumberjacks, geologists,

construction workers, drivers, and peasants of this district, who live and work under extremely difficult economic and climatic conditions.

New Battalion Created To Distribute Aid

AU2110201591 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] The Defense Ministry has organized work to create a new unit, the Transportation Battalion, for the distribution of different forms of aid coming to our country. On 22 October, the motorized columns of this battalion began work to transport food aid that has arrived in the port of Durres. The battalion includes dozens of goods vehicles and other auxiliary vehicles such as cranes, tankers for fuel supplies, repair vehicles, and so forth. The battalion has been organized to ensure self-sufficiency in fuel, liaison services, and other supporting services on every journey on aid distribution, of whatever length.

Measures have also been taken to ensure the security of the motorized columns during their journeys. They are guarded by escort vehicles and, when the need arises, are accompanied by the Army Inspectorate.

Zhelev Leaves for 3-Day Working Visit in Moscow

AU2110123791 Sofia BTA in English 1201 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Sofia, October 21 (BTA)—Bulgaria's President Zhelyu Zhelev left for Moscow today at noon. He will pay a three-day working visit at the invitation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Dr. Zhelev is expected to meet Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

It is expected that Bulgaria and Russia will sign a political declaration on their relations. The president will sign three agreements too: On trade until the end of this year, on the settlement of payments, and on economic, scientific and technical cooperation between Bulgaria and Russia.

The political declaration is considered to be the first real step towards a future Bulgarian-Russian treaty.

The schedule of President Zhelev's visit includes meetings with Mr. Gavril Popov and Anatoliy Sobchak, mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg. He will meet representatives of the Bulgarian community in the Soviet capital.

According to sources that are close to the presidency, Dr. Zhelev will seek Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Gorbachev's assistance so that Bulgarian specialists be given access to documents in the archives of the former KGB that concern Bulgaria.

The other members of the Bulgarian delegation are: Deputy Prime Minister Dimitur Ludzhev, Mr. Ivailo Trifonov, head of the Office of the President, Mr. Ventsislav Antonov, director of the Economic Projection Agency, Mr. Ivan Kolev, head of the USSR and Eastern European Countries Department of the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, advisers to the president.

Rutskoy Welcomes Zhelev

AU2210083391 Sofia BTA in English 2117 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Moscow, October 21 (BTA correspondent)—"I arrived in Moscow with warm feelings and good intentions," President Zhelyu Zhelev of Bulgaria told the press at Moscow Airport upon his arrival on a working visit to Russia at the invitation of President Boris Yeltsin.

The Bulgarian head of state and his party were welcomed by the vice president of the Russian Federation Mr. Aleksandr Rutskoy, who said he was optimistic about the forthcoming talks between the two delegations. He noted the complicated economic situation of the two countries and expressed the conviction that new forms of interaction should be sought to help them out of the crisis. "All the more so that after August 19 we clearly and categorically determined the road of development for the Soviet state," Mr. Rutskoy said.

After a brief meeting at the Bulgarian president's residence with the vice president of Russia, Dr. Zhelev visited the Bulgarian technological and cultural centres in Moscow. In the evening the president met with embassy and trade mission employees and with Bulgarians working and studying in the Soviet capital.

The official schedule of Dr. Zhelev's visit will start tomorrow. At 2 PM he will confer with Mr. Boris Yeltsin.

Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev and President of the USSR Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev may meet on Wednesday.

Later in the day, a signing ceremony will be held for the official agreements between the two republics.

Mr. Yeltsin and Dr. Zhelev are expected to give a joint news conference on Wednesday afternoon.

Diplomatic Relations With UAE Established

AU1810200991 Sofia BTA in English 1921 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Text] Sofia, October 18 (BTA)—The Republic of Bulgaria and the United Arab Emirates [UAE] signed a joint declaration on the establishment of diplomatic relations during the official visit to the UAE by a Bulgarian delegation from October 15 to 18. The two countries will exchange ambassadors.

Repair of Kozloduy Plant 5th Reactor Completed

AU2110164091 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Our correspondent Veselin Angelov reports that the repair and loading with nuclear fuel of the fifth reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant has been completed. The 1,000-megawatt reactor is ready for full capacity activity and only awaits the permission of the Committee on Power Supply.

The new sixth reactor functions at 50 percent of its full capacity. The capacity will soon be increased.

The repair of the first and third reactors continues.

Zhivkov Describes Trial as 'Travesty, Mockery'

AU2110172591 Sofia BTA in English 1651 GMT 21 Oct 91

["Todor Zhivkov Seeks Help From Justice and the Press"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, October 21 (BTA)—Todor Zhivkov insists that the former prosecutor general of the Republic Evtim Stoimenov and his successor Martin Gunev be brought to trial for "framing case No.1." They should tell the court who instructed them what charges to press against the ex-number one at the trial which he sees as a "travesty, a mockery and a boring farce." Speaking at a news conference here today, Mr. Zhivkov asked the

reporters to help him cease being "the most slandered and mud-slung citizen of the Republic."

Mr. Zhivkov believes he has reason to seek a legal remedy because a month ago he obtained a document marked "top secret" which had been drafted a month after his arrest and which essentially contained a scenario for Case No.1, "an attempt to make a single person the scapegoat for all weaknesses and mistakes of the system." Asked to identify the inspirers of the trial, the ex-number one answered that they were in an office in the government and in an office in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Headquarters. Todor Zhivkov declined to name names, saying that this should be done by Prosecutors Stoimenov and Gunev, and he categorically denied the conjecture that one of the inspirers of the trial was Aleksandur Lilov. The ex-number one only said that Andrey Lukanov allegedly gave the go-ahead to the campaign for his discrediting. The former head of state went on to say that "certain circles in both red and blue" were interested in the resumption of the trial he stands on Wednesday.

Todor Zhivkov said that if the court proceeds with the case on the forced assimilation of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, he would emerge from that trial as a "national hero." He substantiated this claim by explaining the correctness of the ethnic policy he implemented. Not without pride the ex-number one said that former President Kenan Evren of Turkey described him in a letter as "father of the Bulgarians" and that his actions could be justified by the works of a number of Bulgarian and foreign scholars.

As to the role of Moscow and of Mikhail Gorbachev in particular for his ouster, Todor Zhivkov indicated that he had resigned on his own but a long time earlier he had sensed the hostile view which the Soviet leadership took of him. Back in 1988 the Kremlin "pushed the button" and the volume of Bulgaria's trade with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries plummeted. Zhivkov had and implemented a "concept on the change of socialism," while all the Soviet leader did was "perestroyka without concept."

At the end of his news conference, the former head of state paternally called on the political forces "to overcome their bias and emotions and work out reasonable compromises" to help mother Bulgaria out of the grave crisis. Todor Zhivkov recalled the proverb: "God giveth the cow, but not by the horn."

Dimitrov Interviewed on Election Results

AU2110214691 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 16 Oct 91 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces Coordinating Council, by Maya Lyubomirska; place and date not given: "I Hope That We Will Form an Energetic and Effective Government"]

[Text] [Lyubomirska] The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] is the leading political force today. This is at least what the election results so far indicate. Despite this, people are talking about a stalemate political situation. This means that two forces—namely, the SDS and the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]—are supposed to be assigned an almost equal number of seats in the future legislature. Is that so?

[Dimitrov] That is true to only a certain extent. As a matter of fact, the two political forces are expected to occupy almost the same number of seats. Nonetheless, the SDS will have a few more. However, even a minimal majority means something. The most important thing is to make the adoption of decisions possible and to create sufficiently strong support for the government. Let us not forget that, in the majority of normal states, no great difference between the number of seats occupied by the opposition and the ruling party is required in order to make things work. Therefore, the so-called stalemate situation will depend on the course of events, provided that a change in the final results emerges at all.

[Lyubomirska] Why did that polarization in voting—either for the SDS, or for the BSP—occur, in your opinion? Do you consider it dangerous?

[Dimitrov] There is nothing dangerous about it. The election results simply showed that people faced the alternative of communism versus democracy, and that that alternative really exists. The very fact that you are asking me this question shows the widespread nature of this thesis the Communist Party tried to promote for a long time by striving to obliterate the difference between the opposition and the BSP. People instinctively felt that the alternative between communism and democracy is a fact. Therefore, the SDS representatives decided at their two conferences that the opposition should run on a joint blue ticket. For that we were accused of being ignorant and totalitarian, lacking political culture, brutally trying to impose our will, and so forth. Mr. Dertliev responded by telling us about the many faces of the opposition. We saw the results. The election results showed that people acted correctly, that they understood what was at stake, that they realized the existence of an alternative. There is nothing bad about that.

[Lyubomirska] In referring to the conclusion drawn by our colleague Vladimir Kostov, who pointed out in his recent OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK article that the value of the elections is determined by the conditions their results are likely to produce in connection with forming the country's new government, may I ask you where the future government should begin its work after your election victory?

[Dimitrov] That is a very difficult question. It is evident that our starting point is perhaps just one jot more promising than that of the previous government, which actually means that it is unfavorable enough. It is a starting point that follows 45 years of communism, which has, by no means, been overcome in Bulgaria. The

question of trends—namely, in which direction to proceed—is much more interesting. One great difference between today and the recent past is that today we are at least free to adopt our decisions. Let us hope that the future government will be energetic enough to accomplish its tasks.

One of the numerous prerequisites for success is the question of how the rest of the world will accept us today. People abroad will certainly be somewhat confused by the great number of seats won by the Communists, which is understandable. On the other hand, the world will presumably duly appreciate the fact that two-thirds of the Bulgarian people voted against communism. That is what gives Bulgaria a chance.

[Lyubomirska] In relinquishing power, the BSP Supreme Council issued a declaration to the members, supporters, and voters of the BSP exhorting them not be afraid, discouraged, or despondent. Are there any reasons for instilling such moods in our society?

[Dimitrov] I had the opportunity to make a statement on that question shortly after the BSP declaration was published. Such are the favorite methods of the Communist Party, which, with all sorts of appeals, actually tries to convince people that they should indeed be very afraid. As a matter of fact, there is nothing to be afraid of. Everyone should simply realize that the SDS means serious business and that it is not willing to follow the example of the Communists in trying to accommodate its own people. We do not intend to persecute anyone because of his political convictions or because of his present or past membership in the Communist Party. It is inadmissible that the bunch of gangsters who have committed real crimes should hide behind the mass of people by saying: Look here, you are taking legal action against so and so, who stole 10 million German marks from the cash register, for example, which means that you are persecuting him for political reasons. Such things should be very clearly distinguished. Some people are simply interested in fanning such fears so that they may hide behind the broad back of the people's majority.

[Lyubomirska] The same declaration states that the BSP election platform should be implemented without delay. That applies in particular to the proposed alternatives such as social peace, social protection, national consensus, revival of production, individual safety and national security, law and order. Is that supposed to mean that the BSP did not manage to guarantee all those conditions in its former governments?

[Dimitrov] It simply means that one can only be surprised at hearing such exhortations from the Communist Party's leadership. Is it not unheard of for a party that is in the opposition to ask for the implementation of its own program? Why is that party in the opposition? Because the other party is in power—then why on earth should that other party implement the Communist Party's program? That can hardly be taken seriously. Naturally, it is the SDS program that should be implemented and not that of the Communists. Another question is to what extent its program can be implemented at all. Similar appeals are launched only with the aim of creating confusion. I would not be surprised to hear Mr. Lilov claim how intolerant we are in refusing to implement his program. By relinquishing power, the Communist Party no longer has the opportunity to violate civic peace in an organized manner. Even if it tries to create unrest in some places, it can no longer rely on the organized methods and means of disrupting civic peace that provoked the civil war in Yugoslavia, or certain events that occurred in Romania and Albania. The fact that the SDS has the majority in the National Assembly guarantees the protection of civic peace. All the rest depends on the people's joint efforts.

[Lyubomirska] One more question: Is there a reason to believe that the BSP may be crushed by violent methods or diverted from the path of reform in society? I am asking this with reference to the aforementioned declaration stating the irreconcilability of the BSP with such actions.

[Dimitrov] You are placing me in an awkward situation by forcing me to comment on a piece of literature in the absence of its authors, especially considering the fact that I can hardly say anything positive about it. Evidently, all these statements are part of some preposterous literary approach. As far as the danger of forcible destruction of the BSP is concerned, there is one situation under which a political organization may be forcibly crushed—namely, when it breaks the law. Another question is that the Communist Party might perceive the confiscation of its illegally acquired property as forcible destruction. If this kind of destruction is meant, it is economic destruction, and the BSP will certainly be economically crushed.

[Lyubomirska] Would you be so kind as to tell me whether certain misgivings are justified concerning the future role of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] as a political arbiter or SDS supporter in a future legislature?

[Dimitrov] This is again a trick from the arsenal of the Communist Party, a card that has been played time and again over the past two years and that was played for as long as five years in the past. It is the propaganda of: "Oh, those horrible Turks!" If a small party acquires a number of seats in the legislature, it always gravitates toward one or the other side. What does it mean that the DPS should play the role of an arbiter? What are the gentlemen in question afraid of? Are they afraid that the DPS, at this or that moment, may side with them? They should be glad about it instead of being afraid! I do not see any reason to complain. Or should they be afraid that the DPS may vote for us? So, why do they not persuade the DPS to vote for them? What are we talking about, anyway?

[Lyubomirska] There is a rumor that the SDS wants to start work in the new legislature as early as toward the end of October 1991 in order to get on with its tasks. What is the point of departure of the SDS majority in the legislature expected to be?

[Dimitrov] Our point of departure is definitely expressed in the firm intention of setting up our own organs and a code of regulations for our activities. As to the rest, we will start with God's will; there is enough work awaiting us.

Dimitrov Discusses Future Political Tasks

AU2110153791 Vienna PROFIL in German 21 Oct 91 p 88

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Gregor Mayer in Sofia; date not given: "We Will Try"]

[Text] [Mayer] You narrowly won the elections. But how strong are you in reality? Who guarantees that your alliance, which consists of 19 parties, will not be split by quarrels about the distribution of the ministries?

[Dimitrov] It has been proved that whoever leaves the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] disappears from the political scene. I do not think that that is a problem.

[Mayer] How do you want to enforce party discipline in the National Assembly?

[Dimitrov] We will try.

[Mayer] You will need the Muslim party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, for the formation of a coalition government. Its leader, Ahmed Dogan, has already announced his claim on the Interior Ministry and another ministry.

[Dimitrov] He never said so officially. It was a joke....

[Mayer] A joke?

[Dimitrov] Yes, a joke at an election rally, when he was asked about it.

[Mayer] Do you support the demands of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria?

[Dimitrov] We are for the strict respect of all human and minority rights. The Turks in Bulgaria have the right to education in their mother tongue and to their own parties and organizations.

[Mayer] What is your view on Macedonia?

[Dimitrov] We do not believe that historical borders are a decisive matter. We do not have any claims on Macedonian territory or any other territory.

[Mayer] Anticommunism was a mobilizing factor for the SDS in the election campaign. How will your voters react when you confront them with the necessarily planned economic policy measures?

[Dimitrov] Of course, we will have to explain those measures to them. And perhaps there will also be dissatisfaction. Who knows?

[Mayer] What is your priority? The continuation of the struggle against the Socialists or the economic reconstruction of the country?

[Dimitrov] The reconstruction of the economy and the reconstruction of culture and all the positive changes that have to be introduced are practically identical with the struggle against communism. We are struggling against communism not because we do not like it but because it is a burden for the nation. And it will be overcome by these positive changes.

[Mayer] Do you want to achieve the return of the former premises of the Communist Party by negotiations with the Socialists, or will you simply use your majority in the legislature to pass laws to expropriate the Socialist Party?

[Dimitrov] We do not intend to discuss this with them. There has been and still is the possibility of voluntarily giving up this property. So far, that possibility has not been used. We are now striving in the National Assembly for a legislative solution that is both efficient and acceptable to the nation.

[Mayer] Do you not fear that the Socialist Party might be able to cause a future government a lot of trouble if it faces expropriation by force? The Socialists could, for instance, use the problem of the Turks against you.

[Dimitrov] I hope that they will not be able to fan the tensions.

[Mayer] Or they could sow unrest among the workers, who are suffering under the price hikes.

[Dimitrov] Look, whether or not these things might happen is no reason not to do this job. But I do not doubt that we will be facing a lot of difficulties in the future.

SDS Official on Coalition, Yugoslavia

LD1810210791 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0750 GMT 15 Oct 91

[Interview with (Ludvana Spasova), foreign affairs spokesperson for the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS, by Kossuth Radio correspondent Hajnal Mate on the "Foreign Affairs Observer" program; place and date not given—recorded; (Spasova) remarks in English fading into Hungarian translation]

[Text] [Mate] What are the ideas of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] on a possible government coalition? Which parties will be considered, the Socialist or the Turkish parties?

[(Spasova)] Under no circumstances will the Socialist Party be considered for possible talks on a coalition because, over the past 46 years, the Socialists have demonstrated that they were unable to lead the country.

We have them to thank for the economic backwardness of the country and the existing social tensions. So, under no circumstances would we enter into a coalition with them. More likely seems to be the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, commonly known as the Turkish Party, but, at present, no final decision has been made on this.

[Mate] What would the economic policy of the new government be?

[(Spasova)] In our party's program, we specified that we would like to support the introduction of reforms and the switch to a market economy. However, in contrast to the Social Democrats, we envisage a reform program that would have more social guarantees, so we would be closer to the ideas outlined by the Christian Democrats. We would like to implement the switch from the model of a centralized planned economy to a capitalist market economy in such a way that the population, which is already living under harsh conditions, would not suffer further hardship.

[Mate] What is the party's opinion about the Yugoslav crisis, particularly in regard to Macedonia?

[(Spasova)] The SDS has on several occasions declared in its statements that our party supports the right of self-determination and that, in Yugoslavia, an attempt should be made to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. Concerning Macedonia, our position is that the population living in Macedonia has the same rights in Yugoslavia as other nationalities. In our statements, we also explained that we have no territorial demands on Macedonia or on any other republic.

[Mate] Does this mean that you will perhaps recognize the independence of Macedonia, as well?

[(Spasova)] Yes, our opinion on this is the same as that of President Zhelyu Zhelev. So, if Macedonia decides to declare independence, Bulgaria will recognize this. We hope all nationalities enjoy equal rights within the Republic.

SDS's Yordanov Rules Out SDS-DPS Cabinet

AU2110191291 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 17 Oct p 3

[Report by Venelina Gocheva and Mariya Stoykova: "There Will Be No SDS-DPS Cabinet"]

[Text] "Not every political force that cleared the 4-percent hurdle can hope for ministerial chairs," Aleksandur Yordanov, deputy chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] pointed out on 16 October.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] has not stated its position on seats in the Cabinet, Mr. Yordanov said to 24 CHASA. He regretted the fact that it was precisely the ANATOLIA NEWS AGENCY that announced the DPS's plans with relation to the executive power in Bulgaria. According to Mr. Yordanov, such plans could have been announced through the Bulgarian press.

"The SDS is prepared to form its government, which in essence will be a coalition government, because the SDS is a union of separate parties." Mr. Yordanov thinks that now is the time to allow these parties to demonstrate their political possibilities.

If the DPS joins the new Cabinet, the SDS image will change fundamentally, Mr. Yordanov thinks. The society would see the SDS as a party that formed a coalition with another party.

According to Mr. Yordanov, the DPS has important tasks in the legislature in defending interests related to ethnic and minorities' problems. "We rely on the support of the DPS in changing the system. Ministerial posts will not resolve the ethnic issue," Mr. Yordanov thinks.

Aleksandur Yordanov is concerned with the fact, that among the DPS leaders, there also are nondemocrats. "I do not say communists, but some of them are Marxists, and Marxism is the only ideology that prefers group problems to the people themselves."

According to Mr. Yordanov, the probable unification of communist and nationalistic forces could produce the first spark of a civil war. Before Mr. Yordanov made his statement, Andrey Lukanov, speaking to journalists, ventured the forecast that the DPS will prompt the creation of an alternative Bulgarian formation.

Fatherland Party Wants DPS Actions Investigated

AU2110191791 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 18 Oct 91 p 2

[DUMA PRESS report: "Fatherland Labor Party Demands Investigation of DPS Antinational Activity"]

[Text] The Fatherland Labor Party will ask the competent organs to urgently undertake an investigation of the antinational activity of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] and all institutions and officials that objectively jeopardize the sovereignty and future of the Bulgarian state, a declaration of the Presidium of the Fatherland Labor Party disseminated on 17 October says.

The party expresses concern with the behind-the-scenes combinations of responsible state institutions of the Union of Democratic Forces-Movement [SDS-Movement] and the Podkrepa Confederation of Labor aimed as asserting the DPS as a political party and the third political force in the new legislature. Those combinations have existed for several months already.

Delcho Balabanov from the Fatherland Labor Party Press Center said that the Fatherland Labor Party, concerned with the deterioration of the situation in

certain regions with mixed populations, will seek a meeting with the prime minister and the president of the Republic.

Dogan, Dimitrov, Lilov on Election Results

AU1910211691 Sofia BTA in English 2029 GMT 19 Oct 91

[Text] Sofia, October 19 (BTA)—"It is not necessary that we should enter the government at all costs. On the other hand, the participation of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms will project a different image of Bulgaria," Mr. Ahmed Dogan, leader of the DPS (the ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms), said this evening in the Panorama political roundup on national television.

"This will be decided by the moment, the times, and the political need, not 'at all costs,' because we are the third political force," he stressed. This was Mr. Dogan's first public statement after the elections.

According to Mr. Dogan, the October 13 elections for the first time gave democratization the chance to turn into an irreversible process in Bulgaria. "It is the democratic process and not the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] or the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] that won the elections," he said.

Mr. Dogan does not see the DPS as a regulator, as many politicians and observers believe. "The DPS will be close to the SDS on all questions," Mr. Dogan said. Should it become necessary, the MP's [members of parliament] of the DPS will act as a regulator.

Mr. Filip Dimitrov, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), who also took part in the programme, stressed that it is unnecessary to try to find a political centre in Bulgaria by all means. He described as a betrayal of the national interests the view that the presence of MP's of the DPS in parliament poses a threat. "The possibility for DPS participation in the cabinet should not be ruled out a priori," Mr. Dimitrov said. The SDS will take into account the specific moment to decide whether this is appropriate.

According to Mr. Dimitrov, one per cent of the vote in the October 13 elections is a very significant margin, especially in combination with the opportunity for the SDS to form a government.

Mr. Aleksandur Lilov, leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), expressed his satisfaction with the election results. He described the 1 per cent margin an honorary loss for the Socialists. "The BSP will make a serious, constructive and critical opposition," Mr. Lilov stressed. He does not expect BSP members to criticize him about the election results because "the BSP has the chance to become a new opposition and to concentrate its efforts on local administration." According to Mr. Lilov, at the forthcoming congress the changes in the BSP will be more important than personal attacks. Mr. Lilov had said that he would resign from the leadership if the Socialists lost the elections.

Election Results Not Seen as Threat to BSP

AU2110171591 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 Oct 91 p 2

[Report by Dora Chichkova: "Election Results Do Not Threaten BSP's Unity and Stability"]

[Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is turning more and more into a legislative party, which depends much more on its supporters than on its members. The elections showed that the ratio between those two groups is 5 to 1, sociologist Zhivkov Georgiev noted at the 15 October news conference.

Even if after all votes are counted the BSP's position as the second political force is confirmed, the election result achieved by the BSP gives us better positions in the process of its further renewal, Filip Bokov said. He sees no danger for the party's unity.

The basic shock is behind the BSP's back, Lyubomir Kyuchukov, BSP deputy chairman, thinks. The issue of an eventual split does not move the BSP, and the fact that this question is often posed at the news conference shows more than anything else that the BSP's stability disrupts the blue idyll, Kyuchukov said.

To the question of whether the BSP is satisfied with its opponent in the new legislature, Aleksandur Marinov answered that he would prefer to have had a more tolerant and constructive opponent. Klara Marinova added to this that one cannot choose one's parents, motherland, or, apparently, enemies.

Elisaveta Milenova, chairman of the Christian Women's Movement Party, said that the opposition is not an opponent but a necessary partner of the ruling majority. I hope that those who see us as enemies will have a more important goal than to struggle against us, Milenova said. According to her, the opponents from the Union of Democratic Forces must begin to resolve the problems they declared that they would resolve.

Journalists inquired whether any BSP members will throw away their membership cards if that is a prerequisite for joining the Cabinet. Filip Bokov reminded them that Bulgaria has a long-lasting tradition in that respect. According to Klara Marinova, there could be more than three BSP members who could prove ready to relinquish their consciences and pasts to participate in a government in which they will be crushed, humiliated, and accused. Well, they will sacrifice themselves for the motherland, the head of the BSP press center quipped.

NOVINI Predicts Future Political Scene

AU2110194991 Sofia NOVINI in Bulgarian 15 Oct 91 p 1

[NOVINI editorial: "To Have the Advantage Is Not Always an Advantage"]

[Text] The election marathon has finished. It was unique, with the queues in front of the polling stations that DUMA appropriately called "queues for democracy," with the patience shown by millions of Bulgarians who were voting even after midnight on Sunday, when the Central Electoral Commission announced that the electoral constituencies' clocks in individual places be stopped at 2000, with the teams of the seven organizations that were carrying out partial parallel counts and that announced their forecast results.

The stand of the foreign observers is categorical: The elections on 13 October in Bulgaria took place democratically, without any significant violations that can have any catastrophic effect on the election result.

Thus, despite the fact that we are a long way from the official declaration of the final figures, it can be stated that the Union of Democratic Forces-Movement achieved a minimal advantage that gives it the right to form a government. Let us wish it success! However, let us also remind it that every advantage has its inconvenient aspects.

This circumstance fundamentally changes the SDS's positions toward the government in which it has, in practice, participated until now. However, from being a participant in a coalition, it will have an opportunity to form a totally dark blue cabinet. The question is whether this will have a favorable effect on Bulgaria's economic situation, whether from the West, as they have assured us up until now, a stream of financial aid will come pouring in and whether they will bombard us with investments. Or will nothing change?! As is well known, money is not given for the color of a party but when a stable internal political situation, good laws, and professionalism in government exist.

It is well known that, many months before the elections, the Bulgarian Socialist Party was stating that its goal was not total power, that the best solution for the country at present was a government of national accord. This is why the Socialists do not accept the results as a tragedy because this loss will most likely turn into a gain. The party will have sufficient time to examine itself, to accelerate the process of renewing itself, to break conclusively with certain reflexes from the past and affiliate itself with European social democracy. Even more, it will have time to stand out as a constructive opposition, a positive political force that will promote the development of the democratic process and categorically stand up for civic peace, the interests of the socially disadvantaged, and the nation's peace.

Undoubtedly, Bulgaria would gain a great deal more if there were a more varied political configuration in the new legislature. This would reduce the eventual keen political polarization of views and help resolve the most important questions with sensible compromises, with agreement, and not from a position of force, as, in fact, happens in every normal political process.

The worst thing that can happen to the new legislature is for it to continue the negative tendencies from the activities of the previous legislature with its enthusiasm for rallies and adopting bills to the advantage of only part of society.

Independent Trade Union Council Approves Election

AU1810191591 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Text] Today the Executive Committee and Coordinating Council of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] held a meeting. Prof. Krustyu Petkov [KNSB chairman] informed us as follows about the proceedings:

[Petkov] The KNSB Executive Committee and Coordinating Council considered a number of issues, the most important of which were the elections results and the KNSB's position regarding them. The session decided to convene a further meeting of the Coordinating Council in two weeks to examine the question of holding an extraordinary KNSB congress, a decision that was made last January. From the speeches and statements made at the session, it became clear that two-thirds of those present supported the idea of convening an extraordinary congress, but no earlier than the second half of January 1992. It was considered important to first wait to see what the new government would propose and what its program would be, and then to formulate our position.

In addition, the Coordinating Council approved the election results, expressing the view that the elections were held in a free, democratic manner and were a good step in the democratization of Bulgaria.

Radical Renewal of Agrarian Party Formed

AU2210094691 Sofia BTA in English 2142 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Sofia, October 21 (BTA)—Members and supporters of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party (United) (BZNS-E) formed a Movement for Radical Renewal of the Agrarian Party. The constituent protocol says the movement was organized because of the party's disastrous performance in the October 13 general elections at which the BZNS-E failed to collect the 4 per cent minimum of the nationwide vote to get into parliament.

The founders of the movement insist on an analysis of the reasons for the deep crisis in the Agrarian Party. They declare themselves categorically against a split of

the BZNS-E but want to discuss the effects of the unification (with part of the Nikola Petkov Agrarian Party). They believe that some of the members of the Standing Committee should make a personal assessment of their performance and publish it in the party daily. Besides, they insist on the dismissal of the old nomenklatura apparatus at all levels in the Agrarian Party structures, on setting a date for a party congress and for a discussion of the party's future.

Newly Elected Sofia Mayor Accepts Office

AU2110201291 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] In Hall No. 10 of the National Palace of Culture in Sofia today, the results of the Sofia mayoral elections and the municipal councillors' elections were officially announced.

Prof. Aleksandur Yanchulev, the newly elected Sofia mayor, who was far ahead of all of his competitors in the local elections, was the first to be introduced.

The names of the newly elected members of the Sofia City Council were then announced. As many as 59 of them were nominated by the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], and 30 were candidates of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. The Bulgarian National Agrarian Union-United [BZNS-United] and the Nikola Petkov BZNS have one municipal councillor each, two councillors belong to the SDS-Center, and eight councillors come from the SDS-Liberals.

In a short statement, Professor Yanchulev declared that he is accepting his post with great emotion as the expression of the Sofia citizen's majority and confidence and as an expression of God's will.

Mr. Yanchulev appealed to all newly elected councillors to join their efforts without any political bias for the implementation of the program devoted to Sofia's revival as a capital city.

The festivities on the occasion of the inauguration of the new mayor and city council continued with a religious ceremony on the square in front of City Hall, followed by a solemn service at the St. Alexander Nevski Cathedral.

Sofia's New Mayor Sets Out City Council Program

AU1810200691 Sofia BTA in English 1919 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Text] Sofia, October 18 (BTA)—The chief concern of the Sofia City Council from Monday on will be to make sure that Sofia is well-prepared for the coming winter, said Prof. Aleksandur Yanchulev, Sofia's new mayor, of the Union of Democratic Forces.

The condition of the city's energy supply system, fuel and food supplies and the state of public transport will be inspected. It was pointed out that the results will be made public immediately after the inspection.

Prof. Yanchulev said that the city council not only wants, but has firmly committed itself to complete the work on Sofia's underground. According to him, the first section can start operating in two or three years' time. The necessary funds—some 230 million leva for 1992 and between 160 and 170 million leva for 1993—will be raised from Bulgarian and foreign companies and from the municipality's budget. The new leadership of the city council wants to phase in free city transport for schoolchildren and students, disabled people and pensioners.

"We rely on all Sofianites for help and call on them to forget their party affiliations, let us all work, hand in hand, to implement the programme of the Union of Democratic Forces for Sofia's revival," Prof. Yanchulev said. "All Sofianites should feel self-confident, secure and calm," he added.

President Havel Signs Screening Law 17 Oct

AU2110143391 Prague CSTK in English 2048 GMT 17 Oct 91

[Text] Prague Oct 17 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel signed the controversial screening law after his return from talks with federal and republic leaders on the state setup of Czechoslovakia, new constitutions, and power-sharing held in Karlovy Vary, West Bohemia, today.

The screening law of October 4 bars from leading state posts for the next five years former communist party officials, collaborators with the former Secret Police (StB), and former members of the People's Militia (paramilitary force of the Communist Party).

Havel told CSTK in Karlovy Vary that the law is needed because "many people linked with the totalitarian regime, who participated in the violations of human rights, did not make use of the opportunity to leave their posts after the democratic revolution" of November 1989.

Nevertheless, Havel thinks the law should be amended. He said his proposals contained in a letter he presented to Czechoslovak parliament chairman Alexander Dubcek today concern the law's implementation, not the posts and categories it lists.

Havel Letter to Dubcek

AU2210085991 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 18 Oct 91 p 5

[Text of letter sent by President Vaclav Havel to Federal Assembly Chairman Alexander Dubcek on 17 October 1991]

[Text] Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have studied the text of the law adopted by the Federal Assembly on 4 October 1991 that lays down some further prerequisites for the execution of certain functions. I have also studied all the available domestic and foreign expert analyses of this law and the various points of view expressed by organizations and citizens.

I agree with the view expressed by the majority of deputies, political parties, and a large section of the general public that this law—albeit unusual and extraordinary—is necessary, because many individuals associated with the totalitarian system—individuals who for many years actively participated in trampling on human rights in our country—have not made use of the opportunities they were given after our democratic revolution, have not understood their share of the responsibility for society's suffering, and have not voluntarily given up their important functions in state administration and in public life. As a result of this, many institutions have not won the public's trust and, in some of them, there are people who—because they cannot rid themselves of their old practices or because of ill will—slow down and hamper the creation of a truly democratic order and make it impossible for those who have an unblemished character to assert themselves.

At the same time, however, I have come to the conclusion that the aforementioned law is rather problematic in its current form because it is based upon the principle of collective guilt or collective responsibility, it curtails the rights of some people, merely on the basis of their former or recent allegiance to a specific—defined by external symbols—group, it raises some former State Security [StB] records—or rather, their absence—to a level whereby they are the only and most important criterion determining whether someone can occupy a particular office, and it considerably curbs, obstructs, and—in some cases—even excludes the right of appeal, defense, and consideration of individual responsibility. Although the state certainly has a right to lay down the prerequisites for executing state functions, the spirit of these features of the law contradicts—according to my conviction—the tried and tested principles of a democratic legal code. Therefore, we cannot discount the possibility that the CSFR Constitutional Court, when it comes into operation, or the appropriate international institutions may come to the conclusion that this law is at variance with the international norms that Czechoslovakia has adopted and, as the case may be, with the Document on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms that is an element of our valid Constitution.

Of course, I am mainly afraid that implementing this law in its current form could be a source of new injustices and wrongs and that a bad precedence could be set here, when we are just beginning to construct a new democratic system.

Therefore, through your office, I recommend that Federal Assembly deputies—or rather, members of its Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committees— consider the possibility of amending this law in cooperation with the Federal Government Legislative Council, that they prepare a draft amendment, and that they submit it to the Federal Assembly plenum for discussion.

I think the amendment to the law should contain the following changes:

1) The complicated, impractical, and lengthy way in which organizations acquire an attestation or a finding of a citizen's membership in the StB, or of his cooperation with it, should be eradicated; this method does not provide sufficient guarantees for an individual's protection. I think the findings procedure before a Federal Interior Ministry committee should be abolished and that all citizens should only be issued with a single document, that is, an attestation. Every citizen, as the law correctly stipulates, must have the right to acquire an attestation. The Federal Interior Ministry should be obliged to personally deliver—within two months—an attestation to every citizen who has requested it. Those citizens who occupy their posts in accordance with Article 1 of the law should be obliged to submit their

attestation, along with an affidavit in accordance with Article 4, Paragraph 3, to the body or organization that elects, appoints, or assigns them, no later than six months from the day the law comes into force. Whoever does not submit these documents within the time limit would be recalled from his duties or, as the case may be, his contract of employment would be canceled in a manner not contradicting the Labor Code (the only exception would be if the agreement of a trade union organization is required). This course of action would guarantee the absolute confidentiality of the contents of the attestation, which would only be known to the citizen it concerns. This would prevent a public scandal involving those whose screenings are positive. This would also protect their family members. Each of these functionaries would have enough time to resign from his post himself or to cancel his contract of employment without the reason being known. This would be a more civilized course of action; however, it would also be a more strict course of action, since it would concern all kinds of cooperation with the StB.

2) All functionaries whose attestation testifies against them and who are convinced that they have been wronged should have an opportunity to appeal to the courts. Of course, the burden of proof would be on them. Based on their testimony, other documentary evidence, testimony from witnesses, and so on, the courts could consider their case individually and could consider, from the point of view of the purpose of the law, whether it would be correct to decide in their favor and, as the case may be, to pronounce a verdict that they are worthy of continuing in their office. Those who feel that the special circumstances of their case are not contained in their attestation, that the attestation does not contain the whole truth or that the truth is distorted, those who cooperated following a threat to the lives of others, but who really did not cooperate with the StB, and, finally, those who for years were committed to the victory of democracy and struggled against the violation of human rights—while this activity greatly outbalanced their former lapse or dubious behavior—could also appeal. It is even possible to imagine cases when someone in the 1950's joined an official organization or accepted a specific post on the instructions of some resistance group that wanted to gain information on the state's future illegal or immoral acts and to warn those under threat in time. In view of the confidential nature of the attestation, and in view of the fact that court proceedings are open to the public, it is improbable that the vast majority of people affected by the law would appeal. Nevertheless, they should have this opportunity in principle. If the law were to wrong only one citizen in the whole Republic, it would be a bad law. It must contain the right to an objective consideration of each individual case as a matter of principle. The slogan "when a tree is felled, splinters fly" should no longer apply in our country. The principle I am putting forward would eradicate all reasons to object to the current form of the law and, at the same time, would in no way endanger its purpose. Special senates made up of carefully selected and absolutely irreproachable judges should be established in regional and supreme courts to consider individual cases. Of course, a citizen's appeal should not be delayed. These senates should also discuss the cases of individuals who admitted in their affidavit that they did not comply with the prerequisites laid down in the law (Article 2, Paragraph 1, Letters d-h), but who, at the same time, prove that—in view of their individual circumstances—the law is unduly severe on them (for example, this involves citizens who were registered in the People's Militia without their knowledge or who demonstrably resisted totalitarian power in a party function). On the contrary, in cases where organizations or individual citizens have reason to doubt the affidavit's veracity, the appropriate organizations should be obliged to submit the matter to a normal court for a decision. This matter would be considered in accordance with common law.

I believe that if these principles proposed by me were incorporated into the law's amendment, not only would they eliminate the main elements that make the law problematic, they would also substantially simplify its implementation.

I will leave it up to the deputies to consider whether the categories of citizens who do not fulfill the prerequisites for executing certain functions should be reviewed again, whether certain categories should be curtailed, and whether—on the contrary—certain categories should be expanded. I am not certain, for example, whether in the case of the People's Militia the law should only relate to those who occupied the position of commander for more than one year; I do not know whether the law, as far as the StB is concerned, should only relate to the elements assigned to the struggle against the internal enemy; I am also not sure whether it is necessary for the law to relate to members of the 1948 screenings commissions. Forty-three years have passed since then, and even the most grave crimes, after so many years, have been expunged or barred by statute. It seems to me that, in this point, the law merely wants to demonstrate politically that the violation of human rights in our country began in February 1948. On the other hand, the law does not at all affect those people who supported lawlessness through their journalistic activity, who celebrated the political trials, and who systematically created an atmosphere of terror in society. I will also leave it up to the deputies to consider whether—if the law is amended in the manner I am proposing—the exceptions conferred upon the Interior and Defense Ministries should be abolished and whether these ministers should instead be given the right to appeal to the same court that will deal with the citizens' appeals. This would undoubtedly be correct from a legal point of view.

As we know, the law cannot be amended if it has not become valid by being promulgated in the SBIRKA ZAKONU [Legal Gazette]. I will sign the law, as usual, when I receive it with the signatures of the chairman of the Federal Assembly and the federal prime minister. I

do not intend to delay its promulgation and, thus, the possibility of its amendment by putting off signing it.

I firmly believe that the deputies will consider my proposals in a matter-of-fact manner. Please consider this letter as my legislative initiative containing the principles for an amendment to the law.

Through your office, I am also requesting the Federal Assembly to include the election of members of the Constitutional Court on its agenda as soon as possible. It is apparent that we face—and will continue to face—issues that only the Constitutional Court can resolve with final validity.

Yours sincerely,

Vaclav Havel
Prague
17 October 1991

Dubcek Will Not Sign

AU2110194591 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 17 Oct 91 p 1

[Jana Benesova report: "His Conscience Will Not Let Him; A. Dubcek Will Not Sign the Screening Law"]

[Text] We asked Federal Assembly Chairman A. Dubcek whether he will sign the screening law, for each law is signed by the three highest constitutional officials—the president, the federal prime minister, and the Federal Assembly chairman.

A. Dubcek told us: "My conscience will not let me sign the law. It is generally known that I take many exceptions to the law. I expressed them prior to its adoption and after its approval. I have to repeat that I consider this law very controversial with respect to Czechoslovak internal law and with respect to international law. Therefore, last week, I sent a letter to the federal prime minister, in which I appealed to the government to consider the possibility of amending the law. The probability may be small that, given the situation in the Federal Assembly, the eventual amendment could be passed, but I felt the necessity to express my stance also as a constitutional official. I believe that we in the political administration and in the committees should attempt to reach a certain compromise that, in turn, would lead to blunting the sharp points of the law. I am thinking particularly of the points where we are at variance with international law. The validity of the law, however, does not depend on the signature of the Federal Assembly chairman. The Assembly deputy chairmen also have signing authority. Those who identify with the law can sign it without pangs of conscience."

The logic of the matter implies that the law would be signed by one of those Federal Assembly deputy chairmen who voted in favor of the screening law—i.e. R. Battek (Civic Movement), Federal Assembly People's Chamber chairman; M. Sutovec (Public Against Violence movement), Federal Assembly Chamber of Nations chairman; or K. Viktorin (Christian Democratic Movement), Federal Assembly deputy chairman. According to our sources, R. Battek is expected to sign the law.

Havel Rejects Allegations of Arms Exports to Burma

LD2110224391 Prague CSTK in English 2112 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Prague Oct 21 (CSTK)—Responding to U.S. State Department allegations that heavy armaments are being exported from Czechoslovakia to Burma, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today told CSTK that for five years Czechoslovakia has not delivered any arms to the southeast Asian nation.

Earlier today Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Egon Lansky said no weapons have been legally exported from Czechoslovakia to Burma, but added that a Czechoslovak firm may have illegally offered arms to Burma's ruling junta.

Havel also said Czechoslovakia's new screening law needs to be amended before being implemented.

"As early as the summer, I warned that it was necessary to prevent the screening process from going wild and to give it a legal framework", said Havel.

"The Czechoslovak government legislative council knew of my opinion on the screening law even earlier.... However it did not respect (it)".

The controversial law, passed by parliament October 4, bars from high public posts former paid communist party officials, members of the people's militia and persons linked to the former StB secret police.

Prague Hijacker Surrenders to Police

LD2210073691 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 0700 GMT 22 Oct 91

[Text] After 16 hours of negotiating at Prague-Ruzyne airport, the hijacker of the Czechoslovak Airlines TU-134 on flight from Bratislava to Prague gave himself up to police early this morning. This was announced to CSTK by Martin Fendrych, the Federal Interior Ministry spokesman. The hijacking is currently being investigated by Federal investigators, and a rapid deployment unit from Prague had been called in.

The drama concluded at 0250 this morning, when the captain being held hostage escaped from the plane. The hijacker, a 17-year-old offender, was talking to a negotiator at that moment.

Sep Economic Statistics Show Further Decline

AU2110151391 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 16 Oct 91 p 2

["(vl)"-signed report: "September: Another Decline"]

[Text] Not even last month could the declining trends in our economy be averted, and only some of them were curbed. So far, it has been a success that the level of consumer prices has become more stable and the increase in the unemployment rate slower.

According to preliminary data of the Federal Statistical Office, overall industrial output in September was 30.2 percent lower than in the same period last year and, compared with August, its dynamism slowed down. During the first nine months of this year, overall industrial output was 19 percent lower than in the same period last year.

Data available at the moment do not permit an assessment of how far the decline has affected useless or superfluous production in a desirable way and how much it curbed essential and desirable output. However, in the breakdown according to industrial sectors, it can be seen that fuel production and electric power generation is 2 to 3 percent below last year's level. Furthermore, the garment industry went through a hard time (a 37.3 percent decline from January to September, compared with the same period last year), as did the textile and leather industries (minus 32.0 percent both).

According to a preliminary estimate, the overall performance in civil engineering, too, declined 32.8 percent in September compared with September last year. Large enterprises with more than 100 employees suffered a decline of 36.3 percent, and 33.1 percent since the beginning of the year.

The recession is reflected in the lower performance of the cargo transportation sector. During the first nine months of the year, railroad transportation declined, compared with last year, 23.7 percent and river transportation 17.3 percent.

The long anticipated decline in the procurement of agricultural products appeared fully in September. Its scale was greater in the Slovak Republic than in the Czech Republic. Generally, since the beginning of the year, sales by primary producers of slaughter animals, including poultry, were 17.5 percent lower, sales of milk were 14.5 percent lower, and sales of eggs 7.7 percent lower.

Overall sales in the retail system during the first nine months—again, according to preliminary estimates, only—were 262 billion korunas in current prices, which is 1.2 percent less than in the same period last year, if price effects are ignored, almost 40 percent less than last year.

Consumer prices—as we describe in detail on page 8 in today's paper—rose only 0.3 percent compared with August. This was mainly due to the increase in food prices. Also the increase in the number of unplaced job seekers, which we published in HOSPODARSKE NOVINY yesterday, was smaller than in previous months.

'Slight' Price Increases Reported

AU2110150691 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 16 Oct 91 p 8

[Federal Statistical Office, Department of Trade and Price Statistics, report: "The Development of Consumer Prices and the Cost of Living in September"]

[Text] The stagnation of consumer prices recorded in July and August continued in September, too.

There was a slight increase of 0.3 percent in consumer prices in September, compared with the previous month. It was caused by the 0.8 percent increase in food prices and 0.5 percent increase in prices for services. Industrial product prices remained on the level of the previous month and there was a slight, 0.2 percent decline in prices for public catering. In these two basic groups, prices moved slightly both ways. The price of milk and dairy product in particular increased 2.2 percent, prices for eggs and egg products 1.8 percent, fats 1.6 percent, and prices for services rose 3.3 percent in the sphere of personal services, and 3.2 percent in the sphere of education, culture, entertainment, and sport. The prices for restaurant meals dropped 0.6 percent.

During the liberalization of prices, that is, from December to September, consumer prices rose 49.6 percent. Of this, the most pronounced increase was in industrial products, 67.2 percent, public catering 45.4 percent, and services 42.5 percent. The smallest increase, 28.0 percent, was in food prices.

Compared with the same period last year, in September the consumer price increase was 54.5 percent higher. This increase reflects not only changes ensuing from the liberalization of prices, but also changes that were made from October to the end of 1990.

In the Slovak Republic, the overall level of consumer prices remains higher than in the Czech Republic (5.3 points higher compared with December). This is a consequence of higher price increases in the Slovak Republic at the beginning of the year. In the recent period, the monthly development of prices in the Czech and in the Slovak Republics was approximately the same (it was slightly higher in the Czech Republic).

Compared with the previous month—due to the 1.0 percent food prices increase—the cost of living in September rose slightly, 0.3 percent in the households of workers, employees, and farmers and 0.5 percent in the households of pensioners.

From December 1990 to September this year, the cost of living rose in farmers' households 46.0 percent, in workers' and employees' households 44.7 percent, and in pensioners' households 44.1 percent.

Correction to Slovak Hungarians on Minorities

AU2110125791

The following correction pertains to the item headlined, "Slovak Hungarian Leaders View Minorities Issues," published in the 18 October East Europe DAILY REPORT on pages 18-20:

Page 20, column one, under the subheading "The Democratic Character of Revolutions Is Disappearing," paragraph one, first sentence, make read: [RESPEKT] The Egyutteles [movement].... (identifying interviewer)

Last paragraph, last sentence, make read: ...the federal framework.

[Duray] I consider it.... (identifying interviewee)

Column two, under the subheading "A Source of More Tension," paragraph one, first sentence, make read: [RESPEKT] Is it possible.... (identifying interviewer)

Paragraph three, only sentence, make read: ...the Slovak state?

[Duray] The Egyutteles talked.... (identifying interviewee)

Horn Addresses Assembly on 'Tensions' With Romania

LD2110164591 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1408 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Speech by Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gyula Horn to a National Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Text] Esteemed National Assembly: I have asked permission to speak on an extraordinary matter, since the shaping of Hungary's relationship with her neighbors is, in my judgement, a matter of vital importance. It is well known that new tensions have arisen in Hungarian-Romanian relations, and the scene of these tensions is the Bucharest Parliament, where last week there were rather crude, explicitly provocative, outbursts and statements regarding Transylvanian Magyardom and the Hungarian Republic—not merely the ill-considered pronouncements of one or more deputies.

The reason I do not describe this matter as unprecedented is because, after all, we witnessed similar phenomena in former years. It is well known that the pretext for this attack was provided by the objective, the advertised program, of the representatives of the Transylvanian Szeklers in Covasna and Harghita counties in connection with the restoration of Szeklerland's autonomy. One can debate whether or not there is any justification for such an endeavor. The decision on the matter, in the last resort, is up to Romania's nations, minorities, or rather their legal representatives.

On the other hand, it is also our affair, or rather the affair of Europe as a whole, when in Bucharest they formulate a concept in parliament that is aimed at the elimination of an ethnic group.

I should like to recall that barely one year ago, in November 1990, in Paris, there was born the Charter, the Paris Charter, to which was linked a joint declaration adopted by the representatives, the highest level representatives, of 22 states. In these two documents, the participating states undertook a commitment to guarantee in their own countries the assertion of human rights and basic freedom rights laid down in the UN Basic Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. They also laid it down—and I wish to cite this in connection with this matter—that the ethnic, cultural, and religious identity of the national minorities enjoys protection, and that individuals belonging to national minorities have the right to freely express, to maintain, and to develop this identity without discrimination, on the basis of full equality before the law.

Romania is a signatory to both agreements, both documents. It signed both of them.

For me the matter is also shocking because, after all, certain deputies of the Romanian Parliament, and, unfortunately, certain authorities in Romania as well, launched some time ago a campaign of slander, moreover of persecution [hajtovadaszat] against Bishop Laszlo Tokes, against the man who had an outstanding role, who had outstanding merits, in the overthrow of the Ceausescu dictatorship, and who also today labors in the interest of the reconciliation and prosperity of Romania's nations.

Also unacceptable is the campaign being waged against the Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania, a constitutional parliamentary party. In Romania, many are demanding the banning of this organization, this party, the banning of an organization that is not full of hatred, that wants the good of the country, that evinces tolerance and expertise, and whose entire activity is imbued with legality.

According to my conviction, it is not to Europe that the path of the Romanian extremists is leading. If these endeavors succeed, they could plunge Romania back into despotism, into a state of conflicts, antagonisms and confrontations.

According to my conviction, I am expressing your opinion as well when I say that Hungary is interested in a democratic, stable Romania, built on European traditions and values. And also on this occasion we are guided by the intention—and we pointed this out on more than one occasion to the deputies of the Romanian Parliament—of promoting by every possible means the prosperity of Romania within the European frameworks; and it was in this spirit that the Hungarian Republic supported Romania's intention to join the Council of Europe.

It is also evident that we do not overstep, and what is more, neither can we overstep, the limits set by international agreements, treaties. And I should also like to stress that we keep it in view that—particularly for Romania's Magyardom—every endeavor that threatens the outbreak of conflicts can be of mortal danger.

But, at the same time, it is not only our right but also our duty to formulate our opinion regarding the tensions that have arisen in Romania in connection with the national, the nationality, antagonisms that affect us and the whole of Europe.

I should like to stress that, according to my conviction, although there are certain extremist voices in this country—in our country as well—even so, Hungarian politics and the Hungarian mass media are basically guided by the intentions laid down in these international documents. Just as we do not have the right—and neither do we have the possibility—for example, to question Romania's intention to join NATO or any other alliance. Incidentally, both the above-mentioned Paris charter and the joint document that was formulated when it came into being declare that every state has the right to participate or not to participate in an alliance treaty as a partner.

On the basis of all this, both now and in the future, we must strive to talk to each other, to try and settle by

negotiated means, to resolve, to calm down, those tensions that have arisen in the country and in our relations.

In the past few days, I welcomed the proposal by my Bucharest partner, Corneliu Manescu, that a delegation of the Foreign Affairs Committee should visit Bucharest and hold discussions with the Romanian partners.

In view of the situation that has evolved, and with regard to the sensitive nature of Hungarian-Romanian relations, I propose to our esteemed speaker, the speaker of our National Assembly, that he address a message to his Romanian partner and propose discussions between the representatives of the two national assemblies.

According to my conviction it would be important to take up the thread of discussions at every level, including the government level.

Allow me, by way of conclusion, to stress this: It is our lot, together with Romania, to live beside each other. And if this is our lot, then we must take it as our starting point that we should not only agree on the point that we are neighbors, but we should also try to do everything that, in the new system of European relations that is now evolving, we should find the common denominators, and with a united will deter the dangers that threaten us all. Thank you very much for your attention.

Antall Assembly Speech Reported

LD2110171791 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1417 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Speech by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in reply to a speech by Gyula Horn at the National Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Text] Mr. Speaker, Esteemed House: I was pleased to hear the words of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gyula Horn, although I could not be here from the beginning because a delegation of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee has just left my office.

I agree that a good-neighborly and friendly relationship is necessary between Romania and Hungary due to our close proximity and interdependence on the one hand, and because of the situation and fate of the Magyar national minority on the other. We, of course, regard all that has been taking place in Romania, and that has been taking place against Magyar deputies, Magyar senators, or against Magyar organizations and individuals in general, as disgusting. We deeply condemn this, and we continue to strive for improving relations between Romania and Hungary.

I believe that we do not have to look back too far in history. It is enough to recall the period following the Romanian revolution, when, in a reverse situation, Chairman Horn was the foreign minister, and we evaluated together and could predict together the prospects of the revolution in Romania. We both showed optimism that the relationship between Romania and Hungary would change as a result of the revolution and the assistance, and a new era would commence in the relations of the two countries. We expressed our trust, but we were both rather skeptical.

I think that the period that has elapsed indicates that no breakthrough could be achieved in Romanian-Hungarian relations either during the previous government, nor after that, apart from a brief, transitional period when the situation was still dominated by the enthusiasm of the revolution. What is more, since the first few months following the revolution, Romania's internal relations have gradually deteriorated. Talks were held on several occasions between Romanian and Hungarian government bodies, personal dialogues could take place with the Romanian president, too, and also between the foreign ministers, but when the smallest specific matter arose, such simple issues as the restoration of the consulate-general in Cluj, we were immediately refused.

On other issues, be it either an issue of education or any other issue, I here, before the whole world and the National Assembly, too, declare that we are striving to improve our relationship, we are striving for good relations and for improving the situation on the basis of the Helsinki and Paris charters, too. However, I do not recommend to the esteemed National Assembly that the National Assembly take upon itself, either through its speaker or the legislative committee, the responsible task that the government has to carry out in this respect and that it has been in fact carrying out. The Romanian side's attempts, proposals for formal talks, would lead to nowhere if we did not negotiate with adequate preparation and in the hope of success. The reason we did not achieve any progress is not that we did not intend to do so, but that internal political relations in Romania, Romania's ideas, the defining of the place of Romania in Europe from their own viewpoint, have not made it possible so far for genuine talks, apart from the areas of military and cultural agreements, to make further progress.

The Foreign Ministry is at present working on a comprehensive summary on this issue, and I propose that this be first examined and then this activity be continued by the government and the Foreign Affairs Committee, in accord, of course, each according to his role. However, I think that, since the Arad meeting, it would be a pity to claim that here we have committed defaults, or that from the Hungarian side—either the previous government or our government—did not do its best for success. I believe that the legislature should make a decision on this issue in the wake of this. I can assure the National Assembly that we are doing our utmost to improve Romanian-Hungarian relations, as well as to guarantee in Europe the human and minority rights of Magyardom in Romania. Thank you.

Belgrade Media Criticize Antall Speech to MDF

LD2110143991 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] In Belgrade, several newspapers and radio stations have described Jozsef Antall's statements yesterday as an anti-Serbian attack. At the national conference of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the Hungarian prime minister said that Serbian nationalism is holding the Magyar minority hostage, and the number of the Magyars who were killed in the civil war is high compared with the population size. Belgrade Radio considers Jozsef Antall's statement as the most open Hungarian attack against the Serbian leadership so far. The daily paper POLITIKA called the prime minister's statements unfounded.

Jeszenszky Sees Need for Solving Security Issues

AU1810192491 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Oct 91 p 6

[Unattributed report: "New Answer to Security Issue Must Be Found in Hungary"]

[Text] Budapest, 17 October—The events in Yugoslavia that increasingly pose a threat for Hungary, as well as other phenomena of instability in its area, prompt Hungary to tackle security issues with a new urgency. In an interview with FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, Hungary's Foreign Minister Jeszenszky stated that the Hungarian Government sees a solution to the security issues for Hungary and for the whole of Eastern Central Europe in the expansion of NATO's sphere of competence to the whole region and in the "association agreements" of Hungary, and possibly other states, with the Western defense alliance. Prime Minister Antall and Mr. Jeszenszky want to present this concept to the NATO countries. However, they are well aware that progress cannot be achieved without Moscow's positive participation. Initial reactions from Moscow are encouraging. Hungary is surrounded by some country's that are not well disposed toward it and that possess considerable military potential. In cooperation with other countries, Hungary wants to protect itself against instability. This is not possible with its greatly reduced armed forces.

Jeszenszky pointed out that, in the past few days, Yugoslavia again violated Hungary's airspace and that the Yugoslav "People's Army" is beginning to lay mines along the border with Albania. The existence of an enormous war machinery that is not subject to anybody's control, that acts without responsibility, and that is apparently headed by adventuresome generals poses a threat to Hungary. The Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, including 500,000 people, are apparently being treated as hostages by these generals under the current Serbian leadership. Numerous Hungarians have been mobilized, and their units, like Albanian units, have been wedged in by Serbian guards and positioned in the most dangerous places on the front where they cannot escape, Jeszenszky stressed.

In addition, the Serbians have a hostile attitude toward the Hungarians, and they interfere with their school system. Entire Hungarian villages in the area of Osijek and Vukovar have been leveled by the "People's Army" and the Serbs. Serbia is aware that Hungary is an important transit country for Serbia to maintain its links with Europe. In addition, Serbia interrupted the Adriatic pipeline southeast of Zagreb so that Hungary's oil supply is impeded. A total of 40,000 refugees—mostly Croats but also Hungarian and Serbian deserters—have reached Hungary.

Jeszenszky does not conceal his view that the West, in general, and the EC, in particular, proved to be quite inefficient in the Yugoslav crisis. The West insisted on Yugoslavia's unity much too long and ignored the realities. The EC still accepts the fact that Serbia uses the "Yugoslav cover" for its own purposes, despite the fact that it does not really cover anything any more. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev no longer invited a representative of the federal authority to attend consultations in Moscow. Hungary would like to acknowledge the new realities in Yugoslavia and recognize Croatia and Slovenia, and the other republics as well, but it can only act in coordination with the EC and the other Western states. The Hungarian foreign minister hopes that the EC will finally show "more courage."

Jeszenszky stated that Hungary does not want to become member of NATO, but would like to establish some form of association that has yet to be defined. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO is the only organization in Europe that is capable of guaranteeing security and stability. The Soviet Union's fear of an expansion of NATO area should be dispelled. Only the states that "respect democracy and human rights" and that agree on "common principles" should join NATO.

Foreign Minister Jeszenszky did not hide his opinion that he would not like Romania to be a member of this club. An unclear concept, that has openly been described as unrealistic by the opposition, seems to place Romania on an unspecified "other side." The concept was criticized by the Hungarian legislature as well. It seems to be a concept that has decisively been shaped by the "Hungarian Democratic Forum" under the leadership of Prime Minister Antall. The politicians of this party do not see democracy in Romania. They claim that the Hungarian minority has almost no rights. They apparently want to attack Romania openly. However, with this behavior, they are in opposition to the party of the Hungarian minority in Romania that has decided to cooperate pragmatically within the Romanian political system.

Antall Views Tasks, Role of Local Government

AU2110135691 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 16 Oct 91 p 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by Katalin Meresz; in Budapest on 14 October: "Diminishing Party Policy Considerations"]

[Text] The first district local self-government in Budapest, led by Mayor Imre Ligeti, is the only one where the government parties won in the local elections. At a closed and friendly discussion on 14 October, Jozsef Antall thanked the deputies for their activity so far and gave us an interview after this meeting:

[Meresz] Does the fact that most of its leaders come from the governing parties give the first district self-government any privileges?

[Antall] Today's laws exclude such a possibility. The relations between local governments and the national government are regulated by the law and, therefore, there is neither a way nor a desire to make exceptions, and the two-level, local, self-government system is also a guarantee of this.

[Meresz] In your opinion, can the often parallel tasks and sphere of authority of the administrative bodies and the local self-governments work?

[Antall] Local self-government, which in the classic legal and administrative sense deals with general public administration, has gradually covered the local administration also in recent decades. The real problem is that most of the local administration got into the hands of the local councils formally at a time when these councils were not yet really self-governing bodies, and the problems that are now emerging in today's self-government system derive from those times. In the old regime, local councils automatically carried out the tasks dictated by the central government; today, local self-government bodies are really in a situation to decide for themselves, and their interests often conflict with professional considerations. The bodies in question often expect corrections from the central government and, of course, this can only be imagined very rarely.

Obviously, there are tensions, but it would have been strange to delete from the law on local self-government the administrative issues formally attributed to the self-government.

[Meresz] In your opinion, is it possible that the controversies deriving from the two-level aspect of our capital's self-government system—the controversy between the chief mayor and the district mayors—will disappear with time?

[Antall] On the one hand, there will always be certain opposing interests, just like common or identical interests. This is only natural. The essential thing is that these differences of interests should disappear on the common issues.

On the other hand, by advancing toward lower realms of state administration, party policy considerations diminish in connection with concrete issues, because issues themselves always determine the way things are done better than party policy considerations.

Smallholders Propose Ban on Former Communists

AU2110152991 Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 15 Oct 91 pp 6-7

[Interview with Bela Nemeth, general secretary of the Independent Smallholders' Party, by Katalin Rangos; place and date not given: "Party Secretaries and Nobel Prizes—A Red Stain on the Curriculum Vitae—Not to Recsk but to a Parking Place"]

[Text] What should happen to people who were members or functionaries of the communist party in the previous system? In his speech at Vasarosnameny, the chairman of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKgP] suggested that the National Assembly make a law that would ban former Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [MSZMP] members—800,000 people—from filling leading positions for five years. Katalin Rangos asked Bela Nemeth about the technical sides of this issue:

[Rangos] Did you take this draft bill to the coalition talks?

[Nemeth] The coalition talks have already started and, naturally, the change of the regime is one of the issues. Many people overdramatize this issue, though, because the point is that the past system favored MSZMP members, and this is a well-known fact....

In Hidden Positions

[Rangos] Is it an exaggeration to assume that 800,000 people were favored by the MSZMP?

[Nemeth] Let me continue. These people were favored because, obviously, very many people joined the MSZMP with a view to gaining advantages. I asked my lawyer friend, [FKgP Chairman] Torgyan, whether the Constitution said anything about compulsory MSZMP membership in relation to filling leading positions. The statement was not broadcast this way. Instead, it said that MSZMP functionaries should not fill leading positions for five years. I think this is an important difference.

[Rangos] Undoubtedly. However, how do you assess who was a functionary? Are you talking about exempted MSZMP functionaries or....

[Nemeth] Well, first, we will obviously have to examine people who lived from this. Such a person had the real job of a functionary. However, in very many cases, party secretaries had some hidden position in a factory or other place, and they still ruled over life and death. This is what has to be examined this way, but it is a difficult problem. It is not easy to tackle....

[Rangos] It is so difficult that at first hearing....

[Nemeth] At first hearing, it does seem like that.

[Rangos] A very large apparatus would be needed to examine who did what and on what level in the previous regime....

[Nemeth] I do not think that we will need that, because people are generally known everywhere. I also do not believe that their situation would be too disadvantaged, just because they cannot be in leading positions. This does not even appear to be a witch-hunt. Just remember that, in the previous regime, people were locked up in prisons for any kind of alleged reason and purely on the basis of assumptions. We do not want to do that; but what entitles these gentlemen to remain leaders? I do not think that this can be continued....

[Rangos] I would be interested in the practical aspects, namely how would you examine who did something and what....

[Nemeth] Naturally, very simply. Every person prepares a curriculum vitae before submitting an application, and he obviously has to state if he filled a party function....

Banned for Five Years

[Rangos] And of which party he was a member....

[Nemeth] Or not. That would be all, one question. Is this discrimination? It would certainly be classed as discrimination for five years, but I believe that this is important and essential to settle the past and start with a clean record....

[Rangos] However, now people are no longer asked to which party they belong. Questions relating to this subject cannot be asked anymore, except for the armed forces and places where no party membership is allowed. Do you sense a contradiction?

[Nemeth] I do not sense any contradiction, but the Czechs are also undoubtedly dealing with this issue. Therefore, some kind of sanctions are applied everywhere. In my opinion, a person who was a party secretary in the past can stand aside for five years. We do not want to put them in Recsk [former political prison], God forbid, but they cannot be in leading positions, and the range of these leading positions will have to be laid down in a law. This is a simple matter.

[Rangos] What kind of a leading position would people not be able to fill? Where does a leading position begin?

[Nemeth] He could not be a factory director or a bank director, and it is also inadvisable that, let us say, former MSZMP secretaries fill the post of the country's prime minister or similar positions as public dignitaries.

[Rangos] You said that this kind of discrimination would apply to people who submit applications for various leading positions now. How would those people who are already employed or have a function be affected?

[Nemeth] I suppose it would not hurt them to be assessed, either....

[Rangos] Do you expect to implement this in the form of political screening committees or in some other way?

[Nemeth] No, I repeat, everyone has a decent curriculum vitae and, on the basis of that, a higher authority can assess where that person belonged. I do not believe this is complicated.

[Rangos] Will this higher authority order certain people to hand in a curriculum vitae?

[Nemeth] It will examine the past of the subordinate leader and perhaps, his leader. We would not place these people in an impossible situation, but we do not consider them to be suitable for leading positions.

Regulations and Exceptions

[Rangos] What happens if these people are otherwise suitable to have a leading positions, and if they are indeed excellent professionals? That is also a possibility, is it not?

[Nemeth] They can be accepted as colleagues and can work very well as such. It is my conviction, and I state this after careful consideration, that much better experts can be found in the second line than people who are said to be experts just now. What is missing? Healthy fresh blood....

[Rangos] Do you think that this will create a great movement of people?

[Nemeth] The great movement will have to start....

[Rangos] And the second line will come?

[Nemeth] I trust that it will.

[Rangos] In your opinion, how many people will be affected by all this?

[Nemeth] In my opinion, some 40,000 or 50,000 people would be affected at the most. Unfortunately, the change of the political regime was not concomitant with the change of the economic system, and the old set of people remained in a considerable proportion of economic units. The counter-selected people will move away from positions they are unfit for. This is the essence of the whole issue. I believe that this is understandable and clear now.

[Rangos] Is this the essence, even if these people have since proved that they happen to be suitable?

[Nemeth] Human beings have a wonderful characteristic, namely that everyone is one person and only that one person. In this life, there has never been a law or regulation that applied equally to everyone. If this person had received a Nobel prize because of excellence in science but, in the meantime, he was also a party secretary, then, in this case, it is his knowledge that obviously has to be recognized.

[Rangos] However, in stating this, you are saying that the law will apply to some but not to others....

[Nemeth] That has never happened in history and will not happen this time, either. That is certain.

[Rangos] What will not happen?

[Nemeth] It will not happen that it would apply to everyone. I have told you the example of the Nobel prize....

[Rangos] I understand that, but the determining principle of a legal provision is usually the fact that it assesses things according to the same conditions, and it applies equally to everyone.

[Nemeth] Yes, but....

[Rangos] Is that going to be the practice?

[Nemeth] In practice and in the regulations, too, there are always various kinds of exceptions. These exceptions have always existed.

[Rangos] Mr. Nemeth, do all members of your faction or the FKgP agree with drafting this bill and taking it to the coalition talks?

[Nemeth] It is a natural demand of 98 percent of our membership to draft this bill....

[Rangos] Do you have a strategy for the eventuality that your coalition partners say that they will not deal with this issue or not in this form?

[Nemeth] We will try to convince our negotiating partners that our views are correct and everything will depend on how well we negotiate.

SZDSZ Leader Reports Opinion Poll Results

AU2110152291 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 17 Oct 91 p 3

[Report by Attila Farkas: "The SZDSZ Is Opposition, Not Alternative"]

[Text] The voters accept the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] as an opposition party, but it is worth thinking about the fact that, although the voters are dissatisfied with government activity, they do not regard the SZDSZ as an alternative—SZDSZ leader Balint Magyar summed up the major conclusions of a 240-page survey prepared by the party at a news conference held on 16 October.

It also transpires from an analysis of the aforementioned opinion poll that, in the past one and a half years, the parties in Hungary have failed to eliminate the disturbances in public political thinking and to develop a stable electorate for themselves. Although SZDSZ sympathizers make up the largest number of people among the potential voters who take a stand in favor of democratic values and a change in the economic regime and who firmly reject totalitarian solutions, a certain division is perceptible among the voters and the party members alike. However, most of the people surveyed think that the SZDSZ has become uncertain.

Some 62 percent of the SZDSZ members regard liberalism as a positive value, but one-third of the SZDSZ members do not support the liberal alternative in solving either economic or social issues. Identification with liberalism is primarily characteristic of the male population of between 30 to 50 years of age who live in big towns. In connection with this, Andras Gyekiczky, deputy director of the Institute of Political Studies and head of the research project ordered by the SZDSZ, noted that support for liberal parties is greater than the extent of liberal thought among the voters. However, the same applies to other intellectual trends, because people do not vote primarily for an ideology, but they prefer a pragmatic approach to everyday issues. The SZDSZ membership generally rejects social democracy as an alternative to liberalism, but many people vote for certain social democratic values when this issue does not appear as a slogan.

It transpires from the aforementioned survey that the SZDSZ members are quite united, both in their sympathy toward the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] and in expressing their antipathy toward the other parties. Some 80-85 percent of SZDSZ members consider the FIDESZ to be closest to their party. However, the SZDSZ members are divided on their views of government parties. Among these parties, the SZDSZ members think that the Christian Democrats are the closest to their party, and the Smallholders' Party is the most remote party for them.

According to the opinion poll results, the list of the most popular SZDSZ politicians is as follows: Gabor Demszky, Peter Tolgyessy, Ivan Peto, Laszlo Rajk, and Miklos Gaspar Tamas. Balint Magyar is the most popular SZDSZ politician.

Foreign Money Markets Show Increased Confidence

LD1810220391 Budapest MTI in English 2041 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Text] Budapest, October 18 (MTI)—"The confidence of the foreign money market has increased considerably towards Hungary. The question today is no longer whether the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) is able to pay its debts on time or not. Thus Hungary's credit conditions are expected to show an essential improvement," said NBH President Gyorgy Suranyi today.

Hungary's favourable evaluation, he said, is a big aid towards reaching its economic goals. The conditions of making the forint convertible are also improving, and might occur as early as the end of 1992 or the beginning of 1993.

Until then, foreign currency reserves should be considerably increased, although these have nearly doubled over the past year. At present the reserves are valued at 2.6 billion dollars.

Suranyi believes foreign currency reserves equivalent to three to five months value of imports are needed to ensure forint convertibility. This implies reserves of 3-3.5 billion dollars. However, in the beginning, when risks will increase considerably, even greater reserves should be available. Therefore, the NBH plans to set aside additional stand-by reserves of some 1-1.5 billion dollars. Talks were held earlier in Japan about ensuring this.

Together with the East European reform countries, Hungary has taken steps for the mutual convertibility of the national currencies. An agreement was reached with Czechoslovak National Bank President two weeks ago to freely exchange the koruna and the forint in both countries for non-commercial turnover. Plans are to extend the agreement to commercial turnover in the near future.

Surany agreed in setting up a similar agreement with the Polish Central Bank president, during his talks in Bangkok.

Suranyi made the remarks on returning to Budapest from Bangkok, where he attended the annual General Assembly of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Decrease in Country's Foreign Debt Reported

LD1810161991 Budapest MTI in English 1252 GMT 17 Oct 91

[Text] Budapest, Oct 17 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Hungary's gross foreign debt, calculated in dollars, shrank slightly this year, a senior official of the National Bank of Hungary, Bela Sandor, told MTI today.

In 1987, the gross foreign debt of the country stood at 20.5 billion dollars and peaked at 21.5 billion dollars in 1990. A new NBH report shows that Hungary's gross foreign debt was 19.9 billion USD in July this year.

Sandor explained that the country's foreign debt calculated in dollars is essentially determined by two factors: the state of the current account and the rate of the dollar. He said the country's foreign debt continued to grow in 1987, 1988, and 1989 because of large current account deficits (800 million dollars in the first two years and 1.4 billion dollars in 1989) and a strong dollar. However, because 30 percent of the country's foreign debt is in German marks and 20-25 percent is in Yen, and these currencies weakened against the dollar in those years, the country's foreign debt calculated in dollars did not grow significantly.

In 1990, Hungary's current account showed a surplus of 127 million dollars, but due to the weakness of the dollar, the foreign debt increased. The improvement in the current account continues and it showed a surplus of 180 million dollars at the end of August.

The composition of the country's foreign loans has improved with short-term credits now accounting for 10 percent of the stock. The average maturity of the country's loans is 6 years.

The NBH had the most short-term loans—3.3 billion dollars worth—in 1988. In that year medium and long-term loans amounted to 16.2 billion dollars. Since that time the stock of short-term loans has decreased and that of medium and long-term loans grown.

In June this year, the NBH owed 2 billion dollars in short-term loans and 17.7 billion dollars in medium and long-term loans. Credits in non-convertible currencies equalled 200 million dollars.

In 1991, the NBH has to pay back 1.164 billion dollars in capital, plus 1.2-1.3 billion dollars interest. In spite of minor advance payments on next year's debt service this year, capital repayment will amount to 2.1-2.2 billion dollars in 1992.

The peak years will be 1995 and 1996 when the annual capital repayment will be 2.6 billion dollars. The country's foreign exchange reserves amount to 2.6 billion dollars at the moment, and are expected to remain at this level until the end of the year.

Kaczynski Discusses Center Accord's Program

AU2210080591 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with Center Accord Leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski by Bozena Wawrzewska and Krzysztof Gottesman; place and date not given: "I Am Afraid About the Future Sejm"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [RZECZPOSPOLITA] Have relations between Lech Walesa and the Center Accord changed, now that he is president?

[Kaczynski] Relations between the president and the Center Accord were always more or less the same. Certain things are often taken to extremes in the way in which they are communicated to the public. I recently read that someone feared, that many people feared, that the Center Accord would politically subsume all of "Solidarity." No one ever had any such plans, because we believed that to be completely impossible.

In the same way, it was never the case that the Center Accord was Walesa's only support. That is a myth.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] So how would you describe the character of your party?

[Kaczynski] The Center Accord was a party that always had aims other than to become the president's party. We do not want to be a typical Gaullist party, to cite the classic example. We want to be a party that has an identity of its own and an existence of its own. We support the president, but we are not his party. We are a Christian democratic party, and we want to strengthen our Christian democratic character. We understand the term Christian democrat in the Western European sense, that is, a center right party that is not linked to a particular class.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] If, before the elections, you were to give voters a brief description of the party's program, what would you say?

[Kaczynski] The question now is not whether we should have a democracy, but what kind of democracy we should have. The main issue is above all: How are we to arrive at democracy and a market economy. The path that we should take and the future form of Polish democracy are matters that have to be considered. You cannot do what the Democratic Union is doing, that is, make several slogans your cause, and then condemn everyone who does not call the slogans into question but wants to discuss their actual form.

We have to consider how to make democracy in Poland effective, so that it cannot be overthrown easily. We must rethink the path to democracy that we have travelled in the short time since 1989. We believed that the path was badly planned from the outset. It was based on the assumption that a democratic system could be introduced in a society in the late stages of a communism that was falling apart, without any additional measures. It was simply a question of removing communist restrictions on the economy and public life, and introducing several basic categories such as money, and everything would go well. However, from the outset, we said that such a course was catastrophic, because the entire post-communist setup regulating economic life, the true one and not the one established by the Planning Commission, was also being carried over. The course is simply dysfunctional with respect to the plan for social and economic restructuring, with all its negative consequences. We said that from the moment the Center Accord was formed, but that this is now obviously being confirmed is a bitter source of satisfaction. Tolerance toward post-communist forces, giving them an enormous advantage in organizing their political institutions, and the failure to confiscate the assets of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], when that was necessary, means that we started out with nothing, and they held all the trump cards. The post-communist setup has been preserved in the press: For example, to take the weeklies, the entire spectrum, ranging from rags such as SKANDALE to serious publications such as POLITYKA, remains in the hands of former communists. This kind of setup has an enormous impact on society and is tolerated because of slogans about "wiping the slate clean" and "the rule of law state."

The effect of this on the state is that there is a fundamental social imbalance, and that the imbalance will become greater. We want to prevent that. Although many opportunities have been lost and many issues can no longer be dealt with today, where something needs to be done, it should be done, because a certain degree of restructuring is, nevertheless, possible. Unfortunately, it is mainly possible in a negative form. We do not conceal that. Something has to be taken away from nomenklatura companies. We have to consider whether the media should be reorganized or not. These are exceptionally delicate issues, because they are connected with the observance of law and democracy. We are aware of this aspect. Nevertheless, changes of this kind have to be considered.

The banking system definitely has to be reorganized, and surely everyone can see that today.

From the outset, we have been saying that leaving the banking system in those hands would have negative consequences. The Art-B affair is just one, specific case. The banks control what is known in economics as entry to the market, that is, the opportunity to set up one's own company. If you are part of the post-communist network, you have a chance of getting a loan; if you are not, your changes are significantly lower. [passage omitted]

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] How effective will the next Sejm be?

[Kaczynski] I fear that it will not be very effective. With the present electoral code, the current social situation, and the trend to make politics about personalities, it cannot be otherwise.

Democratic Union Holds Lead in Election Poll

AU2110195591 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 17 Oct 91 p 3

['PAC'-signed report: "Union Still First"]

[Text] Twenty-three percent of those who want to vote and already know to whom they will give their backing will cast their votes for the Democratic Union; 11.5 percent will vote for the Liberal Democratic Congress, and 9 percent will vote for the Center Accord and "Solidarity." Those were the results of a poll of a sample of 1,014 persons nationwide, conducted by the Sopot-based Sociological Research Workshop on 14 October.

The three main post-"Solidarity" parties received a combined total of 43 percent and, along with "Solidarity," more than half the votes. The Democratic Left Alliance received almost 7 percent, and the Confederation for an Independent Poland did not fare badly, obtaining 4.6 percent.

The Polish Beer Lovers' Party came next (4.2 percent), followed by the Christian-Peasant Bloc (3.9 percent), the "Solidarity" Peasant Alliance (3.8 percent), Labor "Solidarity" (3.5 percent), the Christian Democratic Party (3.3. percent), the Catholic Election Campaign (2.9 percent), the Polish Peasant Party and the Democratic Party (2.5 percent each). The Union for Real Politics fared poorly (2 percent), and Bujak's Democratic-Social Movement received the support of four of the persons polled (0.4 percent).

"Asked whether they would vote, 46 percent said that they 'definitely would,' and only they will no doubt go to vote," says Ryszard Pienkowski of the Sopot workshop.

One-third are awaiting the elections with interest, and 8 percent are looking forward to them. The rest feel indifference (31 percent) or have negative feelings about the elections, 11 percent find the election boring, 8 percent are annoyed, and 7 percent feel regret.

Only one-fourth of those polled (27 percent), said that they had a better idea of who is who in Polish politics thanks to the elections, 15 percent have a worse idea than before the elections, and as many as one-third (37 percent) said they "understand just as little as before."

Spokesman Assures Burmese Arms Contract Expired

LD2110190991 Warsaw PAP in English 1738 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 21—Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry Grzegorz Dziemidowicz stated Monday that "Poland has not been and does not intend to sell arms to Burma. The deal, concluded last year, provided for delivery to Burma of civil helicopters, fire engines and trucks. The contract has already expired following the completion of deliveries." The statement came in response to the Saturday information of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth M. Quinn who said that "the United States tried to persuade China, Poland and Czechoslovakia and some other countries to stop selling arms to Burma."

Correction to Walesa Views Problems in Europe

AU1810114491

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Walesa Views Current Problems in Europe," published in the 18 October DAILY REPORT on pages 38-40:

Page 38, column two, last paragraph, only sentence, make read: ...with what followed?

[Walesa] Yes, and no. So far, cooperation.... (rewording)

Page 40, column two, paragraph four, second sentence, make read: ...period when I divided Solidarity, broke up.... (rewording)

Prime Minister Stolojan Discusses Reform

AU2110212591 Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 18 Oct p 1

[Interview with Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan by Gyozo Roman; place and date not given: "The Reform Continues"]

[Text] [Roman] Mr. Prime Minister! You needed courage to accept this position at a time when Romania is in such a difficult situation.

[Stolojan] We have little time to solve the problems. As I also said in Parliament, we have many urgent problems, so we should start work as soon as possible.

[Roman] Romania needs capital. How will we improve our relations with the IMF and the World Bank?

[Stolojan] A Romanian financial delegation is currently negotiating with IMF and World Bank officials in Bangkok. Financial and economic experts will hold a meeting in Romania at the end of October, and we hope to find a solution to our problems so that capital will flow into the country in accordance with the agreements.

[Roman] There is no money for the time being, but winter is surely coming. We heard that certain basic foodstuffs will again be rationed.

[Stolojan] If we do not find suppliers of basic foodstuffs, we will be forced to distribute them more rationally and make sure that everyone receives his share from the amount of basic foodstuffs available. There is no other solution! However, we will only introduce this as a last recourse. To put it even clearer: Let us suppose that we do not get the necessary amount of sugar to fulfill our population's demands. We cannot allow the price to regulate the sales, so we will ration it.

[Roman] Will we continue to carry out the economic reform in this case, too? Is this not a dangerous thing?

[Stolojan] According to statistical surveys, 81 percent of the population supports reforms, and 46 percent would like to see an accelerated pace of reforms. I do not think anyone in Romania would like us to drag this out for nine years, as the Poles did. Everything should be based on new foundations, and as quickly as possible.

[Roman] People often do not accept the price and the difficulties of the reform, although they are aware of the need for economic reform.

[Stolojan] Difficulties are unavoidable; we must place everything on new foundations and create new relations, and this is not easy.

[Roman] What relations would you like to develop with the trade unions?

[Stolojan] We regard them as our partners. We will try to maintain an open dialogue, to come to an agreement about our problems. It is clear for us that we will have to coordinate all our actions with them; however, this does not mean that we can promise and give more than we actually have. We must consider reality during this dialogue. At present, the funds requested from our Finance Ministry are three times higher than our entire budget. Our budget deficit is much higher than our overall income. I do not say that it is impossible to live under such circumstances. Take the example of the Latin American countries, where this situation has been prevailing for years. However, this cannot go on indefinitely.

[Roman] Is our population also afraid of poverty caused by the reform?

[Stolojan] One of our tasks is to dissipate this fear. We must increase production. I am convinced that our problems do not derive from our lack of funds. Take the housing construction, for example. A lot of money has accumulated, and the savings bank would also provide funds for this, but the builders do not work. Why? I will answer this question: There is money, but they do not want to work. Builders currently engaged in the construction of various projects do not want to construct houses now, although I can assure them that housing is needed and the population would pay the installments and the interest. Dragging out construction also leads to dissatisfaction because a person who signed a contract for 700,000 lei would have to pay 3 million for his house because of the delay. I could give a lot of such examples in which there is money around, but people are reluctant to work.

[Roman] Indeed, there is money around, both black and red. Would you consider the introduction of new money in Romania?

[Stolojan] It is too late for this. We could have done that in December 1989, and we would have sterilized the capital. However, life went on, and people have accumulated certain amounts of money honestly or dishonestly in recent months, mainly from trade. Today, it would be difficult to separate the clean capital from the dirty. We should rather see to it that these funds are invested.

[Roman] Will the new government's relations with the Parliament improve?

[Stolojan] We would like to have good relations. As you saw, we have eliminated the position of state minister. I think this will lead to a political balance. Honestly speaking, we do not have much to divide with the Parliament members. Besides, in my opinion, the everyday events will "crush" us or our time.

[Roman] Many people complain that the taxes are too high. Do you plan a modification of the tax system?

[Stolojan] The actual situation in the world today is that direct taxes are decreasing. However, it is impossible to take such a step in an isolated way, and we must observe certain proportions because this affects our entire

budget. An increasing number of countries are introducing the value-added tax. It is true that they prepared this step over many years. We planned to introduce this beginning with 1 January 1992, but foreign experts warned us that this would not work overnight and that we should be very careful if we want to avoid the collapse of our economy. Thus, we will introduce this in 1993 at the earliest.

[Roman] Foreign capital does not come into the country. Would imminent local government elections bring any change in Romania's image and trustworthiness?

[Stolojan] Yes, they would. The sooner the better. However, this requires a consensus among the parties. The 13-day negotiations with the party leaders convinced me that there are huge differences of opinions on this issue, even between the bigger parties.

[Roman] Will you replace the old mayors?

[Stolojan] This is also a complex problem. If the National Salvation Front likes the mayor, the opposition does not like him. According to whose desire should I then replace him? In my opinion, one can be replaced if it turns out that he is not suitable or has been involved in illegal matters. We take action in such cases. Local elections will bring a solution here, too.

New Interior Minister Views Appointment, Tasks

AU2210122291 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 18 Oct 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with the Victor Babiuc, new minister of interior, by Oprea Georgescu; place and date not given: "There Is no Reason To Dramatize"]

[Text] [Georgescu] Mr. Minister, why do you think that you were not endorsed from the beginning? Did your presence disturb somebody?

[Babiuc] I am not exactly aware of the motives, so I do not want to begin commenting on them. What I can state is that I saw the voting in the Senate yesterday as a manifestation of the Senate's prerogatives to agree or to disagree with one person or another on the government list that was about to be established. Nevertheless, I believe that there were and there are no reasons to dramatize the situation—especially since today, after talks within the ruling party group in the Senate and, evidently, after all the parliamentary groups reexamined the "problems" that cropped up—the prime minister's proposal to leave the names of people "under discussion" on the list was endorsed.

[Georgescu] Do you think that it will be easier for you in the Ministry of Interior than in the Ministry of Justice, or the other way around?

[Babiuc] It is impossible for it to be easier in the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior has always had many problems, many of them extremely difficult. As far as my thoughts upon taking over the Ministry of Interior are concerned, now I can only say that I am expecting very intensive work, and I will strive to ensure the appropriate operation of the ministry, to make this ministry fulfill the duty incumbent upon it in a state of law.

[Georgescu] Nevertheless, in the first stage there must be certain problems that have priority over others.

[Babiuc] No, I cannot say at this moment that there are such problems. First of all, as a minister I have to ensure the proper operation of the ministry as is normal in a state of law—that is, to ensure the security of its citizens and their property and to ensure public order. After I get to know the ministry and the realities that surround me, maybe certain changes will be necessary.

[Georgescu] Do you know about the cable that arrived last night from the United States to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which surprise and disappointment was expressed over the fact that you had not been endorsed by the Senate?

[Babiuc] I heard about it this morning.

[Georgescu] Do you know any details?

[Babiuc] No, I do not. Maybe you can inquire at the Foreign Ministry.

[Georgescu] I extend to you as well as to ourselves wishes for success.

[Babiuc] Thank you.

Commission Issues Harghita-Covasna Report

AU1810115391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1846 GMT 17 Oct 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRESS 17/10/1991—The parliamentary hearing commission empowered to inquire into the cases of Covasna and Harghita counties Romanian residents compelled to leave their homes and jobs, read its report before the two chambers today, 17 October, 1991.

The commission, set up on the strength of the Senate resolution of 31 October 1990 and of the Assembly of Deputies resolution of 3 November 1990, consisted of members of all parties proportionally represented to Parliament.

The commission heard a large number of persons and carried out investigations in the towns of Targu Mures, Brasov, Focsani, Bacau, Ploiesti as well as in the main settlements in Covasna and Harghita counties.

The report, that contains 137 pages divided in 8 chapters and 91 pages of appendixes, has not been endorsed by the two HDUR [Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania—UDMR in Romanian] deputies, although they took part in the hearings. The Hungarian deputies argumented in writing the reasons prompting their decision.

Below are the findings of the commission:

Immediately after the revolution of December 1989 several actions of an open anti-Romanian character were taken in the counties of Covasna and Harghita.

Nationalist-chauvinistic and irredentist slogans were shouted at rallies attended by tens of thousands of people. A number of 35 police stations were totally or partially destroyed, although the order-keeping bodies had a passive attitude and openly stated their pro-revolution stand. Over 200 policemen homes were ransacked, their property stolen or smashed. Violent actions ended in the murdering of 7 persons, 6 of which were active or reserve staff of the former militia and Securitate, with of the 3 murdered Hungarians being slaughtered because, trying to help their Romanian colleagues, they were considered traitors of Hungarians and Szeklers.

The revolution was interpreted in a totally anti-Romanian spirit, as the ripe moment to return to the former autonomous Hungarian region created, as is known, upon Stalin's instructions.

From the very first days after the Romanian revolution of 22 December 1989, in most places in these two counties the Hungarian state flag was hoisted, while the Romanian national flags were torn and trampled on.

On various occasions, the "Szeklers' anthem" and Hungary's national anthem were played and a large part of the Szeklers and Hungarians demonstrated for the union of Transylvania with Hungary.

Orthodox churches were devastated, historical monuments desecrated with an obvious anti-Romanian tendency.

The mass demonstrations of March 1990 occasioned by the celebration of the beginnings of the 1848 bourgeois-democratic revolution in Hungary were sustained by hoisting the Hungarian state banner on public institutions and monuments, in parks.

After the events of March 1990 in Targu Mures, growing pressure was put on Romanians, of whom many had to leave the two counties for fear of reprisals.

The educational system was the victim of a marked process of separation, the Hungarian language education was given a preponderent proportion. As a consequence, many Romanian teachers were made redundant and forced, in midwinter, to leave their homes in search of a job. Their Hungarian and Szekler colleages often used the slogan "here and now". Educational establishments were forcibly and illegally separated into Hungarian and Romania schools, the latter being much diminished in number of classes and pupils banished to inappropriate locations. Many of the Romanian pupils remaining in the area were forced to choose between learning in Hungarian-language schools and leaving the county they lived in. Hungarian and Szekler teachers were elected to the new school managerial staffs in an overwhelming proportion, mostly head masters and their deputies, under the pretext that their Romanian colleagues were "compromised under the Communist regime". Instead, the Hungarians and Szeklers that had held high positions in party structures during the Communist regime were maintained in their functions and even promoted.

It is easy to notice that the process followed several stages, all accomplished: 1. Teachers were driven away, 2. Romanian pupils forced to abandon the Romanian schools, and, finally, 3. The areas in question intensively Magyarised. This process was intended to lead to the creation of a Hungarian enclave, as a first step to territorial separation.

Szeklers and Hungarians were also exclusively appointed to all key positions in town halls, prefectures, industrial units, public institutions, arts, culture, press, justice, health. Under the cover of "cleaning" the former Communist nomenklatura, all Romanians were removed from senior posts, without any distinction. An intense propaganda was carried to this effect through various mass media, in the obvious attempt to convince that during the Communist regime Hungarians and Szeklers had no access to top functions, which is contrary to facts. From the commission's documentation it results that in pre-revolution years Hungarians and Szeklers had occupied the majority of the managerial functions at various levels in the two counties.

Many Romanians, engineers, technicians, workers, have been banned from their jobs.

The two counties attempted to synchronise their economic development with the Hungarian model through numerous visits and swaps of experience with specialists from Hungary.

Mass and youth organisations were created to Hungarian pattern and with the direct participation of Hungarian citizens, while trying to remove any trace of Romanian elements through their activities.

In many places lists of Romanian residents were made and posted in public places and the Romanians threatened with all kinds of reprisals unless they went away.

A vast action was carried on for the replacement of names of institutions, streets, educational eszablishments, place names, the toponimy of the area changing almost overnight.

Shortly, in all settlements where the Szeklers and the Hungarians were a majority all inscriptions in Romanian, including milestones, were replaced with Hungarian inscriptions exclusively.

Unfortunately, these measures were enforced under the shield of a great diplomatic fuss made by the Hungarian officials and the Hungarian diaspora, which culminated with "the call on the Hungarians in Romania by Hungary's interim President Matyas Szuros, on 18 March 1990, to intensify their actions and to organise in the

spirit of the concept that Transylvania allegedly is 'Hungarian ancestral land'." The commission has found that these instigations led to violence against the Romanian population, ending in severe infractions of the law, such as murder attempts and assaults, devastation of public and personal property, violations of the national security, which all undermined social order and disregarded the principles of mutuality of human feelings.

All along the post-revolution period, several extremist and chauvinistic actions were staged in the two counties, during which the Romanians were offended, humiliated, maltreated. In trains, Romanian travellers were injured in assaults by groups of Szeklers and Hungarians.

The conflicting state of spirit was fostered in many places by the massive presence of Hungarian citizens that came to Romania to celebrate Hungarian aniversaries and who, in most of these situations, hoisted Hungary's flag, vexing the Romanians' national feelings.

Without any exageration, one can speak of a real exodus of the Romanians from the two counties as a consequence of these events, almost 4,000 of them having left the area.

The Hungarian press, through its numerous publications, has permanently entertained the state of tension between Szeklers and Hungarians on the one hand and Romanians on the other, publishing offending articles about Romanians and the Romanian state.

The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (HDUR) and other Szekler groups or organisations launched a campaign of disinformation of the central administration and the public opinion, trying to accredit the idea that the exodus of Romanians from Covasna and Harghita were "a false problem" fabricated by the former Securitate.

The reason for which ample interethnic conflicts failed to break out is that the Romanians did not react in the same manner to the offences and humiliations they were subjected to, preferring to leave for other counties.

Another cause that mounted tension in Covasna and Harghita counties was contributed to by external factors: Text-books and publication of a slanderous nature for the sovereignty and unity of the Romanian state were introduced in Romania; many organizations were set up in Hungary, whose activities were closely correlated with what happened in Transylvania; several so-called "cultural manifestations" with international participation were held just to openly raise the issue of changing Romania's frontiers and to air false concepts like "the Hungarian community in Romania is in deadly peril" (Laszlo Tokes); a tremendous amount of propaganda material has been published, abounding in incitations and defamations.

Cases of human solidarity were also reported in the two counties, when Szeklers and Magyars, in consideration of generally human moral values, helped their Romanian co-nationals and saved them from difficult situations, endangaring their own lives.

Szekler and Magyar political parties, groups or organisations were directly involved in many anti-Romanian actions, and, under the pretext of defending the interests of those they were representing, they effectively supported the banishing of any Romanian element from the area.

The prefectures of the two counties did not even tackle the serious anti-Romanian developments that were going on. No incidents were reported to Bucharest, it was said order governed in the area.

In those critical moments the Romanians felt at a loss, abandoned by all local and national decision-makers. They became "nomads" in their own country, went from one county of Romania to another, seeking jobs and homes.

After mentioning that the aforesaid facts in the counties of Harghita and Covasna totally disregard international documents on the treatment of minorities in various states, the report specifies that, interested in their rights in the area, the Magyar nationals overlooked the rights of the Romanian nationals living in the same area and replaced the seeking of solutions though dialogue by criminal acts, by infringements of basic human rights.

Even under the communist rule, the Szeklers and the Magyars in Romania might use their mother tongue, had an important number of schools teaching exclusively in Magyar, were elected in managerial bodies. For instance, in 1989, in the county of Covasna, the seats in the administration boards of 57 enterprises in eight localities were filled by 106 Magyars and 69 Romanians, and the local cultural institutions were headed by 12 Szeklers and two Romanians.

In contrast, referring to the situation of Romanian nationals living in Hungary, an American researcher, James Patterson, wrote in a study on the Romanian minority in Hungary, that he considers to be on the verge of disappearance, that 20,000 Romanian ethnics are living in Hungary, while official censuses only report 12,000 and the official acts of the Orthodox Church register 25,000-30,000. There are 13 elementary schools for Romanian ethnics living in Hungary, many teaching only in Magyar, some both in Magyar and Romanian. A high school at Gyula that teaches in Magyar, also holds courses in Romanian.

The report concludes that essential facts have been taken into account, as, to avoid nationalist, chauvinistic and irredentist developments in future, the Romanian public opinion must learn the truth.

Considering that national minorities are part of the Romanian society, that they represent an element of enrichment of the (Romanian) state and society, the report says that in elaborating the regulations for the

institutionalising of the state of law in Romania, agreements on human rights and fundamental freedoms should be applied in a spirit of total justice, as they have been established in international instruments, both for minorities, at a national level, and for the Romanian population in the two counties of Romania in which Szeklers are majoritary.

Consequently, we consider that the Romanian citizens of the counties of Harghita and Covasna that were forced to leave their jobs and homes in consequence of nationalist-chauvinistic events, and to abandon their belongings—gathered sometimes in a lifetime—are entitled to damages from those guilty of their misfortunes. At the same time, they must be given the right to settle wherever they want in their homeland and to take benefit, like all citizens, irrespective of nationality, of the right to develop their culture, language, tradition and customs, therefore their identity, free from any interference.

UDMR Issues Statement on Minority Rights

AU2110183191 Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 17 Oct 91 pp 1, 4

[Statement by the Parliamentary Group of the Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania issued on 14 October]

[Text] A long line of speakers accused the Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] and some of its leaders in both chambers of Parliament on 14 October. The RMDSZ expresses its astonishment over these accusations, that were not preceded or supported by any thorough and objective information and arguments, something compulsory in all cases.

We understand and regard it as natural that, just like the citizens of any other country, any Romanian citizen is worried and shocked when he thinks that his country's territorial integrity is threatened.

Therefore, we regard it as particularly cynical and dangerous when some people want to make use of these universal sacred feelings and the general lack of information to achieve their political goals. The RMDSZ again sums up the facts necessary for understanding the situation and points out the following:

1. The popularization of all forms of local self-government and institutional autonomy that do not hinder the state's territorial integrity and do not violate anyone's rights, forms that are valid in Europe, represents a basic value in the political program of the RMDSZ. As is well known, the National Salvation Front [FSN] also agreed with this principle in its January 1990 statement.

The almost two-year existence of the RMDSZ proves that it has always represented these principles in a balanced way, by taking the political realities into consideration and by properly dealing with the recurring and mostly artificial crisis situations.

2. Neither Hungarian nor Romanian extremist and demagogic forces have the right to abuse, "make use" or falsify the RMDSZ position on the issue of autonomy under the pretext of interpreting it. As its meeting of deputies in Arad formulated it, the RMDSZ regards the implementation of this goal as possible only by parliamentary means and by participating in shaping the legal frameworks, in accordance with the Gyulafehervar Decisions, the quoted Front declaration, and the European Charter of Local Self-Governments.

3. The leading and representative RMDSZ bodies are not aware of any organized force trying to alter Romania's territorial integrity. If such forces or groups really exist, the RMDSZ firmly and openly condemns their activity.

4. Rumor has it that, on the occasion of an 1848 commemorative meeting to be held in Angyalfalva on 19 October, a body calling itself "The Szeklerland Political Group" wanted to turn to the government with a proposal to hold a referendum on the territory inhabited by Szeklers on the issue of territorial administrative autonomy. Besides, the written information sent by this group to the RMDSZ leadership points out that the meeting of 19 October would be exclusively commemorative.

5. No national or local RMDSZ body gave the aforementioned group any mandate to act on behalf of the RMDSZ. In a separate presidium resolution published last week, the RMDSZ pointed out that it regarded this group's action as a private initiative and that no RMDSZ organization had anything in common with this group. Many RMDSZ leaders condemned the activity of this group, including National Chairman Geza Domokos and the chairman of the RMDSZ branch in Csikszereda [Miercurea Ciuc].

6. It is the position of the RMDSZ not to allow anyone to act on its behalf and, in the same way, it does not accept the accusations that are directed against the RMDSZ that are clearly turning into a witch hunt under the pretext of unclear accusations against an illegitimate group.

7. If there are extremists in the Szeklerland or in other places, this is because the serious national minority problems that the RMDSZ has repeatedly pointed out—including education and administration of justice—are still unsolved. As a result of the constant discrediting campaigns against the RMDSZ and a total lack of consideration of this organization's balanced and real political demands, and the narrow political scope allowed to this organization, the more impatient forces are gaining popularity and influence.

8. The removal of internationally known and appreciated figures from our country's political life, only

because they do not share the dogmas of certain power circles, would only increase doubts about Romania all over the world.

9. We regard as extremely unfortunate the intolerance manifested in the debates about the future Constitution, an intolerance that already calls for punishing and blaming views expressed in Parliament or in international public opinion, views that differ from those of the majority. In our opinion, this intolerance contradicts the essence of parliamentarism.

10. We ask the permanent bureaus of the two houses of Parliament to examine the speeches delivered on 14 October to determine whether they contain unfounded and uncontrollable accusations, slander, defamation, incitement, or expression unbefitting parliamentary deputies; if so, we ask these bureaus to act according to the Parliament's statute.
14 October 1991.

Vatra Pleads for Transylvania's Protection

AU2110120091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1115 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 21/10/1991—"The Romanian state has granted great rights unparalleled anywhere in the world for minorities, not even in the most advanced democracies. However, instead of giving a hand for the country to overcome the crisis, for the promotion of democracy and national understanding, attempts are made at the country's integrity, and the Romanian national being is endangered," reads the release of the Brad Branch of the Vatra Romaneasca Union [VR]. "The relevant bodies, the ruling party, that has tolerated and courted the minorities too much, giving them privileges to the Romanians' detriment" are demanded to take every step "to redeem their rights to the citizens of Romanian origin, driven away from the Covasna and Harghita Counties and the Romanian children removed from their schools by Hungarians," and the Parliament to rule "the punishment of all citizens that slander the country, like Laszlo Tokes and others did."

"In view of protecting Transylvania and Romania's integrity, the members and supporters of Vatra Romaneasca in Moti land are ready, if need be, to enroll themselves in the Romanian Army's combat formations," concludes the release. Brad (some 23,000 inhabitants) lies in Hunedoara County, Transylvania.

PNT-cd Leader Comments on New Government Team

AU2110181591 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Oct 91 p 1

[Amelia Neacsu report on statements by Ion Ratiu, National Peasant Christian Democratic Party leader, about the new government: "A Hybrid Government of Democracy!"]

[Text] Asked about the opinion of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd] in connection with the new governmental team proposed by Mr. Theodor Stolojan, Deputy Ratiu said:

"We have always been against a government of national unity and against parties that belong to the convention joining such a government. At the moment, neither a government of experts nor a government of national unity has been achieved, thus it has no serious political basis. This is only a mini-coalition, which is still limping. It is clear that the position of the National Liberal Party is giving a blow to the spirit of the convention that our six parties have established. We believe that a mistake has been made."

Asked whether the proposed government team would enjoy the Parliament's approval, Mr. Ratiu said: "I am convinced that this setup will enjoy the Parliament's approval, because we have an overwhelming National Salvation Front [FSN] majority in the Parliament, but for no other reason than that. However, as far as the advance toward democracy is concerned, I think this is a step backward! The unity of the opposition—which was very weak as it was—has been destroyed, while a coalition of all forces for democracy has not been achieved either. It would have been absurd to imagine that such a unity could have been achieved. The new form of government is a hybrid government and not a political solution. One thing is certain, namely that this government will not be able to fulfill its goals, and it will not have a favorable response at home or abroad."

Referring to the response that the new governmental team will receive in the world, and mainly in the West, Mr. I. Ratiu said that "in the West, since the last war, politicians were guided by what is called 'wishful thinking,' that is, they imagine what they wish would happen, and then they are convinced that what they wished for is actually happening. In other words, people in the West want to see an advance toward democracy in Romania, and they will try to interpret this change as progress toward democracy. A democracy can exist only when political forces are organized in such a way as to indeed offer an alternative of governing. At the moment, one can say that the FSN has tried to break away as many groups as possible from the convention; it seems that the FSN has succeeded in this attempt.

The FSN made this move precisely to obtain support in the West—a support as substantial as possible—but this is increasingly difficult to obtain; nevertheless, we would not want to see the Romanian people suffer because of the ruling team."

Civic Alliance Leader on FSN Power Struggle

AU2110113691 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 10 Oct 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Civic Alliance Party President Nicolae Manolescu by Monica Zvirjinschi; place and date not given: "Silence as Method"]

[Text] [Zvirjinschi] Have you any doubts about the power struggle going on now?

[Manolescu] Unfortunately, that is right. And it is not even the ugliest thing going on!

[Zvirjinschi] Was this power struggle triggered off by September's events or has it just begun?

[Manolescu] We had previous indications about its existence. However, as is the case with many things in this country, much is said but little can be proved. Unfortunately, we also have proof now. What we knew before—namely that the National Salvation Front [FSN] and, generally speaking, the team in power are divided in factions—has surfaced, presenting a most disagreeable and pointless show.

[Zvirjinschi] In your opinion, who are involved in this power struggle?

[Manolescu] First of all, it is between the two wings of the Front, the reformist and conservative ones. The protagonists can be identified. No matter how insufficient the Roman government's reform was, it was more than Mr. Iliescu was prepared to hold in store for us; for some time now, Mr. Iliescu has let himself become involved with a current that is hostile to the faster pace of events and is more inclined to protect certain old structures.

[Zvirjinschi] What is the stand of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] vis-a-vis this power struggle?

[Manolescu] We do no want to become involved in any way.

[Zvirjinschi] I take it you mean not getting involved in the current struggle! Because, the moment the Civic Alliance felt the need to form a party, it implicitly became involved in the struggle for power.

[Manolescu] If you mean the struggle to be represented in Parliament and do something in this country, then of course, we are involved. However, what we are dealing with here is dissent among those currently in power, an attempt to cling to power. We are not interested in power as an end in itself.

[Zvirjinschi] You made a statement to the effect that you would like to join the government, provided that it is validated by another Parliament.

[Manolescu] I called for early elections to form a Parliament that would express the people's current choices. Mr. Iliescu dwelt on the legitimacy of the current Parliament, formed as a result of the 20 May elections. However, we have a credibility problem here! After two miners' incursions within a period of something over a year, plus the memory of the other two (when practically the same people were in power), I believe there are enough reasons for a big question mark. The FSN promised stability, social peace, and a just world. The most visible result is that the promises have not been kept. The desired reform cannot be achieved if the people do not believe in the reformers.

[Zvirjinschi] In practical terms, how do you see the "calender" of future political activities?

[Manolescu] I believe that general elections could be held in the next two months, to be followed, a few months later, by local elections. Only a newly elected Parliament can ensure the full validity of the elected bodies. Then, there is the issue of presidential elections, which should probably be held by the middle of next year. In no way should the three elections be held at the same time. When several kinds of elections take place at the same time, a contamination of sympathies and antipathies may appear. In a society with an incipient democracy, such a contamination may lead to a single result in all three elections.

[Zvirjinschi] When did you make this proposal for early elections?

[Manolescu] During the miners' incursion in September.

[Zvirjinschi] You were then on a visit to the United States.

[Manolescu] Yes. After the latest events, which showed how unstable the situation is, I realized that local elections that are not preceded by legislative ones—at a time when the government, let alone the Parliament, is no longer master of the situation—can only be chaotic. Politics should take into account the development of events.

[Zvirjinschi] Were you scared of the news from Bucharest during your visit to the United States?

[Manolescu] No, because I somehow expected such a thing. I warned the Romanian authorities of such a likelihood as early as August. We issued a declaration-appeal that emphasized that conditions are ripe for an attempt to overthrow the reformists. We said that Gorbachev's mistakes in the implementation of perestroyka had also been made in our country; hence, one should not exclude the possibility that the opponents of reform might try to provoke a crisis to take over power.

We were told by the Army, the SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service], the presidency, and the FSN—with a certain aggressiveness—that we were imagining nonexistent dangers. They tried to project the idea that there is no Soviet-type perestroyka and that communist structures have disappeared—and, consequently, we are just "destabilizing" the situation. Reality shows that we were thinking correctly. The latest statements made in Parliament by Mr. Magureanu and others proved that those who had to know of preparations for such a coup were aware of its likelihood as early as August. Then, I wonder why Mr. Magureanu made SRI spokesman Nicolae Ulieru appear on television to criticize our declaration,

claiming that there was no justification for our statements, that the communists and undismantled communist structures in Romanian institutions could jeopardize the situation in the country? This is not a rhetorical question! I seriously put this to Mr. Magureanu—because it is incomprehensible that the director of an intelligence service should hide the proof available to him, protest against those that have learned certain details, and then, forced by events, say before Parliament that he knew of all this! After the putsch in Moscow, there was much talk about the existence of the black lists—put together by certain groups from the former Securitate—which included the names of people from the current leadership and the opposition.

[Zvirjinschi] Are you also on such a list?

[Manolescu] I do not know their contents. I wrote an article at the time (also broadcast by Radio Free Europe) that endorsed the statements made by Claudiu Iordache and others in Parliament. My idea was that, regardless of what might happen, these lists—if they existed—should be made public. The public must know and steps must be taken against the people who compiled those lists, even though they were not as strong as they thought and they could not actually implement their plans. The very idea of the existence of such an occult force capable of compiling a list with the names of people that ought to be liquidated is disquieting. If the lists were mere rumors and fantasies, then someone from officialdom should assume responsibility and state: "These lists did not exist." Keeping silent was the worst possible thing. Silence was the line adopted by the SRI, the government, and other institutions. I do not know whether Mr. Voican also has proof to back his sensational disclosures, but if the tiniest part of what he said is true, then the investigation should be serious, and the people involved must be punished.

[Zvirjinschi] During the miners' incursion, some people blamed the Civic Alliance as one of its organizers. How is it that certain people came to such conclusions?

[Manolescu] Through the known method of blaming others. Instead of checking whether its own mistakes have not led to that situation, the authorities preferred to look for scapegoats!

[Zvirjinschi] But why primarily choose the Civic Alliance to blame?

[Manolescu] Perhaps because it is perceived, in certain power circles, as a dangerous adversary. Even in CURIERUL NATIONAL, I could read a statement by one of the individuals accused by G. Voican Voiculescu, claiming that a Civic Alliance man has turned to some agency to recruit individuals capable of action.... I do not know the individuals named there—anyone can make such claims—but they should also bring forward some proof to substantiate them! On the other hand, no organization is free of possible infiltrations. I hope that there are no such cases in the Civic Alliance, at least not at decisionmaking levels.

[Zvirjinschi] Some newspapers claimed that the Civic Alliance brought the miners to Bucharest...

[Manolescu] That was clear maneuvering. The FSN daily came to the conclusion that it could exonerate those in power by accusing their enemies. There is no proof of that!

[Zvirjinschi] There were also other comments to the effect: "Two parties became a laughing stock: the PAC and the PNT-cd [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party]....

[Manolescu] I know what happened, and I do not believe that the PNT-cd compromised itself. The party was in the middle of its congress when it was confronted with the pressure applied by the large number of miners rallied there; so, they thought the best way was to let them talk.

[Zvirjinschi] What if the truth were otherwise, namely the PNT-cd was not subjected to pressure, and the miners were invited—would that have been a mistake?

[Manolescu] In my opinion, yes. As far as the PAC is concerned, we adopted a clear stand from the start: Violence is to be condemned. There is no excuse for the miners' behavior, nor for the brutal methods used by the repression forces.

[Zvirjinschi] Amid the threatening crowds advancing on the television building, coming from the Parliament, one could see trucks with Civic Alliance signs.... How do you explain that?

[Manolescu] Those who gave them the trucks also provided the identification signs. Neither the Civic Alliance Party nor the movement owns any trucks at all.

[Zvirjinschi] Now, when round after round of consultations on a new cabinet are under way without your having been invited, do you feel left out?

[Manolescu] As long as the criterion was that of the parliamentary representation, the answer is no! Even if we had been invited to these consultations, we would have maintained our stand of not participating in the formation of another government before the general elections, as we requested. The present concept of economic reform was conceived by others. We were not asked, hence, it is only natural that they should take matters to their logical end. We cannot administer an economy that resulted from a concept to which we do not subscribe.

[Zvirjinschi] What if people say that you avoided coming to power at a time when anyone doing so is probably going to be sacrificed?

[Manolescu] This is not a question of shunning responsibility; it has to do with political strategy. We are also ready to make sacrifices, but not now!

Emergence of Opposition Political Alliance Viewed

AU2110152491 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1146 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRESS, 21/10/91—The United Democratic Opposition (ODU), the recent merger of 20 non-parliamentary parties, under the chairmanship of Vladimir Fulger, including, among others, the Christian-Democratic Union, the Party of Democratic Union, the Romanian Democratic Party, the People's Alliance, intends, as an overt goal, "to fill the gap made in the country's political life" as soon as the 20 May elections "closed the political circle" of the Parliament-represented parties.

ODU militates for the union of the entire democratic opposition, for the eradication of typically communist organizations, for the resettlement of the fundamental institutions of the state, for a decentralised economy governed by the rules of the free market, for the restoration of Romania's image abroad and for the reintegration of Romania within its natural borders.

"We wish to become a strong and realistic political cartel with a wide and efficient mass support and a marked anti-communist and pro-democratic character."

Also in opposition is the Antitotalitarian Democratic Forum of Romania (FDAR), set up in August 1990 as "a credible alternative for a democratic governing of Romania" by 10 parties, among which the Christian-Democratic National Peasant Party (PNT-cd), the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Democratic Party, the World Union of Free Romanians (UMRL), the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR), the Romanian Independent Forum, the Association for the Defense of Human Rights, as well independent personalities of the fight for freedom and democracy like Professor Doina Cornea and aesthetician Adrian Marino.

Later on, antitotalitarian fora were also created in many other towns as umbrellas for branches of other parties and associations, such as the Party of Democratic Union, the Association of Former Political Prisoners, the Romanian Ecologist Party (PER), the Christian-Democratic Union, the Gypsies' Democratic Union. The first FDAR National Convention called on 24 October 1990 at Cluj- Napoca brought together over 1,000 representatives of the 44 FDAR Branches in Romania, to discuss the guidelines of their policy.

FDAR consists of two parallel structures, one for the parliamentarian opposition, one for the non-parliamentary opposition. This gave birth, on 15 December, 1990, to the "National Convention for the Instatement of Democracy", whose birth certificate was signed by PNT-cd, PNL, PSD, UDMR and the Ecological Movement of Romania (MER), and was joined, on 28 August 1991 by the Civic Alliance Party. Later, MER stepped out of the convention, considering that the convention had not reached its aims, and, eventually, it withdrew from the FDAR as well.

Four days after this, on 19 December 1990, a "National Extra- Parliamentarian Convention" was formed with the purpose of fighting, on a minimal platform, for "Truth and Democracy in Romania", with the united forces of the Christian-Democratic Union, the Party of Democratic Union, the Christian Social-Democratic Party, the Romanian People's Front (Bucharest Branch).

Bucharest Rail Yard Engine Drivers Strike

AU2110115091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1113 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 21/10/1991—The engine drivers of the Bucharest Railway Marshalling Yard, one of the biggest in the country, are on strike. According to Sandu Ristache, leader of the Independent Unions of Engine Drivers, the strike started on Monday, October 21, ten o'clock.

The strikers demand mainly the changing of the wage brackets, which is not possible this year, since the wage negotiation has already been completed. In this respect, according to the Ministry of Transport, the strike is illegal.

To defuse the labour conflict, the engine drivers of the above-mentioned unit demand the undelayed presence there for negotiations of the representatives of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Labour. The goods and passengers trains run normally at this hour.

Craiova Drivers Continue Work

AU2110174091 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1633 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 21/10/1991—The engine drivers of the Craiova depot have not joined the strike called on Monday by the Federation of the Independent Trade Union League of Engine Drivers of the Bucharest Switchyard although one of the trade unions there is a member of the League, the activity following a normal course.

Marian Trifan, deputy leader of the Engine Drivers' Federation, which has some 30,000 members from 36 depots and 13 running sheds throughout the country, and leader of the "Solidaritatea" ["Solidarity"] trade unions, stated: "Solidaritatea" unions which include both engine drivers, assistant engine drivers, and employees from workshops, actually from all the compartments of the depot, considered the strike as inopportune. The Federation of the Independent Trade Union League of Engine Drivers and Assistant Enginer Drivers request mainly the changing of the collective work contract for 1991, that is the changing of the wage bracket for engine drivers and assistant engine drivers. Executives of the National Railway Company met with representatives of the League. We told them we considered fair the fact that "the parties signatories to the work

contract cannot ask the changing of salaries before a year passes since it had been signed." And it was signed at the beginning of July. In the outlook of "Solidaritatea" trade unions, trade union actions must take into consideration the interests of both the employees and the units. We are against the reduction of jobs, we do not agree with the division of employees, of T.U. members and since wage negotiations—in all compartments—started from "zero" it is but normal that in other compartments of our sector wages be comparable with those of the engine drivers. Every job has its specific problems.

Labor Ministry Issues Unemployment Data

AU1810162591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1040 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRESS 18/10/1991—The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection has registered 179,711 unemployed (103,727 women) of which 151,620 are workers, 21,563 medium-trained staff and 6,528 highly trained people. Of the total number, 137,769 were left jobless owing to cutbacks in the activity of economic agents, the remainder being represented by other categories of unemployed people, mostly young people who have not taken up work yet. Also registered are 76,789 unemployed (53,344 women) who do not get unemployment benefits.

Since February 1, 1991, 21,867 unemployed (9,359 women) have been offered jobs as follows: 17,853 workers, 2,579 medium-trained and 1,436 highly trained people. At an all-country level there are 4,161 vacancies: 180 for medium- and highly trained unemployed and 3,961 unemployed workers. There are 32,61 [number as received] unemployed (17,284 women) who no longer get unemployment benefit as the six-month period during which they are entitled to it has expired (27,973 workers, 3,620 medium-trained people, and 1,088 highly trained people.

Iliescu Appeals for Life of Kidnapped Diplomat

AU2110202791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1955 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 21/10/1991—On the kidnapping on October 9, 1991 of Romanian diplomat Liviu Radu in New Delhi and the threat of the kidnappers to kill the Romanian diplomat if by the evening of October 22 their claims are not met, Romania's President Ion Iliescu, expressing the deep concern of Romanian public opinion, of Mr. Liviu Radu's family and of his own over the fate of our fellow countryman calls on the entire international community to take urgent measures apt to contribute to saving the life of the Romanian diplomat and his undelayed release.

It is obvious that to sacrifice the life of an innocent man can in no way justify the attainment of an aim no matter which it may be.

Romania's president expresses the belief that his appeal, in the name of the good and of human conscience will get appropriate support from the entire international community.

In these dramatic moments of high responsibility Romania's president expresses the confidence that the force of wisdom will impose itself and lead to Mr. Liviu Radu's release from captivity.

International

EC Warns of 'Selective' Economic Sanctions

LD2110221491 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2047 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Brussels, Oct 21 (TANJUG)—The European Community (EC) is extremely worried about the unfavourable development of the situation in Yugoslavia, the head of the Yugoslav mission to the EC was informed this evening.

The EC will apply selective economic sanctions unless the situation should be settled soon, member of the EC Commission Abel Matutes said during a meeting with head of the Yugoslav mission Mihailo Crnobrnja.

Matutes, who is in charge of the Mediterranean policy, explained that the sanctions would be selectively applied.

The sanctions have been worked out and prepared to the poimt where they could be applied within 24 hours of the EC political bodies taking the decision, Matutes said.

He said he hoped, however, that this would not be necessary and that the Hague conference on Yugoslavia, whose latest summit session he assessed as a certain step ahead, would soon lead to a resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

The EC Commission does not want to prejudge solutions which might be arrived at in The Hague, but reiterates the interest of the EC In the preservation of a single Yugoslav economic space, for which it will actively work within the Hague talks, said Abel Matutes.

Army To Permit UNESCO To Inspect Dubrovnik

LD2110133191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1242 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Trebinje, October 21 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Army spokesman stated on Monday that the Army would enable the representatives on UNESCO, currently in Yugoslavia, to enter Dubrovnik so as to see for themselves that the rumour that this ancient city was not destroyed.

In a talk with newsmen, Deputy Commander of the Army Operative Group for Herzegovina, Col. Savo Lukic blamed the Croatian propaganda for spreading this rumour.

Col. Lukic denied the reports that an army grenade allegedly fell in the garden of Hotel Argentina in the immediate neighborhood of the old part of the city.

The position of the forces was such, and this was confirmed also by the ballistics experts, that it was impossible for the grenade to fall on the said spot, he said.

Col. Lukic said elecricity supply was normal and the old water supply system was being used, because the Croatian side was using the new one for the protection of its forces.

Speaking about the strength of the Croatian forces in Dubrovnik, Lukic replied that they were such meaningless in the military sense.

He repeated that the task of the Army was to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts and enable unblocking of barracks and other military installations, and in Dubrovnik also to preserve this city of inestimable cultural value.

Danger Causes EC To Withdraw Helicopters

LD2210065191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0531 GMT 22 Oct 91

[Text] Belgrade, October 22 (TANJUG)—The European Community (EC) is going to withdraw from Yugoslavia its six helicopters used by its monitor mission members, fierce fighting making it impossible for them to act, REUTER reports.

The situation is such that it is simply too dangerous to fly. So, the helicopters are being used no longer, Viebe Alkema, spokesman for the Dutch Defence Ministry, announced last night.

Three Dutch and three Italian military helicopters are to leave for their bases next Wednesday, Alkema said.

For the time being, there are no plans for withdrawing the EC monitor mission from Yugoslavia, sent in to the hot spots in Yugoslavia nearly four months ago, Alkema added.

Hungarian Consul Expresses Concern Over Fighting

LD2210074291 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0700 GMT 22 Oct 91

[Text] Hungary again expressed concern over fighting that continues on its southern borders between the Yugoslav Federal Army and Croatian forces.

According to a Croatian radio report this morning, a message concerning this was handed over to the Croatian foreign minister by the Hungarian consul general in Zagreb. During the meeting the Hungarian diplomat expressed hope that the good-neighbourly relations between Hungary and Croatia will continue to develop.

According to the information received by Radio Zagreb, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry invited the Croatian prime minister to visit Budapest.

'Strong Protest' Lodged Over Albanian Policy

LD2110204591 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1950 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Belgrade, October 21 (TANJUG)—Yugolavia today lodged a strong protest with Albania against an escalation of its anti-Yugoslav policy.

The note, handed by under-secretary in the Yugoslav foreign ministry Milan Veres to Albanian Ambassador Kujtim Hysenaj, said that official Albanian organs are directly instigating members of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia to acts of disloyalty to the Yugoslav state and violation of its sovereignty and integrity.

The protest was [word indistinct] by Albanian President Ramiz Alia's letters to the illegal president of the so-called "Republic of Kosovo," sent on September 26 and October 8 this year, and the Albanian Goivernment's statement of September 29 openly supporting last month's illegal referendum on independence in the Serbian autonomous of province of Kosovo-Metohija. The statement promised Albania's comprehensive involvement so that "the republic of Kosovo, as an independent and sovereign state," can receive broad international recognition, the note of protest said.

The fact that during the referendum, a polling station was opened in Tirana for ethnic Albanians from Yugoslavia is also an unprecedented event, the note pointed out. It added that the albanian side is no longer hiding that such activities are aimed at separating the autonomous province of Kosovo-Metohija from the Republic of [word indistinct] and Yugoslavia.

Federal

Mesic Views Chances for Peace Between Republics

AU2110111791 Vienna PROFIL in German 21 Oct 91 p 96

[Interview with President Stipe Mesic by Rudolf Gruber and Marian Srienc in Zagreb; date not given: "Quartet of Extraterrestrials"]

[Text] [PROFIL] Mr. President, why do you attend talks in The Hague as the head of a state that you yourself have described as "no longer existing"?

[Mesic] It is true that the State Presidency no longer exists in its original form. It is being dominated by the Serbian bloc, by a quartet of extraterrestrials. The Hague is the only place where we can meet. In Yugoslavia this is no longer possible. It is true that Yugoslavia no longer exists. Its parliament, its government, and its State Presidency no longer exist. However, Yugoslavia still exists under international law. I am obliged to hold my current position until the world acknowledges the new realities.

[PROFIL] Would the expiration of the EC moratorium on 7 October not have represented an opportunity for you to resign?

[Mesic] If I resign, my deputy Branko Kostic (from Montenegro) will take my position. He is already behaving as though he were president. However, my task is to achieve a maximum internationalization of the Yugoslav crisis. I will remain in office until the final splitting of Yugoslavia.

[PROFIL] Do you believe that the recognition of the individual republics will take place in the near future?

[Mesic] Yes, because the Army, as the last institution, has also left the federation and turned into a Serbian military force. After Croatia's recognition, this Army would have to be considered a foreign force and would have to leave Croatia immediately.

[PROFIL] Would an independent attempt by Austria, for example, be useful?

[Mesic] Particularly Austria, as a neighboring country, might take the initiative and open up opportunities for Croatia in the international arena.

[PROFIL] As the president of Yugoslavia, you have always clearly supported the Croatian position. In this way, did you not provide arguments for the Serbian bloc that accuses you of misusing the highest state office?

[Mesic] Serbia never saw Yugoslavia as a multinational community, but always as "Grater Serbia." As president, I have tried to balance Serbia's predominance in the State Presidency, in the Army, among the police, and at the diplomatic level.

[PROFIL] Your rhetoric, however, made it easy for the other side to accuse you of acting on Tudjman's behalf.

[Mesic] I am not acting on behalf of the Republic of Croatia, and I have never advocated the interests of my republic to the disadvantage of others. It is quite clear that I am in agreement with Tudjman. He is the chairman of the Democratic Community, and I am his deputy.

[PROFIL] A new conflict might break out after the declaration of independence by Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Mesic] Serbia's war of expansion will continue. What might happen in Bosnia-Hercegovina is nothing compared with what has taken place in Croatia so far. Milosevic will not give up his policy. If he should attack Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia would also be involved in the war. This will lead to a battle by everybody against everybody, and Serbia will be soaked with blood.

'War Conflicts' Cause Credit, Debt Problems

LD2110173891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1132 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Belgrade, October 21 (TANJUG)—Owing to the war conflicts in Yugoslavia foreign countries have stopped giving credits to Yugoslavia and there were problems over collecting money owed by foreign countries.

Yugoslavia's claims, without the clearing areas, and based on credits approved for exported goods, equipment and completed capital projects, total 3.66 billion dollars, writes the Belgrade economic daily, ECONOMIC REVIEW. All foreign payments are due by the year 2000.

On a continent-to-continent basis, the largest number of claims of Yugoslav creditors already falling due on insured and credit-given operations, are in Asia, primarily Iraq. Iraq owes Yugoslavia 2.36 million dollars. In 1991, Asian debtors should pay up 470 million dollars.

African countries owe Yugoslavia a total of 845 million dollars from equipment exports and capital investment operations. A total of 96 million dollars were due in 1991. The biggest debtors are: Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Libya.

Latin American countries owe Yugoslavia as much as 250 million dollars, Cuba being the biggest debtor.

BORBA Reports Army Desertion, Replenishment Problems

LD1810204191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1416 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Text] Belgrade, October 18 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade Daily BORBA writes today that the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) has to cope with a growing number of deserters and is facing difficulties in replenishing its ranks.

As a result, members of the Yugoslav Army recruited last November may have to stay on as reservists at least a month longer, says the daily.

Likewise, the soldiers recruited last September had to continue serving as reservists.

The daily writes that the parents and wives of Army reservists from the town of Pancevo, near Belgrade, yesterday asked Serbian Defence Minister General Tomislav Simovic to allow the reservists to return home, claiming that many of them have been on the front since July 1.

General Simovic said that this was out of the question because the reservists from Pancevo are in tank and artillery units which are "necessary and indispensable."

He added that he was not in charge of withdrawing the reservists, and that the demands for their replacement would be met if today's plenary session of The Hague peace conference on Yugoslavia produces "some sort of agreement and Serbia stays out of war."

Relatives of the Pancevo reservists said that the reservists are not allowed to complain because "their officers threaten them with weapons or with sending them to the frontline," the daily writes.

"One of the reservists managed to come home for the weekend. He told us that reservists who wanted to come home were dispersed with tear gas and water cannons on the Bogojevo bridge," a reservist's wife said.

BORBA goes on to say that 200 reservists from Novi Sad (capital of Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina) yesterday returned home from the front in Slavonia, turned in their weapons and refused to go back.

They said they had decided to return home because of heavy casualties in Wednesday's attack on Borovo Naselje.

One of them, who preferred to remain anonymous, said he heard reports about eight dead and 68 wounded, but doubted that the actual figure would ever be known.

Citing unofficial soures, BORBA says that about 15 reserve officers who deserted from units in Croatia are being held in custody in the garrison in Valjevo.

Expired License Cited as Reason for Yutel Ban

LD1810202691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1513 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Text] Belgrade, 18 Oct (TANJUG)—The Federal market inspector for radio communications today issued a decision banning the transmission of Yutel programs as of this evening. TANJUG was given the information this afternoon by Gavra Vukasnovic, an assistant in the Federal Office for Radio Communications. The explanation given is that Yutel's program is being abolished because its license to operate expired two months ago. If this television station turns a deaf ear to the decision made and continues to transmit its program without a license, the Federal inspector will go to Yutel again on Monday and "seal" the television station on the spot, Vuksanovic said. The removal of Yutel's program from the television screen, Vuksanovic said, does not imply a permanent ban on its work. The ban remains in force until the station renews its license to operate.

Slovenia

Colonel Details Progress of Army's Withdrawal

AU2110170591 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1200 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Statement by Colonel Albin Gutman, commander of Dolenjska Region Territorial Defense; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] The Yugoslav Army's departure from the Dolenjska Region is running according to plan. Some installations, like the Ortnek gasoline reservoir, have already been handed over. Mokronog, that is to say Puscava, and its entire warehouse will probably be handed over some time tomorrow. We have taken over the convoy at Dobova railroad station and the ammunition dump where the military equipment belonging to the Territorial Defense from Brezice and Sevnica have been stored.

The Yugoslav Army removed infantry weapons and ammunition a long time ago. Regarding the arms of the anti-aircraft defense division, here I refer primarily to the anti-aircraft cannons, the situation is extremely bleak. All hardware has been literally destroyed, broken, and a part of the hardware has also been taken away.

As the Yugoslav Army is handing over the installations, the process of de-mining these same installations is also under way. Special attention will be paid to the de-mining of the installations in the Cerklje region, as this will become a base for gathering hardware, probably from half of Slovenia.

The situation in the Bregana Technical Maintenance Service is such that together with the employees that we have—that is 36 workers who have been on the side of the Territorial Defense during the war—we are running a temporary production, primarily servicing the vehicles we are taking over from the Army and, of course, those vehicles that we seized in the fighting. We also carry out regular maintenance work on all these premises.

We can expect that after tomorrow—except for the premises in Cerklje and the situation that will result in us keeping the air base until further notice—the situation will no longer be critical, and we will be completely in control.

First Half of YPA Soldiers Leaves Koper Harbor

AU2110173591 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Leo Horvatic report from Koper]

[Excerpts] The Yugoslav Navy training ship Galeb, carrying 1,130 soldiers, left Koper Harbor exactly at noon today. It left Slovene territorial waters before 1300 GMT. Members of the Yugoslav Army began to gather in the Slovene harbor shortly before 0400 GMT. The majority of them arrived in Koper by train, the rest of them by bus. "Galeb" sailed into Koper Bay just after 0500 GMT and was towed into the harbor just before 0830 GMT. The boarding of the ship started at 0845 GMT and ended at 1030 GMT. It took place without any complications. This was primarily due to the special units of the Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs, Slovene Territorial Defense, and a special police unit from Koper.

However, the Army has committed two gross violations. Namely, the [Yugoslav Army] Koper destroyer sailed unannounced into Koper Bay. Incidentally, at their last session the local Koper assembly deputies denied it the right to carry this name. After the Galeb commander's mediation, the destroyer left Koper Bay at 1000 GMT. Beforehand he tried to threaten our units and boats that were anchored at that time. The soldiers were also carrying many things that could not be classified as personal arms and equipment, which was also contrary to the agreement. However, they have left Slovenia peacefully. [passage omitted]

A little over 1,000 members of the Federal Army remain in Slovenia together with 200 noncombat transport vehicles that are being held back by police in Postojna. The transport vehicles will depart for Koper once the Slovene authorities have been notified about the arrival of the Stefan Muko ferry. This ferry is expected to ship the Army's equipment from Slovenia at least twice. On its way to Tivat on Friday the ferry will be accompanied by the Galeb, which will carry the remaining 1,000 soldiers. Immediately after the last soldier has left Slovenia, a news conference, attended by all responsible ministers, will be held in Koper.

Troops Leave for Montenegro

AU2110170091 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Dragoslav Kosaric report from Koper]

[Excerpt] At noon precisely, the Yugoslav Navy's training ship Galeb set off from the Koper port with 1,370 soldiers and officers on board. They took personal weapons and equipment with them. Journalists were not allowed to enter this port. The whole area is being protected by strong special police forces and units of the Territorial Defense of Slovenia.

The Galeb training ship entered the territorial waters of this republic early this morning accompanied by the destroyer Split. At the request of the Slovene authorities, the destroyer withdrew to the territorial waters of Croatia.

As the ship was being loaded, it became obvious that the Territorial Defense of Slovenia is not allowing a large concentration of military units in the actual port, but allows in smaller groups of the units that are immediately put onto the ship without much delay. An agreement was reached in principle that the Galeb training ship would not put ashore at any port on the territory of Croatia, but this contingent, which represents somewhat more than 50 percent of the soldiers and officers who remain in Slovenia, will land at the Montenegrin port of Tivat.

As I report, the Sveti Stefan ferryboat, which will transport about 200 noncombat vehicles to Montenegro, is expected in the Koper port. We have unofficially learned that the loading of the ferryboat will be extended until tomorrow because the ferryboat has not reached its final destination.

As is well known, the Yugoslav People's Army is due to withdraw from Slovenia by midnight on 25 October at the latest. Let us say, that the handover of military facilities and the stationing of the so-called combat technology of the Yugoslav People's Army in two barracks, not far from Vrhnika and the Cerklje air force base, is going smoothly, while explosive equipment and ammunition will be stored in modern arms warehouses in the Mackovec military premises. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Comments on YPA Withdrawal

LD2110191791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1718 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 21 Oct (TANJUG)—The latest agreement signed on the withdrawal of the remainder of the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] from Slovenia is the utmost that could be achieved in a peaceful way, Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa said in Ljubljana today. He was speaking at a session of the Slovene Assembly's Defense Commission.

Jansa said that two important principles were observed while the YPA was withdrawing: First, the withdrawal passed without conflicts and second, the YPA withdrawal from Slovenia did not mean an intensification of aggression on Croatia. The agreement envisages that YPA members, about 2,500 of them, will withdraw from Slovenia only with light weapons and equipment via the port of Koper.

Jansa said that 1,130 Yugoslav Army soldiers left Slovenia today on the battleship Galeb. According to him, weapons and equipment were successfully handed over to the Slovene territorial defense. He added that Slovenia will solve in an adequate way the payment of pensions to approximately 5,000 army pensioners in this republic, and also the problem of the army housing fund which has completely been taken over by Slovenia.

Territorial Arms at Cerklje Airbase 'Dismantled'

AU2110144791 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1200 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] The Regional Headquarters of the Posavje Territorial Defense today continued taking over their weapons that have been stored in the Cerklje Upon Krka Military Air Base. The complete infantry armament for more than 700 men, large amounts of ammunition of higher than standard caliber [nadkalibrsko strelivo], sixteen 40 mm cannons, and twenty 12 mm cannons, have been stored there.

It was obvious that the hangar where all these arms have been stored has been broken into and, therefore, none of the personal arms, purchased by the Posavje communes with their own money, remained. The territorials only found a limited amount of ammunition. The most modern cannons were missing while the most essential parts of all other cannons were dismantled and, therefore, practically made useless. It appears that the arms were seized and cannons dismantled at the beginning of the aggression upon Slovenia, probably because the air base anticipated that the Posavje Territorial Defense would try to recapture its anti-aircraft arms. If that had been the case, then the Army airplanes and helicopters would not have flown so carelessly over Slovenia.

The takeover of certain installations, which was announced for today, has been postponed until tomorrow morning. At the airport they are now clearing mine fields, and it seems that some of them will require the attention of the Territorial Defense experts.

The first train convoy carrying 13 tanks and two military hoisting vehicles [dvigalo] arrived at the Brezice railroad station at midnight. The materiel will be unloaded and transported to the Cerklje Airport once this one has been de-mined. There is already a large number of the military personnel carriers from other Slovene barracks at the runway and landing strip of the Cerklje Upon Krka Military base.

Payment Agreement With Croatia Envisaged

AU2210073091 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Zvone Zorko report on the Slovene Assembly Commission for International Affairs session on 21 October in Ljubljana]

[Text] At today's session the Government of the Republic of Croatia adopted an identically worded text on the envisaged payment agreement between the republics of Slovenia and Croatia. It is expected that the agreement will be signed any moment. One has to emphasize that, in essence, this is the first Slovene international agreement, as Slovenia is adopting it as an interstate agreement and not, perhaps, as an agreement among the Yugoslav republics.

The agreement envisages two ways of mutual payment operations—in foreign currency and by barter. They anticipate that mutual payment operations between the two countries will primarily be done through barter. They expect that by signing the agreement the majority of the present problems, which also arose because an adequate agreement was missing, will be resolved. Some problems, like the question of the Ljubljanska Banka, will have to be resolved separately.

It is also envisaged that talks on signing similar agreements with Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia will start in the coming days. An initiative was also presented at the session that we should consider signing a similar agreement with Serbia regardless of whether this republic is willing to accept it.

Continuing the session, members of the commission gave some editorial and contextual proposals and amendments to the proposed declaration on the war in the Republic of Croatia. The statement that was amended and updated in this way, especially regarding

the role of Montenegro, is expected to be adopted at the next correspondence session and then the public will be informed.

After the report by the Slovene foreign minister about the events on the last session at The Hague conference, the commission unanimously approved the performance of the Slovene delegation at the conference. The commission also gave its consent for Roman Kokalj, new Slovenijales [furniture company] representative in Moscow, to become the authorized representative of the Republic of Slovenia in the Soviet Union.

Foreign Minister Starts Visit to Poland

AU2110191591 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Slovene Foreign Minister Dr. Dimitrij Rupel starts his visit to Poland today. He will discuss political and economic cooperation. The visit is also one of the series of visits aimed at convincing other countries to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia. The Polish side has already demonstrated that interest is increasing in economic cooperation, especially because both countries have lost a large share of their previous market, particularly in the market of raw materials.

Effects of Independent Monetary Policy Examined

LD2210035591 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1324 GMT 21 Oct 91

[By Milan Cveticanin]

[Text] Ljubljana, October 21 (TANJUG)—The introduction of Slovenia's replacement for the Yugoslav dinar will have major consequences on Slovenia's economy. The Slovenian Government believes that the tolar will curb inflation and create possibilities for the republic to have an independent monetary policy and thus play an active role in its economy.

The fact that the tolar appeared just now is explained in Slovenia by the effort to prevent the financing of the war in Croatia by printing dinars on the part of the central monetary authorities in Belgrade which could boost inflation.

The Slovenian authorities assessed that the time had come to draw the final monetary move also because the republic (as well as Croatia) was excluded from the Yugoslav monetary system and because the National Bank of Yugoslavia decided to print bank-notes whose size and colours will differ from the existing ones.

The printing of the tolar will not prevent inflation in Slovenia, but economists hope that it will be less than the inflation of the Yugoslav dinar. In the 10 days of its existence, the tolar increased in value in relation to the dinar from a 1:1 ratio to 65 tolars for 100 dinars. However, the tolar coupons will not be interesting to other partners on the Yugoslav market to whom Slovenia exported 24 percent of its production. The firms from other parts of Yugoslavia will not agree to pay in hard currency for Slovenian goods when they can buy products of the same quality, even better, and cheaper in the West.

Thus many economists in Yugoslavia believe that the introduction of the tolar will result in decrease in Slovenia's trade and social product, further decline in the standard of living and higher unemployment.

The governor of the National Bank of Croatia, Ivo Cicin Sain, described Slovenia's decision on monetary independence as a political and forced act which has resulted in a complete break in payment operations in the country. In the first fews months, tolar cannot expect to be recognized by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international financial intitutions.

Slovenian Vice-Premier Andrej Ocvirk does not seem concerned since, as he put it, "the Slovenian national income is already 4,000 dollars per capita which represents the limit for financial aid from international institutions".

Slovenian Finance Minister Dusan Sesok admitted that Slovenia now had only 130 million German marks in foreign currency reserves, which have been formed in the past month and a half, which is insufficient for payment opertions in conditions of a foreign currency blockade by the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

There has been talk in Slovenia over the past few days about the possibility of receiving a sizeable foreign credit "from friends" as support to the new Slovenian authorities.

Croatia

YPA Commander on Evacuation of Croats From Ilok

LD1910141291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0948 GMT 19 Oct 91

[Text] Backa Palanka/Ilok, October 18 (TANJUG)—Colonel Petar Gravhovac has said that several thousand people left Ilok and nearby villages in eastern Croatia yesterday "solely under pressure from the leadership in Zagreb".

Grahovac, the commander of the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] unit securing the bridge on the Danube linking Ilok, in Croatia, and Backa Palanka, in Serbia, told journalists that around 3,500 people, or just over half the town population, stayed on in Ilok despite pressure. Only Slovaks and some Croats remained in Ilok, as Grahovac said.

He cited statements by townspeople who said they had been ordered to leave Ilok, for the achievement of a propaganda goal. He cited another example when a

delegation from Zagreb, headed by Borislav Magovac, was to take 70 families from the village of Rados into exile, but the villagers refused to leave their hearths.

The Yugoslav Army guarantees full security to all those who remain in Ilok, Grahovac said.

He added that the civilian municipal authorities would begin to be set up next week, factories would resume work and pupils should return to schools. The curfew will remain in effect until further notice, Grahovac said. Major-General Dragoljub Arandjelovic, the commander of the YPA unit stationed near Ilok, told TANJUG that he tried to persuade people not to leave the town and even suggested that the Croatian policemen in Ilok police station stay on with their weapons.

Despite yesterday's assurances by the Ilok police station commander Mate Brletic that all mines had been cleared, members of the Yugoslav People's Army today found and stored in a safe place five four-tonne trucks with explosive devices.

Information Minister Analyzes Political Situation

AU2110160291 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Oct 91 p 2

[Interview with Information Minister Branko Salaj by Oszkar Fuzes in Zagreb; date not given: "It Will Be Hard To Heal the Wounds"]

[Text] Today and, perhaps, for a long time to come, the war will hold people's attention in Croatia.

[Fuzes] Serbia alludes to the threatened position of Serbians in Croatia. Will the Zagreb government negotiate with the local Serbian minority, and if it will, what will it offer them?

[Salaj] First, there are very few places with a real Serbian majority in Croatia. Most of the Serbians, who form 12 percent of our population, live scattered around. Therefore, we have nothing to discuss with people who want separation from Croatia. There are also Serbians loyal to us. We negotiate with them, and we ensure full citizens' rights and, in addition, minority rights for them.

[Fuzes] However, the Serbians want territorial autonomy or at least special rights because, rather than being a national minority they have been a people forming the state in the SFRY up to now?

[Salaj] We cannot give them special status because what would the Hungarians, the Italians, and the Czechs, that is, the other national minorities of Croatia, say in that case? Naturally, the Serbians can be given local autonomy in certain places, and they can enjoy cultural autonomy everywhere. We are in the process of drawing up a bill on national minorities.

[Fuzes] In view of the historical burdens and the heavy inheritance of the present, what future do Croatian-Serbian relation have?

[Salaj] This will be the biggest challenge for an independent and free Croatia. It will be hard to heal the wounds and overcome prejudices. However, we cannot avoid doing it. We will continue to be neighbors, we have to rely on each other in many areas and, obviously, our cooperation is expedient in even more areas. Why would we not be able to solve these tasks in a civilized manner within an ordered interstate framework? As a matter of fact, it is also important for Serbia to settle its relations with us sooner or later.

[Fuzes] How are Croatian-Slovene relations progressing?

[Salaj] Our relations are free of problems because we are natural allies. At the same time, the situation of these two countries is fundamentally different, and the Slovenes sometimes explain to us what to do in such a way as if we did not understand it. That is a minor issue, though.

[Fuzes] When will you set up a Croatian Embassy in Slovenia?

[Salaj] That is a technical question because we have both recognized each other. However, when will we have a Hungarian Embassy in Zagreb? Of course, we understand that this is not at all a technical question.

[Fuzes] How do you foresee Croatian-Hungarian relations?

[Salaj] I very much hope—personally, too, as my family name originates from Szalai [Hungarian surname]—that they will be the best. History has obliged our countries to be good neighbors, but not only in the past. Except for 1848, our relations are not burdened with anything.

[Fuzes] Returning to the domestic situation, will it be a long war?

[Salaj] Who knows.... In my opinion, perhaps it will not be long because we are firmly resisting in spite of the current Serbian military superiority. It is a great danger that Serbia might also extend the conflict to Bosnia-Herzegovina to cut off Croatian areas. It would be useful if the outside world also supported the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Fuzes] How long can the Croatian economy sustain the war?

[Salaj] That is a difficult problem, indeed. However, it is more likely that Serbia will run out of breath first.

Federal Army Withdrawal Plan Rejected

LD2110170991 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] The Yugoslav Army has offered a plan for its withdrawal which Croatia. However, it has not been accepted, Colonel Imre Agotic, the Croatian representative, stated this afternoon prior to the resumption of negotiations between the Yugoslav Army and the Croatian Army General Staff. The problem lies in the

sequence and the units to be withdrawn, Agotic said. He went on to specify that the Yugoslav Army has not envisaged the withdrawal of those units which occupied Croatia from other republics. Agotic noted that Croatia has insisted on the priority withdrawal of these units. On behalf of the Yugoslav Army the negotiations are being attended by General Andrija Raseta, deputy commander of the Fifth Army District.

Tomac Eyes Effects of Introducing New Currency

AU2110150391 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 21 Oct 91 p 10

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Zdavko Tomac by Michail Pasternak; place and date not given: "Slovenia's 'Bomb' as an Accelerating Factor—Croatian Dinar Will Soon be Replaced by Kruna"]

[Text] [Pasternak] Slovenia's unilateral introduction of a currency of its own without prior coordination was probably the greatest bomb that exploded recently in the disintegrating Yugoslavia. How does Professor Zdavko Tomac, deputy prime minister of the Croatian Government, assess the situation?

[Tomac] There was a lack of understanding between these two friendly republics. We naturally risk receiving an enormous amount of dinar notes that cannot be exchanged in Slovenia. Financial insecurity among businessmen and consumers is increasing. Inflation has soared. However, I believe that the Slovene currency will die of inflation in the next six to 12 months. I believe that the Slovenes are aware of that.

Croatia will introduce a new currency in a few days' time: The Croatian dinar. This will be a transitional currency designed to curb inflation. Then we will introduce a permanent currency, the Croatian kruna.

However, the introduction of a separate currency by Croatia will be accompanied by talks with the other parts of the former Yugoslav federation. We want the new states that are being built on the ruins of the federation to be open to each other, both in the economic, financial, and political spheres.

[Pasternak] Will you adopt limited protectionist measures in view of the blows that the war has dealt the manufacturers in your country?

[Tomac] This is quite possible. However, not at this point, but after the end of the war. The enterprises in our country must be given an opportunity to consolidate themselves. However, at the moment the war protects us against the large-scale import of goods and against large-scale exports involving dinars. With the decrease of the hostilities, this problem will exacerbate. In addition, the amount of dinar notes in the whole world is enormous. This entails further problems. However, I can promise that Croatia will assume all debts and obligations of the former federation. The percentage must naturally be determined through negotiations.

[Pasternak] How do you assess the economic support for Belgrade and the Serbian partisans in Croatia by Serbs living abroad?

[Tomac] I cannot mention specific figures, but there is no doubt that their support is sizable. However, it is well known that Croatian communities all over the world are much bigger and richer. We receive considerable support. The financial struggle between the Serbian and the Croatian communities abroad may lead to a war all over the world if we do not stop this war here. Nobody needs such a war. I believe that the democratic forces in Serbia will call Milosevic to account once the war is over.

[Pasternak] One of Belgrade's strongest "weapons" against you is the issuance of money.

[Tomac] It is difficult for us to defend ourselves against this measure. For this reason, we want to introduce our own currency. However, Belgrade should understand that the excessive issuance of money might backfire and hit the one who ordered this move hardest. For the time being, we have stipulated a top limit for purchases with dinar notes and activated the use of checks and other means of payment. It might be necessary to temporarily reduce the import of raw materials payable in dinar notes from the republic.

[Pasternak] Would an independent Croatia be a "young tiger," ready for the market and for increased financial risks?

[Tomac] Yes, I think so. In Germany alone the Croatian community has 20 billion German marks in bank accounts. Its members seriously consider investing in Croatia and are probably only waiting until the situation is stable.

[Pasternak] Will Croatia use the Croatian community abroad as an instrument to bring about diplomatic recognition in the world?

[Tomac] Yes, it will. As a matter of fact, it is already doing that now, to a civilized extent.

'Yugo Generals' Continue 'Open, Brutal War'

LD2110194891 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] The behavior of the Yugoslav Army in Croatia yesterday and today is typical of the behavior of an occupation army whose days are numbered. This is said in today's bulletin published by the headquarters of the Croatian army. Aware that they cannot achieve their imperialist aims, the desperate and nervous Yugo generals want to leave chaos behind. With their actions, they are not only violating the cease-fire but are also continuing with an open and brutal war. Mortar attacks and artillery fire have continued in the areas of Karlovac, Pokupsko, and Novska. Attacks have also been carried out against Desni Stefanki and other places in Croatia.

Apart from mortar fire against the center of Vinkovci, gunfire was also heard throughout the town. Tanks fired shells from Mirkovci.

The enemy forces today continued yesterday's fire near Daruvar and closed down the water supply at Bijela. In the afternoon, a mortar attack was launched against Podravska Slatina and Grubisno Polje, and an artillery attack against Cetingrad from the direction of Vojnic and against Rakovica from the direction of Plitvica.

On the sea, enemy warships continue their maneuvers and the withdrawal of battle and technical means is proceeding from the ports of Pula and Losinj. The enemy forces continue to control maritime traffic in the middle and southern Adriatic.

In the afternoon, the gasolinel pump exploded in the Marshal Tito barracks in Zagreb. The headquarters of the Croatian Army considers that, following past experience, this is part of a deliberate plan to destroy vital infrastructure in the army barracks.

'Frail' Cease-Fire; Fighting in Slavonia, Vukovar

LD2110230791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2114 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Vukovar, October 21 (TANJUG)—A frail cease-fire—the tenth so far—is being maintained on most battlefields in Croatia. Bad weather in all zones of operation appears to have contributed significantly to the abatement.

However, fierce fighting has been reported in western Slavonia, and the situation is again becoming complicated in the area of Vukovar. Sources close to the Banjaluka army corps command say that the positions of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and Serbian territorial defence units in Lipik and Pakrac came under attack from Croatian paramilitacy formations around 1 P.M. (1200 gmt) and the attack was repelled.

Military sources claim that strong reinforcements were sent to Croatian formations from Daruvar and Virovitica during the night. The area came under strong artillery fire and that fierce infantry clashes are in progress.

According to incomplete reports, fighting of different intensity has continued in the areas of Novska and Nova Gradiska, western Slavonia. The Banjaluka army corps has denied Croatian media reports claiming that the army has lost much of its equipment, and has said that only two tanks (?and one) armored personnel carrier were damaged so far in clashes on the Knin-Slavonia battlefront.

Exchanges of mortar fire have been reported in Vukovar, with both sides accusing each other of ceasefire violations. Military sources in Negoslavci say that the YPA has not yet used its artillery in responding to persistent mortar shelling of its positions by Croatian formations.

Croatian radio reported complete calm interrupted by rare mortar duels between Serbian and Croatian villages as continuing in the area of Osijek over the past three days. There is a lull also in the broader area of Dubrovnik. Military sources have reported no movements of Croatian paramilitary forces.

The YPA operative group for Herzegovina has said that the army will make arrangements for the [word indistinct] representatives now in Yugoslavia to enter Dubrovnik and satisfy themselves that the reports about destruction of the old part of the city are untrue.

The talks between the YPA representatives and an EC peace mission, scheduled for today in Cavtat, were not held since no representatives of the mission turned up.

Army Withdraws From Zadar; Road Blockade Continues

LD2110225391 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Bozidar Klaric reporting from Zadar]

[Excerpt] Since 1600 this afternoon when the facilities of the Djuro Djakovic barracks were handed over to the Croatian authorities, Zadar has been without units of the occupying army. There has been no official report about where the convoys of military vehicles observed today and on previous days have gone. Unofficially, both the equipment and the personnel from all the barracks in Zadar will be deployed outside the Republic of Croatia, probably in Sarajevo. That those who destroyed their buildings, factories, churches, schools and monuments have left the town is the most significant development for the population of Zadar.

Under an agreement signed on 9 October the occupying army should also leave the Zadar area. This would imply lifting the traffic blockade of Zadar and the creation of conditions for the return of refugees from nearby villages. [passage omitted]

Failure To Reach Prisoner Agreement in Dalmatia

LD2210041191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2154 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Knin, October 21 (TANJUG)—Representatives of the warring sides in Dalmatia and Lika, regions in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, today agreed immediately to exchange their dead and wounded, but not their prisoners. TANJUG correspondent learned that the exchange of prisoners did not take place because the principle "all for all" had been interpretted differently.

The Croatian side had asked that the prisoners be exchanged at the level of police stations, which would mean that 27 people from the territories of Lika and Kordun, regions of the so-called Serbian autonomous region of Krajina, would remain in prison. The Croatian side did not agree either to the proposal of the Knin

corps command representative that 50 prisoners be exchanged immediately as a sign of good will.

Under the reached agreement, only those wounded who are being treated in hospitals in the Dalmatian cities of Sibenik, Zadar and Split will be exchanged for wounded prisoners hospitalized in Knin, the center of the Serbian autonomous region of Krajina in central Croatia, which the authorities of this republic do not recognize.

The negotiations which were held in the Dalmatian town of Drnis were attended also by European Community (E.C.) observers.

Zagreb Accused of Misusing Civil Airline Code

LD2110212391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1906 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Belgrade, Oct 21 (TANJUG)—The management of the biggest Yugoslav airlines (JAT) today said that the airlines worldwide telecommunications and information services—the sita code—was misused from Zagreb at 11:27 a.m. local time (10:27 G.M.T.) on Saturday October 19.

An unknown offender used the code, essential for the maintenance of regular and safe international flights and exchanges of information among 150 world airlines, in order to shamelessly attack the Yugoslav People's Army and the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, it was heard at JAT in Belgrade.

The JAT staff in Zagreb in the Republic of Croatia signed the [word indistinct] to all the employees of the Yugoslav airlines the world over with an "invitation to a movement for peace", which was teeming with gross insults and lies, the JAT management in Belgrade said. This kind of "invitation to a movement for peace" is in fact nothing but a call to a fratricidal war, the JAT staff in Belgrade said.

The several hundred employees of JAT in Belgrade have requested JAT's interim general manager to take "energetic steps for an immediate dismissal of all the employees of JAT from the Republic of Croatia, both in the country and abroad."

Serbia

Serbian 'Expert' Reacts To EC Document

LD2110121291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1040 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Belgrade, Oct 21 (TANJUG)—Professor Dr Smilja Avramov, in a statement carried by the Belgrade daily POLITIKA, has assessed the document on the organization of Yugoslavia, proposed at the peace conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague on Friday, as a 'trap set for the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and the Serbian people as a whole.'

Dr Avramov, who represented Serbia in The Hague as expert, recalled that 'Serbia was recognized as an independent state at the Berlin Congress in 1878', noting that the continuity of Serbia as a state 'cannot be questioned.'

Leader of Serbian Renewal Movement Vuk Draskovic assessed that 'an unwise, stubborn and imprudent policy of Serbia's leaders suffered a defeat in The Hague.'

In a statement today carried by the Belgrade daily BORBA, leader of the most influential opposition party of Serbia explains that 'Serbia's leaders have been subordinating national interests to the demands of an ideology which is dead in the world and have raised their personal vanity and unrealistic ambitions at the level of state policy and all-Serbian reasons.'

Member of the leadership of the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) Radomir Tanic says 'the proposed document is good but only as a starting foundation for coordinating opposed interests.'

Tanic, in a statement carried by BORBA today, reproaches the Hague document for 'envisaging international sovereignty for Yugoslav republics while at the same time failing to offer a projection of the future association of these sovereign republics.'

Jovanovic Discusres Expectations From Hague

AU2110122791 Novi Sad TVNS Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 20 Oct 91

[Interview with Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, by Andjelka Bjelajac-Stojkovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Bjelajac-Stojkovic] Mr. Jovanovic, the public has been informed about the reasons why the Serbian President, Mr. Milosevic, did not agree with the offered arrangement concerning the global solution of the Yugoslav crisis. He is, above all, dissatisfied with the status of the Serb people within the administrative borders of Croatia. There is also a surprising move by the conference in The Hague which erased the Yugoslav state from the territory of Europe with the stroke of a pen. Knowing the stands of the governments of these two Serbian Autonomous Regions, of Krajina and Slavonia, namely that they do not want under any circumstances any kind of autonomy within Croatia, could you tell us something about the direction of our political and diplomatic activities concerning the stands of these two governments at the next conference, plenary session, in The Hague?

[Jovanovic] Much of it will depend on how the EC, the authors of that proposed document, will modify this document in view of the objections, reservations, and criticism raised by our president. We expect that this will done in a way that would make the new modified text much more balanced, more adapted to the interests and demands of all, and, finally, more acceptable as a possible basis for further work.

As far as we are concerned, we as a republic have consistently held the view from the beginning that the Yugoslav crisis cannot be resolved to the detriment of peoples' principles and rights, and that the administrative borders cannot simply be proclaimed state and international borders.

Therefore, we will continue to defend both legality and Yugoslavia as an international subject. Yugoslavia is still an international subject, regardless of all the wishes and activities that have been used and are being used to put an end to Yugoslavia as soon as possible. Let us recall that according to the conclusion of the Hague conference itself, a conference of about 10 days ago, international recognition of the socialist republics will depend on the successful results of this conference. Therefore, this implies that Yugoslavia, as an international subject, exists and will exist until the successful conclusion of the conference. After that we will see what will happen.

With this document, the Hague conference and its board distanced themselves from their own stand. They tried already at this stage to prejudice the final outcome of the conference, not waiting for the expiration of the deadline set last week, one month plus another month, to accomplish this positive result jointly.

It is obvious that the Serbian people in Croatia do not have any confidence in the Croatian authorities, not only because they suffered terribly in the first Croatian independent state 50 years ago, but also because the new Croatian authorities declared themselves to be the successor of the previous authorities, and because with their activities they have been carrying out not only a policy of discrimination and deprivation of human rights, but also, unfortunately, aggression with many forms of genocide. This fact is, of course, very present in the thinking of the board at the Hague conference and we believe that in the future work of the conference this thinking will find an appropriate place in addenda, substantive addenda to the offer of so-called special status.

Jovic Clarifies Serbian Stand at Hague

AU2110140791 Novi Sad TVNS Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 20 Oct 91

[Interview with Presidency member Borisav Jovic by Milorad Vucelic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Vukelic] The disagreement of Serbia and the Serbian leadership with the Helsinki documents, undoubtedly represents a new, yet another, point of precise historic identification and the national policy and national strategy of the Serbian people. [sentence as heard] Mr. Jovic, I would like you to tell us what represented the pillar, motives, and inspiration of the Serbian strategy and Serbia's answer to the Helsinki documents [as heard] in this particular case?

[Jovic] First of all, I would like to say that the main pillar of our policy is the interest of the Serbian people. Their interest is to live in a joint state for which they fought at least in two world wars and for which they suffered enormous casualties.

The document proposed for the future of Yugoslavia and the future of its peoples does not respect this interest of the Serbian people, but offers a concept of solutions according to which the Serbian people would be divided among several states. This is the fundamental reason of a political nature.

The other question is the approach to solving this problem. The problem arose because of the secession of some republics and some peoples who wanted to leave Yugoslavia. Our view is that the natural way of resolving the problem would be either to eliminate secession, that is to say to suppress it, or to find a legitimate, legal way of achieving this secession, provided that the existence of the country and its survival in the parts of the country where secession did not take place or where there is no wish for secession were brought into question

However, unfortunately, what was pursued is a procedure of liquidating the existing country with a proposal to create six new states on this territory. This ignores all norms of international law and international documents on which the world is founded. Because of that, we could not accept that approach, for very logical reasons. This approach also contradicts both international law and our interests.

The third reason, but not the least important reason, is the fact that we do not have the authority to do that, to break up the state, to sign something like this.

[Vucelic] Your categorical answer, your disagreement with the document, does not represent, we hope, the end, that is to say, a lack of interest on Serbia's part for the conference in The Hague, and the international process of resolving the Serbian question and the Yugoslav state crisis.

[Jovic] No, of course, not. We think that the conference must proceed and seek a just and reasonable solution, something that has essentially been accepted. Of course, the circumstances are fairly delicate, considering that the representatives of five republics basically accepted the proposed concept. This does not mean anything. What is required is the consent of all, including our consent. Our proposal to continue talks on disputable issues has been accepted. One can therefore expect these disputes to be resolved in the period ahead.

[Vucelic] Thank you.

Serbian Party Assails Hague Agreement

LD2110211291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1858 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Novi Sad, 21 Oct (TANJUG)—The Democratic Party expects from the European Community that, for the sake of peace and establishment of just relations in

Yugoslavia, it will re-examine its proposed agreement which is unacceptable to Serbia and the Serbian people in its present form.

This is emphasized in today's statement by the main committee of the Democratic Party, which says that the policy of the president of the Republic of Serbia and the ruling party is in decisive measure responsible for the situation in which Serbia finds itself. The statement says that the extreme consequence of the Hague agreement is not only the final collapse of Yugoslavia but also the threat of disintegration of Serbia.

The Democratic Party considers that the creation of independent states from the present federal units on the soil of Yugoslavia inevitably raises the question of a change of the internal borders in keeping with the principle of the people's right to self-determination.

Vojvodina Prime Minister Rejects Hungarian Charges

LD2210042191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2150 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Novi Sad, October 21 (TANJUG)—Premier of Serbia's autonomous province of Vojvodina Radoman Bozovic today sharply reacted to a statement by Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, who alleged that the "Serbian nationalist leadership treats some 500,000 (ethnic) Hungarians in Vojvodina almost as hostages."

Bozovic called Antall's statement an open attack on the Serbian leadership and misinformation intended to stir up dissatisfaction among the Hungarian national minority in Vojvodina. History and the democratic public opinion in Europe will not forget that the Hungarian Government and Antall were among the first to illegaly assist in creating and arming the Croatian paramilitary formations, he said.

Prime Minister Antall and the Hungarian Government set themselves against their "closest neighbours, the U.N. Charter and the CSCE documents" by giving open political and other support to violent secessionist acts of some Yugoslav republics, said Bozovic. "In doing this, they assume considerable responsibility for the overall casualties of the Yugoslav political crisis, including those among the (ethnic) Hungarians who live like equal citizens in Yugoslavia and its Republic of Serbia," he emphasized.

Kosutic Deems Sandzak Referendum Unconstitutional

AU2110201191 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 18 Oct 91

[Report by Milan Glisovic]

[Text] Dr. Budimir Kosutic, vice president of the Government of Serbia, visited Novi Pazar today. During his visit he spoke to Novi Pazar people at a discussion forum on the announced referendum on the autonomy of the Sandzak. On this occasion he said that peace and equality cannot be provided by adopting and implementing unilateral decisions which are contrary to the Constitution of Serbia.

[Begin Kosutic recording] Peace, prosperity, equality, and harmony can only be created if any unilateral actions, particularly actions which are contrary to the Constitution, by any side are avoided. [end recording]

With these words, Professor Budimir Kosutic, vice president of the Government of Serbia, ended his introductory speech to representatives of the political parties and business community in Novi Pazar and then fierce polemics developed in which some of the professor's students showed that they have easily passed the test on international law, particularly when it comes to the right of a people to disassociation and secession.

Obviously, the repeated lecture did not help them this time, either. This is what is worrying and what could lead to serious conflicts over the scheduling of the referendum for the full political autonomy of the Sandzak, whose consequences are difficult to foresee.

In reply to the claim by Dr. Rasim Ljajic, secretary of the Party of Democratic Action, that no one can deprive the National Council of Muslims of the right to a referendum, particularly as Muslims do not want to live in any kind of greater Serbia, Professor Budimir Kosutic said among other things:

[Begin Kosutic recording] Regarding citizens, I am sincerely convinced that they will think and decide in favor of those solutions that open the way to peace, prosperity, and cohabitation. I reiterate: A referendum held in the way proposed by Ljajic is contrary to the Constitution. [end recording]

The initiator of this meeting, Assembly Deputy Mahmut Memic again pointed out the great danger that the act of voting would lead to bloodshed and civil war whose consequences cannot be foreseen by anyone, and he also pointed out the Republic of Serbia's delay in more quickly solving some burning issues, which is something that is being made use of by some people.

At one point, embittered by the lack of understanding among one group of people in the hall, he said:

[Begin Memic recording] Attack this democracy! You can freely criticize me. I am allowed to say what I think in the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, here, in the market place, and anywhere else. I could even be physically liquidated, but I will say what I think, and that is that we do not have a spare homeland other than here where we were born. [applause] Let those who think differently say so. Thank you. [end recording]

Government Rejects Referendum

LD2110164791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1316 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Belgrade, 21 Oct (TANJUG)—In connection with the Democratic Action Party [Stranka Demokratske Akcije-DSA] statement in Novi Pazar that it will organize a Sandzak autonomy referendum, the government of the Republic of Serbia today issued a statement which says:

"In connection with the announcement of an impending referendum about a political and territorial autonomy for Sandzak, which has given rise to exceptional dismay and disquiet among the public at large in the Republic of Serbia, the government of the Republic of Serbia, having noted that this illegal and irresponsible act by the SDA leadership in Novi Pazar is an attempt to bring down the constitutional system in the Republic of Serbia and is a threat to its territorial integrity, states:

1. The intimated referendum is in direct contradiction with Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia by virtue of which the territory of the Republic of Serbia is one and inalienable. This act also runs counter to Article 81 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and represents a form of abuse of the democratic rights and freedoms of the citizens established by the Constitution. Besides, it violates directly the proven interests of the life together of the Serbs and Muslims in this area.

2. The Government of the Republic of Serbia calls on the Muslim people in Serbia not to be taken in by manipulations with religious and national sentiments aimed at wrecking the unity and integrity of the Republic of Serbia and to denounce this attempt to upset the relations between the nations living here.

3. The Government of the Republic of Serbia and appropriate organs will take the envisaged measures against the people breaking the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Serbia so as to protect the constitutional system and equal democratic rights and freedoms of all citizens of the Republic of Serbia," says the government statement signed by its president, Dr Dragutin Zelenovic.

Kosovo Assembly Elects 'Prime Minister'

LD2110152291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1407 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Pristina, 21 Oct (TANJUG)—The newspaper SKENDIJA, published in Albanian in Pristina, today printed a report on its front page that Dr. Bujar Bukosi has been elected "Prime Minister of Kosovo".

The election was carried out by the so-called "Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo". SKENDIJA cites the announcement made two days ago by Zagreb Radio in its Albanian broadcast. It is added that Bukosi has been elected as prime minister of "a coalition government which will be composed during the interim period until free elections can be held by the representatives of the Albanian political parties, nonparty people as well as members of the present government."

The report has also been confirmed by the headquarters of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, of which Dr. Bujar Bukosi has been secretary hitherto.

Recently Bukosi has been very active in the political field and has usually travelled around the world with Ibrahim Rugova. By profession, he is a surgical neurologist and has become particularly known to the Kosovo public by his testimony in last year's alleged poisoning of Albanian pupils.

Rugova on Kosovo Situation, Hague Conference

AU2110202191 Pristina BUJKU in Albanian 12 Oct 91 p 3

[Behxhet Haliti report: "We Will Make Guarantees for Everybody in the Future State of Kosovo"]

[Text] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, chairman of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance [LDK], began yesterday's regular LDK news conference with the following words:

We can say, because it is a fact, that, since the referendum, the Serbian police have further increased their repression in Kosovo. Thirty-five people have been convicted by summary trials, including three chairmen of LDK branches in Vushtrri, Dragash, and Peje [Vucitrn, Dragas, Pec]. A general repression is being carried out against our activists, a large number of teachers have been convicted for peaceful protests over schools, and now a new campaign has begun against Albanian journalists and those Albanians newspapers and magazines that still remain. As you know, the chief editor of the newspaper BUJKU has been sentenced, and Jonuz Fetahaj, a magazine director, and editor Gani Bajrami were sentenced two days ago. We demand their urgent release. Everything that I have mentioned makes us realize that the Serbian regime's state terror against the Albanians has increased.

Withdrawing the Yugoslav Army From Kosovo, Too

Serbia's law on language use, which categorically demands the use of the Cyrillic alphabet and the use of the Serbian language even for communication among people at their work places, has also recently become a pretext for dismissing Albanians from their jobs, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova continued. This measure will probably have the most serious effect at the Kosovo Power Stations at Obiliq, where more than 10,000 Albanian workers have been threatened with dismissal solely over the issue of using the Serbian language or Cyrillic script.

I also wish to stress the importance of the referendum for Kosovo; we can freely say that this was the first time in the history of the Albanian people in Kosovo that they have been able to freely speak out about their own

future. We will continue to insist on the realization of the freely expressed wishes of the Albanians, and we will do our utmost to attain this.

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said that, in the future state of Kosovo, we will guarantee the rights of all the peoples, including the Serbian people and all other national communities, according to international principles.

Meanwhile, commenting on the most recent developments in European diplomacy toward bringing the war in Yugoslavia to an end, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova welcomed the suspension of the war in Croatia and the decision to withdraw the Yugoslav Army from this state. Rugova went on to say that we demand the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police from Kosovo, too, before it is too late, because this would be the first sign that the problem of Kosovo will be solved by peaceful means.

Unfortunately, he said, we must talk about problems of Albanian-language education again today. More than 400 Albanian teachers have been dismissed from the University of Kosovo, and this means the de facto end of Albanian-language teaching at the university. There are even signs that it will be officially announced that our university will operate solely in Serbian. In spite of this, we will continue to strive to find a solution for Albanian-language education from primary to tertiary level. However, there is unfortunately still nothing new in this connection. We once again think it reasonable, Rugova said, to repeat our view that if there is no education for Albanians there can be no education for others in Kosovo. We are forced to reemphasize this, Rugova said, because the terror and repression in Kosovo have exceeded all bounds and apartheid, segregation, and discrimination against the Albanians have become institutionalized.

Concluding his remarks, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, after condemning the unprecedented violence used against participants in the protests of pupils and teachers, said that the LDK is continuing to do its utmost to solve the problem of Kosovo and the Albanians by peaceful means and through dialogue. I believe, he said, that we will achieve a political solution for Kosovo too now that Yugoslavia is being closely watched by the European Community.

Europe Has Not Forgotten the Albanians

Radio Croatia's journalist started the series of journalists' questions at this news conference. He asked two questions: How do you comment on the invitation from The Hague for the Albanians, too, to take part in the peace conference on Yugoslavia, and how do you assess the definitive independence of Croatia and Slovenia?

We welcome the invitation from The Hague, and we will take part in this peace conference, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said, because the EEC and the European Parliament have not put to one side the problem of Kosovo and the Albanians. This is also a sign that nobody can any longer do what they please in Yugoslavia. Total European supervision will bring results. As for the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, he said, I have already said that we support the independence not only of Croatia and Slovenia, but of all other republics and people who wish to find a way of life most suitable for themselves.

FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT's correspondent asked what the LDK chairman had to say about the agreement in The Hague for the Army's withdrawal from Croatia. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said that this is the first sign that Croatia is becoming independent and that the Yugoslav Army is collapsing. I think, Rugova said, that the Army will also withdraw from other regions.

Radio Sarajevo's journalist asked how long the discipline of the Albanians in Kosovo will last. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said: I consider what you call the Albanians' discipline to be the high level of awareness of a people who wish to solve their own problems in a political way and by peaceful means. If the Albanians accidentally vent their fury and disgust, Rugova said, we do not want this to end in a massacre or the mass sacrifice of the Albanians, because the Serbian regime is waiting for this.

OSLOBODJENJE's correspondent asked what Dr. Rugova thought of the meeting of the Serbian Assembly's Defense Council with the Council on Kosovo that was held in Pristina, and where it was said that the situation in Kosovo has deteriorated thanks to the LDK's activities.

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova called this hypocrisy, while Dr. Fehmi Agani said that to accuse the LDK and the political parties of exacerbating the situation in Kosovo is a barefaced attempt to hide the truth.

Who sent you the invitation to take part in the conference in The Hague, and when will you go there, asked a journalist from Pristina Television's Serbian-language program. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said that the invitation had been sent by the peace conference at The Hague, and that we will meet there with the two deputy chairmen of the peace conference on Yugoslavia. We will go there next week and present our standpoints.

OSLOBODJENJE's correspondent asked again whether there was any similarity between the problem of the Serbs in Croatia and the Albanians in Kosovo. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said that there is not the slightest resemblance. We, he said, have an international border here with Albania, we are 3 million people, and on the basis of Yugoslavia's ethnic map we are not a minority. The problem of the Serbs in Croatia has been created with the aim of concealing the problem of the Albanians and Kosovo, Rugova said.

TANJUG Exposure of 'Agents' in Kosovo Viewed

AU2110104591 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 12 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Shkelqim Beqari: "A Network of Agents Discovered in Kosovo!—The World Waits To Hear Actual Names"]

[Text] Serbian State Security has discovered a network of agents in Kosovo and calls this the most sensational exposure of the year, not only in the Balkans but also in Europe and the world. This report has now no doubt taken root because it was published in a special edition of the trustworthy news agency TANJUG and has been officially confirmed in the Serbian Assembly by a group of Serbian deputies, who, for security reasons, did not supply actual names. Perhaps the Serbian deputies, as investigators in this service, do not wish to compromise the Assembly in public or to show that they are involved in such unlegislative activities. Nevertheless, they have scored a success and want to tell the whole world!

The Serbian discovery states that the existence of a large number of political parties that have turned into dangerous centers of subversion is an immediate danger to security and peace in Kosovo. The Republican Party based in Peje [Pec] is considered to be the most dangerous. It carries out its underground work by infiltrating the ranks of schoolchildren and students, who demand syllabi only in Albanian and reject Serbia's teaching curricula. There are likewise many facts about the Kosovo Democratic Party's subversive activity in defense of the Albanians. The experts of the Serbian Security Service regretfully observe that the presidiums of the Kosovo parties, especially the Presidium of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance, "consist of outstanding nationalists and proven enemies." They are former political prisoners, and their activities are therefore suspect. Dedication to the national cause and special national virtues figure in their files. Thus, pluralism of ideas and freedom of speech and thought fall foul of the democratic laws of Serbia, with its monism of leadership, thought, and judgment and its dictatorial rule. Therefore, the Serbian Assembly, or, more precisely, the Assembly in collaboration with the Secret Service, plans soon, after the files are filled with data about illegal political activities, to arrest the leaders of Albanian parties in Kosovo (it is not the first time that it will do this), to ban the parties, and to impose monist Serbian rule in Kosovo. However, legal grounds such as Kosovar excesses of an extreme kind, mass demonstrations, and armed actions are first necessary. The Serbian Secret Service is considering how to find such facts at a time when the Albanian political movement refuses to use violence and is applying the European principles of democracy.

Europe is one thing and Serbia is another! After all, Serbia is a law unto itself and does not ask what Europe and the world are doing. Europe and the world even annoy Serbia with their underground activities. Do not be surprised that other powerful agencies, besides the Albanian underground, have also been active. It is not I but TANJUG and the Serbian Security Service who state that "foreign agents are present in Kosovo," encouraging the movement for the Albanians' self-determination and equal rights with other peoples. Agents also organized the referendum. The Serbian Secret Service has come across the agents of other states such as Germany, the United States, and Britain. I forgot the Netherlands. This happened when the U.S. senators—I mention no names because the Serbian Assembly will announce them soon—met the Albanian parties in Pristina, and when German, British, or Dutch representatives of the EEC went to Kosovo and condemned the Serbian genocide. Let us wait for others to appear—EEC representatives, agents, and those who, according to Serbian logic, are enemies of the Serbian cause. Hans van den Broeck, the current chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers, will have to head the list, with U.S. Senators Dole and Pell, Genscher, and so forth. The world is impatiently waiting to learn the names of those in the anti-Serbian conspiracy. I forgot to mention that they are also in the U.S. Congress. No doubt TANJUG will report them soon!

Teaching in Albanian 'Postponed' in Kosovo

LD2210034891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1337 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Excerpt] Pristina, 21 Oct (TANJUG)—Teaching in Albanian in Kosovo and Metohija has again been postponed "for an indefinite period." This decision, it was explained, was made based on the opinion expressed by the so-called coordination committee for the educational questions of Kosovo for the sake of "the preservation of the health, life, and human dignity of pupils, students, and teachers, as well the prevention of conflicts with possibly unforeseeable consequences."

The statement by the coordination committee also says that this stand had been adopted because "the Serbian occupation authorities prevented the continuation of the 1991/92 school year at all levels of education."

The committee suggests to all educational, cultural, and political bodies "to continue their endeavors to find a solution that would make possible a dignified return to teaching in the Albanian language," to strive for "the development of possible forms of education in given circumstances," and to seek solutions through international organizations and institutions, including international arbitration. [passage omitted]

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Bosnian Serb Democratic Party Supports Milosevic

LD2010151791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1321 GMT 20 Oct 91

[Text] Sarajevo, 20 Oct, (TANJUG)—Bosnia-Hercegovina's Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] maintains that The Hague conference on Yugoslavia demonstrates that Europe is biased and that it wants to endorse and authorize acts of unilateral secession.

A decision on the termination of a state, this party maintains, can be no means be made by an international forum, but by those nations that created it. Hence, the party's statement says, the SDS gives full support to Slobodan Milosevic's decision not to accept the solutions put forward and to rightly demand their change and alteration.

In the SDS's view the solutions offered at The Hague ignore justice, legality, and the same protection of interests for all of Yugoslavia's peoples as they are proposed to the detriment of the Serbian people.

The arbitration commission has been bypassed, resulting in the exclusion of an eminent body, thus suspending solutions based on legality and law.

There is no solution to the Yugoslav crisis, the SDS maintains, without protecting the national survival and interests of Serbs in Croatia. The SDS, the statement says, does not oppose in the least Croatia's departure from Yugoslavia, but only with its territories, it should by no means press the Serbian people, who have already been victims of the greatest genocide in its history, into joining it.

The European gentlemen, the SDS statement says, must accept the reality of the existence of the Serbian Autonomous Region [SAO] of Krajina, Baranja, Slavonija, and Western Srem and their wish to remain a part of Yugoslavia.

Alija Discusses Conflict, Republic's Position

PM2110152291 Paris LE FIGARO in French 18 Oct 91 p 4

[Interview with Bosnia-Hercegovina President Alija Izetbegovic by Jean-Jacques Mevel in Sarajevo—date not given]

[Text] Sarajevo—[Mevel] Can Bosnia-Hercegovina stay out of the conflict between Serbs and Croats?

[Izetbegovic] I am not entirely sure. But I do not think that Bosnia-Hercegovina will reach the point of splitting. Public opinion in Croatia and Serbia is being misled, particularly by the media which has lost all judgment. Politicians and the television on both sides have brought public opinion to boiling point; it is they who have made possible this insane violence. The citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina can still examine both sides of the argument.

[Mevel] Do you believe Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic when he states that Serbia has no claim on the other republics—Bosnia-Hercegovina, for instance?

[Izetbegovic] So far I have not heard Mr. Milosevic make any territorial claim. What he has said, however, is that if Yugoslavia is to be broken up, the question of borders between the republics will have to be reexamined. I say now that no part of Bosnia-Hercegovina has ever belonged to Serbia. There are Serbs here but they form one of Bosnia-Hercegovina's component nationalities, alongside the Croatians and Muslims. We believe in the loyalty of Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Mevel] This is not preventing some Serbs from breaking with Sarajevo and proclaiming "autonomous republics" within your republic! How can you restore the constitutional order?

[Izetbegovic] That is true. Legally, these "autonomous regions" do not exist; parliament has declared them illegal. In practice, parliament is prepared to examine any request formally submitted to it with a view to the "regionalization" of Bosnia-Hercegovina or the creation of territories with special status. But this must be done by a legal and democratic procedure.

[Mevel] If not, do you plan to use force to restore the constitutional order?

[Izetbegovic] Not for the moment. We must exhaust political means, perhaps in the framework of a general settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. There are similar disputes in Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo. The same rules should be applied everywhere.

A Realistic Option

[Mevel] Since the start of the crisis, Bosnia-Hercegovina has said that it will not remain in a Yugoslavia reduced to Serbia and its allies. Slovenia and Croatia have slammed the door. Is your republic moving toward independence?

[Izetbegovic] It is not certain that Slovenia and Croatia will leave the Yugoslav entity together. The international community is still counting on the maintenance of a "flexible" Yugoslav confederation. This is one of the subjects currently on the agenda of the conference in The Hague. This is still a realistic option for us. If it is impossible, the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina will have to decide the future of their republic themselves by a vote.

[Mevel] It is a fairly safe bet that the Muslims will want a Bosnia-Hercegovina which is independent of Belgrade....

[Izetbegovic] All the citizens of Bosnia want their destiny to be decided in Sarajevo rather than in Belgrade. But this does not mean that we want an independent state. Yugoslavia's Muslims are scattered. There are Muslims in Macedonia, Kosovo, Croatia, and Serbia. That is why we Muslims stand to gain from safeguarding the Yugoslav community.

Hercegovina Serbs Elect Leader, Set Up TV, Radio

LD2110142291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1326 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Text] Trebinje, 21 October (TANJUG)—The assembly of the Serbian autonomous region of Hercegovina today

confirmed that its only interest is Yugoslavia, a country of equal nations that wish to stay in Yugoslavia. Those who do not wish to stay in Yugoslavia can go, but without Hercegovina.

The assembly today elected Milorad Bojovic, a solicitor from Bileca, premier designate of the government of the Serbian autonomous region of Hercegovina. By 10 November, when a plebiscite of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina is scheduled to take place, other members of the government will have been elected in order to establish a legal and constitutional system of the Serbian autonomous region of Hercegovina. Today, deputies unanimously adopted a decision on the setting up radio and television for the Serbian autonomous region of Hercegovina.

Montenegro

Bulavotic's EC Move Divides Republic

LD2110171191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1252 GMT 21 Oct 91

[By Sanja Pejovic]

[Text] Titograd, October 21 (TANJUG)—The acceptance of the E.C. arrangements for a general settlement of the Yugoslav crisis by Montenegro President Momir Bulatovic has divided the political circles and general public in Yugoslavia's smallest republic.

Bulatovic's acceptance of the E.C. document in The Hague last Friday has taken by surprise both the Yugoslav and world public, which have been used to seeing Montenegro always siding with its traditional ally—Serbia.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic did not accept the Hague document which calls for Yugoslavia as a free association of sovereign and independent republics. Milosevic said that to accept the Hague document would mean to accept "the abolishing of Yugoslavia."

The Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI today writes that Bulatovic's move in The Hague has divided Montenegro into two camps.

While one side maintains that Montenegro has "for the first time signed a capitulation, betrayed the Serbian nation, and committed the most shameful ever act in its centuries-long state history," the other feels that Montenegro has "at last realized that it can use its own head and... has at last ceased to be Serbia's satellite, and realized that its own nation should come first, and the others second."

Bulatovic, himself, explained on returning from The Hague that he had "in principle agreed" to the Hague document, believing that it opened the way for "a further discussion" about Yugoslavia's future.

Bulatovic said that "the other variant" was "war", and set out that Montenegro had not changed its stand on being "together with Serbia in a common federal state."

The majority of the Montenegrin parties have sharply criticized Bulatovic. The democrats have called for his resignation, saying that he has "agreed to a degrading dictate which abolishes Yugoslavia against the will of its citizens and does so in an entirely illegal manner."

The National Party of Montenegro has requested that the republican parliament hold a special session to revoke Bulatovic's decision in The Hague.

The Montenegrin parliament had given Bulatovic carte blanche for his actions in The Hague, that is, a mandate himself to decide whether to accept the E.C. document or not. Bulatovic was given a free hand because differing views of the Hague document had been presented in the parliamentary debate.

Bulatovic, himself, had hinted in parliament that he would accept the Hague document. He told the deputies that Montenegro's stand must not be "somewhere in between" but that the document must either be accepted or rejected, and specified that the latter "could quite surely lead to international isolation."

Hague Delegate From Montenegro Resigns

LD2110193491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1650 GMT 21 Oct 91

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 21 Oct (TANJUG)—In view of the fact that Montenegro has accepted the EC proposal I am no longer in the position to represent Montenegro as its expert delegate in the working group of The Hague conference on Yugoslavia, Dr. Gavro Perazic says in his letter of resignation to the Montenegro Presidency.

"In its initial paragraphs the proposal of Lord Carrington proceeds from the supposition that Yugoslavia no longer exists," Dr. Perazic stresses in the part of his resignation listing the reasons for it. "As a lawyer I am convinced that the proposal submitted in The Hague is a blatant and profound violation of article 2.4 of the UN Charter which unambiguously safeguards the territorial integrity and political independence of states," Dr. Perazic stresses. [passage omitted]